Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Spring 5-10-2019

"Prejudice": The Impact on Dialogic
Communication Ethics
Cyril Latzoo

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
Recommended Citation
Latzoo, C. (2019). "Prejudice": The Impact on Dialogic Communication Ethics (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University).
Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1785

This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

“PREJUDICE”: THE RHETORICAL IMPACT ON DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION ETHICS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Cyril E. Latzoo

May 2019

Copyright by
Cyril E. Latzoo

2019

“PREJUDICE”: THE RHETORICAL IMPACT ON DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION ETHICS

By
Cyril E. Latzoo
Approved March 14, 2014

_________________________________
Ronald Arnett, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication and Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Chair)

_________________________________
Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication and Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Calvin Troup, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Communication and Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Member)

iii

ABSTRACT

“PREJUDICE”: THE RHETORICAL IMPACT ON DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION ETHICS

By
Cyril E. Latzoo
May 2019

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Ronald Arnett
This work seeks to elaborate upon the contributions of dialogic communication ethics to
a rhetorical understanding of prejudice. The aim is to address the problematic nature of ethical
rhetoric apropos of dialogic communication, arguing that there are contending views in the
community of memory, and that prejudice is an integral aspect of dialogic communication ethics.
Drawing upon Arnett’s concept of dialogic ethics, I argue that there is need for a “dialogic turn”
towards the notion of prejudice in the postmodern era. I begin by looking at Chesebro (1969),
Arnett (1987), Johannesen (2001), and Arnett, Arneson and Bell (2006) to advance the concept
of rhetorical prejudice which I define in terms of the hermeneutical principle of Gadamer, a path
to what Arnett describes as “fundamental prejudice” that renders efficacious “the interpretive act
of dialogue.” To demonstrate the significance of this concept, I provide a historical analysis of
the concept of prejudice from the classical period, early Christianity, the Middle Ages, the
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Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Modernity to Postmodernity. Through the history of the
notion of prejudice, the rhetoric of prejudice is explored from the perspective of dialogic ethics.
Although my concern is the rhetorical implication of the concept of prejudice, my emphasis upon
ethics is intended to reveal dialogue as an existential-phenomenological aspect of
communication ethics necessary to the rhetorical nature of prejudice in post modernity.
The hope is that this study will help frame a dialogic communication ethics within a
history of the problematic term, prejudice, with the objective of displaying the pragmatic reality
that dialogic communication ethic begins not in objectivity nor in the commonality itself, but
rather in the very ground of prejudice that shapes the conversation and its conventional patterns.
This essay unmasks the past assumption that prejudice can and should be always eradicated.
Such thinking falls prey to the modernist set of assumptions hostile to the existential reality, to
use Buber’s expression, “that we walk in the modern-day light.”
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CHAPTER ONE—Introduction
There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays,
And—every—single—one—of—them—is—right!
(Kipling, 1999, p. 452)
There are no doubts that there are unsettling boundaries that frame our existential
Weltanschauung and account for its significance. These boundaries are accompanied by a “unity
of contraries” (Buber, 1965b) that foreground the taken for granted communicative
“everydayness” (Heidegger, 1962) of situated difference. Underpinning this proposition is the
inevitability of fundamental prejudice in human interaction. Postmodern theorizing about
multiple ethics points to this inevitability in its originary sense of the dialectical meeting of
difference (see Baxter & Montgomery, 1996). Prejudice nurtures communication praxis in this
postmodernity, an era of diverse forms of discourse and heterogeneity of cultures, traditions, and
narrative structures (see Schrag, 1998). Prejudice is an acknowledgment of “assumptions that
guide … or taint the ground from which we render a judgment” (Arnett, Bell, & Fritz, 2010, p.
114). This work is a public welcome of prejudice as the ground on which one stands in every
human interaction. Prejudice is described variously in rhetoric and philosophy of communication
as “radical alterity” (Levinas, 1969), “individuality” (Tocqueville, 1969), “recalcitrance” (Burke,
1984), “ethics of self-expression or self-realization” (Gare, 2006), to mention a few. These
various metaphors corroborate the necessity of prejudice in postmodernity, and so the contention
of this dissertation a la Dewey (1988) that prejudice is not something “bad” to be eradicated (p.
243).
This work is an attempt to reinstate rhetorical prejudice as a constitutive element of
dialogic communication ethics, believing that prejudice not only privileges the necessity of co1

creating meaning in a world replete with contentions, but also welcomes the potential to address
the postmodern challenge of “fractured spirit” (Arendt, 1998), “situatedness” (Benhabib, 1992),
and a particularity that rejects “originative agency” (Arnett, 2008a), and bears witness to the
failed promise of monolithic dogmatism and the establishment of unambiguous authority by “a
new oligarchy of wealth” (Arnett, Fritz, & Holba, 2007b, p. 116). This work is structured on the
assumption that prejudice displays the pragmatic reality that dialogic communication ethic
begins neither in objectivity nor in the commonality itself, but rather in the very ground of
prejudice that shapes the conversation and its conventional patterns.
This work elaborates upon the contributions of dialogic communication ethics to a
rhetorical understanding of prejudice, challenging the assumption that prejudice should always
be eradicated. In this work, prejudice is treated as a productive phenomenon of human
interpretation and interaction in line with Gadamer’s (1975/1989) assertion that prejudice
discloses our understanding of the world as well as our way of being in the world. In order to
understand, we open ourselves to prejudices. Being open does not mean starting from no
prejudice or bias; rather, we learn to differentiate productive prejudices from unproductive or
counterproductive prejudices. Stanley Deetz (1978) notes that “the person who imagines himself
free from prejudices not only becomes unconsciously dominated by them but cuts himself
[herself] off from their positive insight” (p. 18). The positive insight of prejudice allows us to
draw on others as a means for correcting our understanding (White, 1994). Thus, instead of
adopting an objective and neutral stance, Gadamer’s approach calls for bracketing of all
presumptions and biases and qualifying them as such in order to understand others’ perspectives
compared to our own prejudices.
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Gadamer would have agreed with John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdune (1990) in their
warning about the “anonymity of the collective” that seeks to level habits of individuality
(Rodríguez, 2012, p. 77). Naisbitt and Aburdune called for attentive listening to the signs of the
time. Difference and diversity are the signs of the time, and they invoke phenomenological,
philosophical, existential, and ethical response to the proclivity for totalitarian erasure of
difference by asserting fundamental prejudice. Fundamental prejudice provides communicative
partners with opportunities for enthymematic confession and listening to the narrative biases that
ground the signs of the time—multiplicity, diversity, contention, and fragmentation.
I begin this work by exploring the various definitions and treatment of the concept of
prejudice by looking at the scholarship on the concept of prejudice, its implicit and explicit use
in the rhetorical tradition, the inevitability of prejudice, the connection between prejudice and
rhetoric, and prejudice and dialogic communication ethics. Within these various discussions, the
significance of this work to dialogic communication ethics is teased out: dialogic communication
ethics begin neither in objectivity nor in the commonality itself, but rather in the very ground of
prejudice that shape the conversation and its conventional patterns.

Definition and Treatment of the Concept of Prejudice
Prejudice is mainly understood as a problem of social psychology and defined in
psychological terms (Jackman, 1994; Ropers & Pierce, 1995; Shield, 1986; Young-Bruehl,
1996). Recent treatment of the concept has been attributed to Gordon Allport (1979) who
contends that prejudice is a corollary of alienation and denigration based on the flawed and
misleading stereotypical conclusions toward others, and which, according to Adorno, Levinson,
Sanford, and Frankel-Brunswick in The Authoritarian Personality (1950), breed “the dominance-
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submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures;
overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego” as well as “projectivity,”
emotivism reified as a social construction of reality (p. 228). Voltaire, a French philosopher,
suggests that these traits derive from irrational perceptions of the “vulgar world” (see Edwards,
1908, p. 439). Thus, his definition of prejudice as “an opinion without judgment” (Voltaire,
2010, p. 251). When opinions are made sans phronesis—practical wisdom—human
communication becomes a telling act, ever dismissive of the truth of the other.
It is this standing in the way of the truth of the other that has fraught treatments of
“prejudice” with negative connotations. Michael Billig (2012) hoped that an exploration of the
concept’s “ideological roots” from the perspectives of rhetorical criticism would reveal the
“context of justification and criticism” of prejudice (p. 145). According to Billig,
The ideological basis … lies in a claim to being rational, and, as such, the
semantic use of ‘prejudice’ involves lay notions of the philosophy and psychology
of rationality. This can be seen by considering the concept of ‘prejudice’ itself and
its transformation from being a concept of Enlightenment philosophy to a concept
which permits, by its apparent criticism, the expression of prejudice in everyday
discourse. (p. 146)
However, between the ideological basis and everyday discourse lies a phenomenological
suspicion of communicative actions which excise difference in the name of what Dietrich
Bonhoeffer (1996) described as Husserlian “science of the phenomena of pure consciousness”
(p. 62). In the pursuit of the Husserlian pure consciousness, Bonhoeffer called for avoiding the
proclivity to bracket out difference because the “totality of life” does not rest within “pure
idealism,” but an openness to new insights (p. 64). Arnett (2005) argued that new insights
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flourish in “moments of blurred vision,” not in “undue assurance” (p. 14). The latter is
inattentive, unresponsive to revelation, and stymies new insights. The unwillingness to engage
new insights is tantamount to prejudice, a phenomenological aloofness that one can stand above
history and cast judgment. For Allport (1979), phenomenological aloofness is the byproduct of
prejudgment, which when left unchecked, becomes prejudice (p. 9).
The entry for prejudice in The Oxford English Dictionary defined the concept as “A
previous judgement; esp. a judgement formed before due examination or consideration; a
premature or hasty judgement; a prejudgement. This definition is consistent with the
etymological rendering of præjudicium, Latin for judicial scrutiny prior to hearing. Thomas
Hobbes (1904) suggests that a judicial presumption that is prior to hearing is tantamount to
“prejudice”: “For all Judges … if they refuse to hear[e] Proof[e], refuse to do Justice … their
Presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice,
whatever precedent prejudgment” (p. 200). Hobbes placed the understanding of prejudice as
otherwise than valid presumption within a judicial context, an understanding that prevailed in
continental Europe—especially England— until the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries
when Francis Bacon reformulated psychology as an epistemic interrogation of cognitive error.
Unlike Hobbes, Bacon situated his work within an epistemic interrogation methodic
monism. The turn toward epistemic interrogation aided the shift in the treatment of prejudice,
revealing the concept’s epistemological underpinning and imports. The paradigmatic turn in
treatment of the concept (prejudice) was a result of a methodological questioning of judicial
procedures and individual reasoning processes: “‘prejudice’ gained its epistemological salience
in the context of sustained attack of Baconian science, and later … on scholasticism. Besides
designating a failure of legal decision procedures, ‘prejudice’ also came to designate a failure of
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the individual reasoning process” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 386), a problem Bacon attributed to the
deductive syllogism of Aristotle and the scholastics, whom he accused of engaging and
promoting a sham method of learning.
Baconian science, contrary to Aristotelian deductive reasoning, was inductive. The
inductive method focused on embedded axioms. Baconian science was a product of modern
scientific and philosophical questioning of an overemphasis on “the Aristotelian ideal of
disinterested philosophical contemplation of the world and its harmony” (Perumalil, 2006, pp.
82-83), and as a result, improving understanding by freeing humanity from unreflective dogmas,
a byproduct of metaphysics. Bacon connected metaphysics to the enthrallment of human
intellect. In De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon stated: “men have used to sever and withdraw
their thoughts too soon and too far from experience and particulars, and have given themselves
wholly up to their own meditations and arguments” (1875, p. 361). From this Baconian
perspective, prejudice came to be understood as a cognitive error with devastating scientific
consequences (see Farrington, 1964, p. 107).
For Bacon (1875), prejudices are idols that beset human understanding. Idols are “the
deepest fallacies of the human mind: For they do not deceive in particulars, as the others do, by
clouding and snaring the judgment; but by a corrupt and ill-ordered predisposition of mind,
which as it were perverts and infects all the anticipations of the intellect” (p. 431). The
perversion and infection lead to a tyranny of parochialism, bringing perception of reality in
contact with inflexible ideology—such is the basis of irrationality, habits of the heart hooked to
provincialism. Sometimes, provincialism may be a derivative of intrinsic habits of the heart
(idols of the tribe) that can lead to the ethereal belief that “human understanding is of its own
nature prone to suppose that the existence of more order and regularity than it finds” (p. 55).
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Provincialism could be constituted as habits of heart which can lead to construals of
individualism (idols of the cave) with the proclivity to divert and blur nature’s light by
superimposing “its own nature with it” (Bacon, 1875, p. 54). Sometimes, parochialism is a result
of routinized semiotics (idols of the marketplace). The following often cited example from
Bacon illustrates the dangers of the idols of the marketplace, a prevarication of natural
philosophy that reifies parochialism.
The idols of the marketplace are the most troublesome of all: idols which have
crept into the understanding through all alliances of words and names. For
[wo]men believe that their reason governs words; but it also true that words react
on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences
sophistical and inactive. Now words being commonly framed and applied
according to the capacity of the vulgar, follow those lines of division which are
most obvious to vulgar understanding. And whenever an understanding or greater
acuteness or diligent observation would alter those lines to suit the division of
nature, words stand in the way and resist change. (pp. 60-61)
The idols of the marketplace precipitate a tyrannical form of parochialism unresponsive to new
ideas.
At other times, provincialism is a result of learned habits of the heart (idols of the
theater). Such habits connect “philosophical systems” with “perverted rules of demonstration”
(p. 62), prevaricating the unreflective obedience routinized sensus communis might exert. For
Bacon, routinized sensus communis is nothing but routinized caricature because sensus
communis is a stage play, representing worlds of its own creation after an unreal and scenic
fashion” (p. 55). Aristotle (and the scholastics), for Bacon, offered a sensus communis, by way
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of his deductive logical syllogism, an epistemic evil that plagued human understanding for
centuries. To overcome the epistemic plague, Bacon called for an epistemological humility, an
openness to new ideas and a renewed call for a learning in which “goodbye and welcome emerge
in the same breath” (Arnett et al., 2007b, p. 130). Bacon suggests that
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of
dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use; the
reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out their own substance. But the
bees take the middle course; it gathers its materials from the flowers of the garden
and of the field, but transforms and transforms and digests it by the power of its
own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely
or chiefly on the powers of the mind, not does it take the matter which it gathers
from natural philosophy and mechanical experiments and lay up in the memory
whole, as it finds it; but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested.
Therefore, from a closer and purer league between the two faculties, the
experimental and the rational, (such as has never yet been made) much may be
hoped. (1875, pp. 92-93).
The hope is that philosophy moves from the subliminal dogmatism of deductive logical
syllogism of Aristotle to a “pluralistic methodology” (Feyerabend, 1975), ever attentive to the
embedded nature of induction. The former—for Bacon—breeds what Paul Feyerabend called the
“law and order view of science” (p. 18), prone to an error in judgment. The latter offers
pragmatic opportunities for learning, providing new ways to interrogate scientism.
Bacon’s program of scientific knowledge—a new system of the sciences—precipitated
the founding of the Royal Society of London, an eighteen-century English organization credited
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for bringing down the “iron curtain” that to blocked scientism from open contact with scientific
plurality. Apart from bringing down the iron curtain of separation, the Royal Society spurred a
detailed epistemological interrogation of the prejudice. In the words of Hoffman, the
organization “provided the framework for new ways to define prejudice and a new reason to
expose it: prejudice was failure of reason that stood in the way of scientific advancement” (2006,
p. 386). The new ways to define prejudice as well as a new reason to expose the concept offered
an “interpreting otherwise” that invited the reconsideration of prejudice as an epistemological
error in judgment. Epistemic flaws arise when scientism becomes unresponsive to diverse
philosophical systems that shape discourse and interpretation.
Like Bacon, Descartes and Locke attribute prejudice to as an epistemic flaw that leads to
an error in judgment. Judgment is an issue of will and understanding. The will, for Descartes,
rests within the power of choice. “The faculty of the will consists alone in our having the power
of choosing to do things or choosing not to do it … to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things
placed before us by the understanding” (Descartes, 1993, p. 76); understanding, on the other
hand, is a responsive acknowledgment of “the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment”
(p. 75). Error in judgment arises when there is a forceful conflation of the will and understanding
(see Evans, 1993, pp. 53-56). According to Descartes, the conflation becomes an epistemological
perception of reality imposed tacitly on children, leading to what he described as prejudices of
childhood. “The principal cause of errors proceeds from the prejudices of our childhood”
(Descartes, 1983, p. 32). Marquis de Condorcet (1955), mathematician, scientist, philosopher,
educational reformer, and journalist who was in hiding from the Jacobin terror of the French
Revolution, echoes this concern of Descartes saying, “Fallacies which are imbibed in infancy”
are “in some way identified with the reason of the individual” (p. 100). In other words—for

9

Descartes—“a person’s cultural context burdens him with the kind of prejudice which seems to
make progress nigh impossible” (Schouls, 1989, p. 65). However, one can be freed from the
bondage of prejudice through a methodological questioning of preconceived opinion provided by
authority or society as well as abandoning ill-conceived prejudgments (Cottingham, Stoothoff, &
Murdoch, 1985, p. 218).
Locke extends the methodological questioning of dogmatic ideologies and their negative
impact on human reasoning. For Locke (1836), dogmatic ideologies are replete with opinions,
reasonings, and actions “founded upon nothing else but a false supposition” (p. 436). Locke
imputes the false suppositions to prejudice (p. 284). In addition Locked attributed the
unreflective reliance on dogmatic ideologies to the myopic scholastic program of education (see
Hoffman, 2006, p. 387).
In addition to the epistemological treatment of prejudice is the concept’s psychological
component. Locke (1836) attributes “madness” for which “prejudice is a general name” as rooted
in “rational minds” (p. 284). As noted earlier, Locke saw prejudice as an offshoot of dogmatic
ideologies and their corollary companions of flawed opinions, reasonings, and actions. These
flaws—which Locke calls custom—become the prisms for human understanding, for they
condition one’s worldview. Apart from customs, our worldviews can be a result of “chance”
which “comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations,
education, interests, & custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding … there are such
associations made by custom in the minds of most men …” (p. 285). Hoffman (2006) gives an
exegesis of this text. He writes,
Ideas could be correctly or incorrectly joined, and a major source of error, as
Locke explains, is too much trust in complex ideas that come prejoined or
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prejudged. In other words, while some ideas have a sound natural connection, like
the idea “bird” and the idea “flying,” others, like “stars” and “small,” do not have
a connection with any foundation in nature. These unnatural connections between
ideas survive only because their rightness is prejudged and settled in custom and
habit. (pp. 387-388)
Bacon’s new system of the sciences, Descartes and Locke’s epistemology portrayed prejudice as
preconceived opinions that need to be set aside. Their treatment of prejudice prevailed through
the eighteenth century continental Europe until Edmund Burke’s (1968) paradigmatic shift in the
treatment of prejudice.
Burke framed prejudice not as an epistemological aberration but as a “manifestation of a
collective rationality that exceeds the rational powers of the individual” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 388).
Instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very
considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them
because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more
generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect
that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to
avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages. (Burke,
1987, p. 183; cited in Hoffaman, 2006, p. 388)
Burke’s assertion highlights the relationship between prejudice and dogmatic ideologies in
communities of memory. Prejudice foregrounds customs and traditions, and is the ground upon
which profound judgment and common sense thrives. Thus, questioning dogmatic ideologies
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leads to fragmentation as well as interrogates unfettered confidence in epistemic certainty. Such
is the reason Edmund Burke, questioned the communicative standpoint of the French Revolution.
Prejudice, according to Burke, should not be eradicated since it provides the epistemological and
moral grounding for deliberation, a grounding found in the commonly accepted beliefs, values
and practices of the community” (Whedbee, 1998, p. 172). Burke’s positive spin on the concept
of prejudice—albeit skeptical of self-reflexivity—outlined by Hans-Georg Gadamer
(1975/1989). Gadamer’s take on the concept confirms the inevitability of the concept in
postmodernity, an era defined by voices of doubt, limited authorial intent, narrative contention
and difference.

The Inevitability of Prejudice
Postmodernity, faced with a multiplicity of voices and contending narratives, redirects
our attention to the power and importance of prejudice in dialogue. From a postmodernist
standpoint, prejudice discloses the rhetorical “complexities of human” interaction (Arneson,
2014). The complexities call for embracing “personal equations” (Burke, 1989, p. 123). These
personal equations necessitate the communicative encounter with difference, which—according
to Baxter and Montgomery (1996)—constitutes the dialectics of dialogue. The encounter with
difference suggests the implicatures of attentiveness and responsiveness to embedded
enthymemes in dialogic encounters.
We live in era of incompletes, and attentiveness to the incompletes is reminiscent of the
Aristotelian invitation to enthymematic standpoints as well as points to the embeddedness of
“grounded conviction” (Arnett, 2005). As Dietrich Bonhoeffer advocated in the Drama (1981)
“Give me ground under my feet … and all would be different … Ground under your feet—I have
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never understood it like that. I believe you are right. I understand—ground under your feet, to be
able to live and die” (Bonhoeffer, 1981, pp. 46-47; cited in Arnett, 2005, p. 107). Arnett, Fritz,
and Bell (2009) allude to the necessity of ground as “pragmatics of dialogic ethics”:
The pragmatic move to dialogue emerges first and foremost from a content view
of communication ethics. Dialogue requires that one knows the ground from
which one speaks, meet the Other with a willingness to learn, and learn about the
ground from which Other’s discourse emerges. This view of dialogue begins with
the importance of content—privileging content over style. The task of dialogic
ethics is to meet whatever is before us—the good, the bad, and the ugly. The
banal impulse of our time is to reject another’s idea because that person does not
“do” dialogue as we demand. The move to demand transfers the communication
from the possibility of dialogue to monologue in its most negative sense. (p. 223)
Modern discourse, like the Enlightenment project, made demand otherwise than dialogue primal
in its commitment to the “deductivist monologues of one-way tyranny” (Christians, 1995, p. 59),
dismissive of the ground of the Other. Such is the reason why Lyotard called for interrogating
the totalizing ethics of modernity, arguing that it “situates persons as addressees, and in so doing
prohibits dialogue” (Smith, 2008, p. 166). Lyotard (1984) framed the necessity of ground from
an interrogative (agonistic) and descriptive (responsive) standpoint. Ground, for Lyotard, is a
dialogic reality of everyday communicative experience, and its relevancy is evident in the
everyday dialogic struggle for recognition. The quest for recognition is not a therapeutic
command or imposition, but a derivative response and invitation to acknowledge fundamental
prejudice. This work assumes that we cannot dismiss fundamental prejudice—the biased
ground—of another.
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Without the biased ground, one cannot communicatively engage difference, and with
without prejudice, one cannot claim and name individuality. Prejudice, to paraphrase Julian
Huxley, is a Bergsonian élan vital, an élan dialogic of human expressivity and relationality (see
Gillies, 1996, p. 34). Kenneth Burke would agree with the rhetorical notion of prejudice and its
necessity in human expressivity as the symbolic activation of language—not for purposes of
compliance but consubstantiation. For Burke (1966) “any given situation derives its character
from the entire framework of interpretations by which we judge It” (p. 35; cited in Littlefield and
Quenette, 2007, p. 29). In today’s world of multiple voices, prejudice sharpens interpretation.
This presupposition privileges the authoritative ethics of ground in contrast to any authoritarian
ethics that subsumes individuality and difference. Authoritarian ethics co-opts and corrupts
singularity, particularity, and individuality.
This work questions such rhetorical insensitivity and aloofness as authoritarian forms of
persuasive relativism. In addition, this work calls for revisioning the notion of prejudice as
situated “habits of the heart” that make human expressivity not a monologic act but a dialogic
relationality. The point is that prejudice becomes the dialogic platform of radical otherness
manifested through fragmented narratives, and holds communicative entry points of learning
from difference. To paraphrase Pat Arneson (2007b) postmodernity proffers a philosophy of
communication that makes fragmented narratives central to every communicative encounter. For
Seyla Benhabib, these fragmented narratives, which she calls “fractured spirits” point to the
necessity of fundamental prejudice because they “inform any discussion of human
communication” (Pat Arneson, 2007b, p. 3). In other words, fundamental prejudice offers
rhetorical opportunities for confessional shifts. Equally important to these confessional shifts is
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acknowledging difference as a phenomenological reality of otherness with all its muddiness
(Arnett, 2008b).
Such acknowledgment of difference with all its muddiness, the “tainted ground” (or
fundamental prejudice) permits dialogic insights illustrative for engaging multiplicity, diversity,
and plurality, phenomenological features of postmodernity. Fundamental prejudice, an inevitable
metaphor for communication ethics, points to the burgeoning “unity of contraries,” which Martin
Buber (1997) claims, constitute “the mystery at the innermost core of dialogue” (p. 17).
Communication ethics as unity of contraries in the twenty-first century attends to this mystery by
engaging prejudice as the bridge to otherness, claiming Ernesto Grassi’s (1980) “ingenious
activity” of catching sight of relationships in terms of which learning occurs.
Prejudice as ingenious activity rests not on process but on human doing and deeds that
intrinsically develop in our doing. The metaphors of “open inexhaustible” (Merleau-Ponty,
1962), “rhetorical turn” (Schrag, 1986), “touchstones” (Friedman, 2002), “penultimate” (Arnett,
2005), and enthymematic confession, which I add to the conversation, allow for engaging the
taken for granted assumption that prejudice, the primordial ground of difference, is not premised
on authoritarian ethics, but authoritative ethics. Gadamer (1975/1989) was critical of
authoritarian ethics because of its proclivity to displace fundamental bias, a danger the
Enlightenment project was oblivious to (pp. 280-281). Authoritarian ethics imposes a telling that
renders prejudice pariah in totalitarian discourse. Authoritative ethics, on the other hand, is
responsive to the singularity of the other, inviting, instead a communicative praxis that is
tantamount to hermeneutic conversation, listening to the different Other (Gadamer, 1972/2006,
p. 358).
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Rooted in an authoritative ethics, prejudice interrogates the authoritarian ethics of
“victory, ideological, hegemony, or … ‘having the last word” (Herrick, 1992, pp. 133-134).
From the perspectives of dialogic communication ethics, having the last word eclipses the ethical
necessity of listening to the first word. Listening to the first word, contrasted from having the last
word, informs us about enthymematic confession, bringing the “tainted ground” into an
intersubjective relationship of ethical co-creation of meaning. Scholars of dialogue and
communication ethics motivated by the concept of prejudice theorize its necessity, not from a
Hegelian perspective of dialectics, but from a dialogic standpoint of difference, a defining sign of
the (Anderson, Baxter, & Cissna, 2004; Arnett, 2007b; Arnett et al., 2010; Arnett, 2010; Baxter
& Montgomery, 1996; Foucault, 2001). As noted by Arnett (2011b), the tainted grounded
foregrounds learning:
A dialogic ethics that begins with knowing the ontological reality of tainted
grounded and a willingness to confess a perspective assumes the pragmatic
position of communication from a position that is not universal but committed to
the particular, respectful of the distance between persons of difference, and ever
attentive to learning from acknowledgment of one’s own position of learning
from that of another …” (pp. 54-55)
Prejudice in this sense is a confessional first principle of human communicative relationship
because it offers “opportunity of learning, which is the natural by-product of meeting
differences” (Arnett, Arneson, & Bell, 2007a, p. 144). In this postmodern era, prejudice is an
embedded communicative reality with efficacious dialogic consequences: meeting the obvious
yet mysterious different otherness before us. And this, Camus would argue, entails courage, the
courage to confront both the devil we know and the angel we don’t know. Between the know and
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the unknown lies the essential ethics of dialogic: embracing multiple horizons “without
presuming first foundations, without the luxury of an objective metaphysical reality from which
to begin” (Christians, 2010, p. 9). Prejudice is neither an ontological first principle,
epistemological certainty, nor a metaphysical prescription of what reality is. Rather, it is a
phenomenological and existential constitution of difference within the dialogic of ethics.
The future of dialogic communication ethics is viable because of its capability and
willingness to accommodate and defend rhetorical prejudice with phenomenological, existential,
and ethical response to the everydayness of difference. As we walk the path of dialogic
communication ethics, the point is not pushing for an authoritarian ethics that demands a closed
attention to the necessity of prejudice, but rather an authoritative ethics that commands an
opened response to difference. Closed attention constitutes a perversion, leading to the treatment
of the singular other as the “spoiled identity” (Goffman, 1963) to be quarantined, watched,
isolated, contained, or even sanitized. This was the prevarication of the presumptuous
epistemology of modernity, a presumptuousness that led to its insolvency (see Christians, 2010).
For example, a prisoner of conscience might be kept under suicidal watch not for purposes of
preserving his or her life, but for purposes of intelligence information. The individual becomes
an object of information, a means to end—offering the powers that be an entitled authorial intent
that they possess certainty and can always unlock uncertainty.
Unlike the authoritarian ethics of closed attention, the authoritative ethics of opened
response situates prejudice within the dialogic framework of otherwise than epistemological
certainty and ontological agency. The works of Buber and Levinas questioned these modern
assumptions that gave rise to the tyranny of individualism with “invitations.” Buber invites us to
the existential prejudice between persons; Levinas invites us to phenomenological prejudice as
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an “ethical is” and as a dialogic necessity (Arnett, 2004). Buber’s existential ethics and Levinas
phenomenological ethics point to both the “presence” and the “emergence” of prejudice in a
postmodern age, permitting an opened response to difference. Prejudice announces the necessity
for the meeting of differences, au contraire competing views vying to create totalitarian
consensus. Prejudice invites a listening to and a learning from difference, articulates
responsiveness to the rhetorical contention of competing goods that shape the postmodern
engagement with communication ethics (Arnett et al., 2009).

Rhetoric and Prejudice
Kenneth Burke (1950) describes rhetoric as “the art of persuasion, or a study of the
means of persuasion available for any given situation” (p. 46); however scholars like Starhawk,
Sonja Foss, Cindy Griffin, Nel Noddings, Carol Gilligan, and Mary Daly, working from feminist
perspectives, have questioned this totalitarian underpinning of rhetoric as persuasion. For
example, Foss and Griffin (1992) questioned mainstream rhetorical theories’ proclivity for
metanarratives and how these master narratives function to undermine difference. As a
counterpoint for interrogating mainstream rhetorical theories, Foss and Griffin juxtaposed
Burke’s rhetoric of persuasion with Starhawk’s rhetoric of “inherent value” in response to “the
context for rhetoric, the nature of the rhetor, and the primary rhetorical strategies it features” (p.
333). By interrogating the mainstream rhetoric of domination, Foss and Griffin, by way of
Starhawk, point to the inevitability of prejudice in human (communicative) relationships.
It could be argued that the necessity for prejudice has guided the postmodern rhetorical
interrogations of Foss and Griffin, and Starhawk—prejudice understood as inherent value derives
from “interconnection,” “immanent value,” and the rhetorical strategies of “mystery, ritual, and
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power with” (Foss & Griffin, 1992, p. 333). The relationship between rhetoric and prejudice
possibilitizes dialogue as “the power not to command, but to suggest and be listened to”
(Starhawk, 1989, p. 10; cited in Foss and Griffin, 1992, p. 334). Such a positioning offers a
rhetoric of “power-with” otherwise than a rhetoric of “power-over,” by engaging prejudice as a
rhetorical necessity for countering systemic dogmatism: “Power-with is more subtle, more fluid
and fragile than authority. It is dependent on personal responsibility, on our creativity and daring,
and on the willingness of others to respond” (Starhawk, 1989, p. 11). Starhawk framed a dialogic
sense of rhetoric shaped in agonistic conviction, not in a “conditioning to obey” a status quo.
Starhawk’s rhetoric of inherent value rests within the rhetorical construct of
enthymematic relationship, such as Buber’s “interhuman” (1965a), Cissna and Anderson’s
“moments of meeting,” “commons rhetoric,” “mutuality rhetoric,” “moments rhetoric,”
“vulnerability rhetoric,” “praxis rhetoric,” and “recognition rhetoric” (2002; 2004, 2008),
Benhabib’s “interactive universalism” (2002), and Hawhee’s “kairotic encounters” (2002), who
move rhetoric beyond persuasion into what I call enthymematic encounters and rhetorically
grounded prejudice. Cissna and Anderson’s (2008) “dialogic rhetoric,” for example, provides
potential for exploring the relationship between rhetoric and grounded prejudice. Cissna and
Anderson (2008) write,
Traditional rhetoric privileges persuasion … A dialogic rhetoric assumes a more
open and less controlled communicative arena … Thus, in a dialogic rhetoric, the
notions of individual control that are so crucial to a more traditional rhetoric are
rendered meaningless as dialogue transcends control … and, if dialogue is to
result, we intend to listen, be open to and respectful of the other, and open to
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influence by the other … the purpose of rhetorical dialogue, then, is … to invite
… (pp. 43-44)
Key to the metaphor of dialogic rhetoric is the issue of standpoint, which according to John Du
Bois (2011) “functions” as the interpretive ground of prejudice (p. 55). Postmodern rhetorical
theorizing privilege enthymematic encounters and rhetorically grounded prejudice (see Littlejohn
& Foss, 2008, p. 51). This work articulates the taken-for-granted connection between prejudice
and rhetoric, and how the connection brings communicative understanding to the fore. To
illustrate this connection, I would like to comment on the relationship between rhetoric and
hermeneutics. This perspective derives from an understanding of prejudice as an interpretive
standpoint, an explication Gadamer alludes to in his Philosophical Hermeneutics.
Gadamer provides a notion of philosophical hermeneutics that frames the interplay of
rhetoric and prejudice apropos of philosophy of communication. With Gadamer, I believe that
the philosophical hermeneutics of prejudice provides significant insights that are reached through
an interpretive model that reclaims human relationship as a language of interpretive standpoint.
For Gadamer, the interpretive standpoint is fundamental to understanding; it involves engaging a
plurality of “meanings and contexts,” and shapes discourse. Meanings and contexts was
foreshadowed by Gadamer’s notion of prejudice, offering four normative characteristics of the
concept: “situatedness and embeddedness,” “fusion of horizons,” dialogic reciprocity, and
linguisticality (see Gill, 2015, pp. 10-11). Pertinent to these characteristics is that prejudice is a
way of being with the otherness of the other. In other words, prejudice opens the possibility for
engaging alterity (Gadamer, 1989, p. 27).
This work listens to Gadamer’s (1975/1989) questions: “Does being situated within
tradition really mean being subject to prejudices and limited in one’s freedom? Is not, rather, all
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human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways?” (p. 277) to make a case
for lived provinciality as inevitable prejudice. From such a questioning, this work frames rhetoric
“as a potential of human meetings” (Cissna & Anderson, 2008, p. 42). For Gadamer, the
potential for meeting possibilitizes understanding. The implications are clearly articulated by
Gadamer (1975/1989) in his treatment of prejudice as a dialogic structure for understanding:
[It] is a process of coming to an understanding …that each opens himself to the
other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other
to such an extent that he understands not a particular individual but what he says.
What is to be grasped is a substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be
at one with each other on the subject. (p. 387)
Such is one form of a rhetorical turn away from persuasion to a hermeneutical turn toward
prejudice. Thus, the linkages between rhetoric and prejudice a la Gadamer is the expansion of
enthymematic horizons that interanimate to constitute meaning making not from a tyrannical
imposition of meaning, but from a relational negotiation of what I call lived provinciality.
Rhetoric understood as otherwise than persuasion brings a lived provinciality, the tainted
ground of the different other into poiesis. As poiesis, rhetoric brings forth prejudice as the
foundation our everydayness (Heidegger, 1971). Underlying poiesis is grounded conviction,
which could be articulated as phenomenologically constitutive play. As Donna Trueit (2005)
asserts, through her reading of Gadamer, “play is the action of poiesis (creating) involved in
doing and becoming” (p. 89; emphasis original). In other words, play is an enthymematically
responsive encounter that discloses fundamental bias as interpretative standpoints and positions
in human conversation. As Kenneth White (1994) suggests, “conversational play requires the
recognition of the role prejudice takes in human understanding” (p. 96; emphasis original).
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Interpretive standpoints and positions offer opportunities for engaging understanding not as a
utopian cooptation of alterity, but as an interpretive response to difference. Play, therefore could
be seen as an activated ground of conviction that leads to, and is necessary for, dialogic
understanding.
This work situates dialogic understanding within the paradigmatic necessity of prejudice.
Intrinsic to the Gadamerian notion of prejudice is a view of that rhetoric is a means for
negotiating differing viewpoints. Questioning the Enlightenment proclivity for a rhetoric of
compliance which led to the ontological genocide of prejudice—caricatured as prejudice against
prejudice, Gadamer argued that understanding requires the engagement of biases. Within the
process of engagement is the resolve (an ethical response) “to seek and acknowledge the
immanent coherence contained within the meaning claim of the other” (Gadamer, 1987, p. 87).
For Gadamer, seeking and acknowledging the bias of the other is a learning process, a learning
that exposes our vulnerabilities—human finitude—and the those of others, and might somethings
require the “suspension of one’s prejudices.” At other times, it might require standing one’s
ground. Gadamer calls this learning process bildung, the hermeneutic cultivation of horizons.
Gadamer understood a world in which the cultivation of horizons “suggests listening to,
knowing, and encountering the other in such a way as to allow one’s self to be changed but not
eradicated … ” (Barthold, 2010, p. 76). Bildung, therefore, conveys the necessity to listening to,
knowing, and encountering standpoints contrary to a rhetoric of compliance. As Richard
Bernstein (1991) asserts, “[it is] only by seeking to learn from the ‘other,’ only by fully grasping
its claims upon one can it be critically encountered” (p. 4). Bernstein addresses the importance of
opening oneself to the prejudice of the other. “Such an opening” (p. 143) does not favor
compliance, but what I term a rhetoric of enthymematic relationality.
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A rhetoric of enthymematic relationality shifts the focus of what Jürgen Habermas (1984)
describes as imposed agreement to what Gadamer constitutes as “reciprocal engagement” (Gill,
2015). This works rejects the world of imposed agreement—a rhetoric of compliance—and
welcomes a conversation layered in an enthymematic rhetoric of relationality. Buber points to
the centrality of the rhetoric of relationality in his philosophical anthropology (see Arnett, 2004,
pp. 77-80): “In the beginning is relation” (Buber, 1958, p. 18); Levinas addresses the issue of
relationality in his phenomenology of ethics (see Lipari, 2012): “I am responsible for the Other”
(Levinas, 1985, p. 98). These philosophers frame the dialogic characteristics of enthymematic
relationship by placing grounded conviction—not persuasion—at the center of human
communication. Prejudice is the primary ingredient of enthymematic relationship.
This work suggests a rhetorical hermeneutics that makes prejudice a locus of dialogic
ethics. The focus on prejudice is a response to the postmodern quest for attentive learning from
and listening to difference. The relevance of prejudice in postmodernity is a rhetoric of
relationality, a communicative praxis central to dialogic ethics. As Arnett (2011b) suggests, the
“interplay” of “communication ethic and dialogue standpoints” is a confessional response to the
signs of the time (p. 45).

Prejudice and Dialogic Communication Ethics
Arnett’s definition of communication ethics “as dialogue among differing perspectives
(2011b, p. 47) frames the necessity of prejudice within the sphere of dialogic engagement.
Aristotle (1985) was cautious of monologic extremism, the danger that led to the dogmatically
repressive ontology and epistemology of the Enlightenment and modern projects. Postmodernity,
on the other hand, celebrates a layered understanding of ethics that is not dismissive of
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methodological truth, but engages a complexity of truths as rhetorically constructive standpoints
in communicative praxis. As Arnett argued, the interplay of prejudice and communication ethics
resonates Arendt’s notion of “enlarged mentality,” an attentive responsiveness (Levinas, 1969) to
differing narratives, a feature of postmodernity. Such an interplay focuses on tensional narratives
that detour from the conventional endorsement of truth.
This work bleeds fundamental prejudice into layered perspectives that “background” and
“foreground” (Arnett, 2011b, p. 46) dialogue, disclosing “habit of the heart” (Bellah, Madsen,
Swidler, Sullivan, & Tipton, 1985) as the contextual ground of ethical encounters. Scholars of
dialogue—Gadamer, Buber, and Levinas—understood ethical encounters as communicative
commitment to difference and alterity. Dialogic communication ethics emphasizes difference
and alterity. Tullio Maranhao (1990) writes that one approach to dialogic communication ethics
rests within relationality; that is, “the relation between Self and Other … in the sense of the
Self’s turning to the Other” (p. 18). It is a “turning to” that is comprised of, according to Arnett,
Arneson and Bell (2006), competing narratives. They argue that “The emergence of dialogic
ethics in the postmodern era represents the significance of communication ethics in negotiating
competing” narratives (Pat Arneson, 2007, p. 166).
Competing narratives, a paradigmatic necessity before us, are reminders of the dangers of
master narratives and the proclivity to epistemological profiling that nourishes control and
progress. This position is precisely Arnett’s (2011b) contention “that one cannot stand above
history and offer an opinion through objectivity or through self-proclaimed confidence from
one’s subjectivity” (p. 46). This work acknowledges the pragmatic reality that dialogic
communication ethics neither begins in objectivity nor in the commonality itself, but rather in the
very ground of prejudice that shapes the conversation and its conventional patterns. This work
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also seeks to elaborate upon the contributions of dialogic communications ethics to a rhetorical
understanding of prejudice. Finally, this work argues that there is need for a turn toward the
notion of prejudice in the postmodern era. Prejudice is the originary home of competing
narratives, and renders the alterity of the Other an ethical poiesis.
Ethical poiesis invites a turning toward that can only be made relevant through the
interanimation of standpoints, an emphasis prevalent in postmodern theorizing in communication
ethics. Makau and Arnett’s (1997) vision of communication ethics, for example, call for
engaging standpoints by living “openly and responsibly with the dialectical tension inherent in
commonality and difference” (p. x). For this opening to standpoints also happens to be the
Levinasian ethics of polymodality, which, according to Lipari (2012), constitutes communication
ethics as an attentive response to “plurality, exteriority, and alterity over unity, interiority, and
ontology” (p. 228). In its most fundamental sense, however, communication ethics invites a
“polemical unity” (Bonhoeffer, 1955; see Arnett, 2005, p. 215) of standpoints. Such a position
has flowed throughout the history of communication, with postmodern ethics calling for an
Arendtian enlarged mentality with a Ricoeurian suspicion of what constitutes prejudice.
Conventional treatment of prejudice framed the concept in monological terms, suspicious
of individuality. Postmodernity, on the other hand, was suspicious of psychologism, and more in
line with Ricoeur’s (1992) ethics of intentionality, which he defined as “aiming at the ‘good life’
with and for others, in” communities of memory (p. 172; see Cohen, 2002, p. 128). The good life
assumes a dialogic implicature and a phenomenological turn toward the Other. Between the
“good life” and the Other, to paraphrase Arnett (2008b), is the “tainted ground.” Ground assumes
multiple goods, reminding us of the necessity to open ourselves to the obvious yet unfathomable
prejudices before us (R. Arnett, 2012b).
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Communication ethics typify postmodernity’s response to difference as the fundamental
prejudice that is otherwise than convention, opening relationships to the reality of lived
provincialities. In the metaphors of Arendt, an “enlarged mentality” and “plurality of publics”
(Arendt, 1998) articulate the embeddedness of prejudice as a communicative necessity. Arendt
reminds us of the consummate nature of prejudice and the prevarications of totalitarian ethics
that undermine difference, demanding conformity and obliterating lived provincialities.
Postmodern ethics recognizes the importance of an enlarged mentality and plurality of publics,
metaphors that “background” and “foreground” (Arnett, 2011b, p. 46) communication ethics as a
plurality of ethics. We live in era of competing narratives and contending goods, and attempts to
offer a universal ethic as THE RESPONSE to these diverse problematics is phenomenologically
presumptuous. Jeffrey Stout in Ethics After Babel (1988), using the metaphor of “bricolage,”
called for a “stereoscopic” response to the densely packed understanding of the ethical
complexity of the signs of the time. Stout argued that the refusal to permit, invite, and
acknowledge difference and diversity creates “a false sense of unity,” foster “harmful stereotypes
of the ‘other,’” creating a self-absorbed ontological monster (p. 5).
This work acknowledges the metaphor of bricolage, an acknowledgement of “a perfect
Babel of confusion” (Stout, 1988, p. 333), calling into question rhetorical attempts to brings an
ethical closure to difference. The signs of the time offer the necessity of disclosures, and point to
how disclosures constitute narrative grounds, making the notion of prejudice—tainted ground,
grounded conviction, bias ground, or lived provincialities “come of age” (Arnett, 2005).
Attending to the disclosures of ethical standpoints is central to communication ethics. The
scholarship of James Chesbro (1969), Richard Johannesen (1983; 2001) Ronald Arnett (1987;
2001), James Jaksa and Michael Pritchard (1988), Josina Makau and Ronald Arnett (1997),
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Clifford Christians (2003), Brent Ruben and Lea Stewart (2005), Michael Hyde (2001), and
Ronald Arnett, Pat Arneson, Leeanne Bell (2006)—according to Arnett (2011b)—point to the
significance of the ethical bricolage of common sense before us.
Key to the metaphor of bricolage is the question of response—an ethical otherwise than a
dogmatic response. The latter guides this project because prejudice (tainted ground), the
phenomenological embeddedness of difference calls for interrogating the dogmatic assumptions
of modernity that the tainted ground is an epiphenomenon or a byproduct of methodic
inconsistency. Aspirations for methodic consistency often takes as its ground rule the dogmatic
profiling derisively described as “the prejudice against prejudice” (Gadamer, 1975/1989, p. 273).
Prejudice construed as such, becomes the language of universal generality when, as Arnett, Fritz,
and Holba (2007b) argued, “narrative awareness of traditions that shape consciousness is lost,
leaving them forgotten or taken for granted” (p. 118). Relevant to dialogic communication ethics
is how prejudice is constituted in the realm of narrative awareness.
The work of James Chesebro (1969) points to the necessity of narrative awareness,
possibilitizing a plurality of responses that “promote and protect a given sense of the ‘good’”
(Pat Arneson, 2007, p. 56). To Chesebro, narrative awareness assumes interpretive standpoints
in communication ethics. Chesebro outlined four interpretive standpoints—(1) democratic ethics,
(2) universal-humanitarian ethics, (3) codes and procedures, and standards, (4) contextual
ethics—which he considered important to communicative ethics praxis (Arnett et al., 2009, pp.
44-60). These categories have since been extended and added on to. Arnett (1987) forged a fifth
conceptual framework of ethics, narrative ethics; and Arnett, Arneson, and Bell (2006)
classified a sixth category, dialogic communication ethics. These six framework are “central for
navigating a postmodern era” of narrative and virtue contention (Pat Arneson, 2007, p. 155).
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According to Arnett (1987), democratic ethics derive from “a public ‘process’ ethic, an
open airing of opinions and control by majority vote” (p. 46; see Arnett et al., 2009, p. 46). The
“‘public’ process” is anchored by mass totality and a conscientious commitment to consensus.
This perspective, as Robert Nozick (1981) argued, “set[s] up reverberations in the brain: if the
person refused to accept the” status quo, “[s]he dies” (p. 4). For Nozick and Arnett the interplay
of democracy and ethics is neither a phlegmatic response to tradition nor what Bernard William
(1985) would call a “superpower view of defense” aimed at obliterating difference (p. 84);
instead, it is a communicative participation that breeds individuality from the standpoint of
“humans as persons” who “can be talked with.” After all, “only persons can engage in mutual
responsive communication” (Johannesen, 2002, p. 63). Democratic ethics privileges a mutuality
that is otherwise than an enthymematic compliance—roots of totalitarianism and the tyranny of
individualism. Democratic ethics has kinship with Buber’s notion of “unity of contraries” under
conditions of what this project considers communicative bricolage. Alexis de Tocqueville work,
Democracy in America (1969), point to the importance of democratic ethics. Communication
situated within democratic ethics provides a sense of embeddedness and situatedness, “habits of
the hearts” that keep fundamental prejudice vibrant in the postmodern community of memory
(Bellah et al., 1985, p. 37).
Universal-humanitarian ethics hosts the Enlightenment commitment to methodic
rationality as the guiding principle of every communicative behavior (Arnett, 1987, p. 48). The
guiding principle, often championed by a “select intelligentsia” and framed as a “public
announcement” (p. 48) embraces the Kantian notion of a priori universals. “Kant advises us to
consider the wisdom of a given ethical principle by asking, ‘Can this principle be universalized
such that it would make sense for human life?’” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 49). Universal-
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humanitarian ethics require a rational discernment process which brings the universal and the
singular into a bricolage of common sense in a given narrative context.
In a way, Levinas’ notion of ethical responsiveness as meeting the radical alterity of the
Other gives currency to the notion of universal-humanitarian ethics in the postmodern era. In the
Ethics and Infinity (1985), Levinas argued that “It is banal to say that we never exist in the
singular. We are surrounded by beings and with things with which we maintain relations.
Through sight, touch, sympathy and common work, we are with others” (p. 58). Universalhumanitarian ethics acknowledges the inevitability of “touchstones” through a sense of
communality that is sympathetic to singularity. As Christians (2008) said, “We embrace an Other
with deep sympathy, and simultaneously universalize impartiality—wishing conceptually that
the whole human race were like the Other, and defining the Other as the universal ideal” (p. 17).
The interplay of communality and singularity define human communicative relationships and
behaviors as “humanizing topoi that lead one to reason on behalf of the ‘good’” (Arnett et al.,
2007a, p. 158).
Codes, procedure and standard ethics are publicly disclosed prescriptions of what
constitutes an ethical behavior in organizations. The codes, procedures, and standards ethics rely
on professional guidelines for directing and enforcing a “common agreement on appropriate
conduct” within professional groups or organizations (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 50). According to
Arnett (1987), the professional guidelines—handmaid of a select intelligentsia—are purposive
goods aimed at promoting discussions (pp. 50-51) about the public “ought” of a given
organization: “… codes and standards are formed through repeated conversation[s] … provide
communicative guidance and assurance for the participants … enhance a communicative terrain
of trust … responsive to persons and a given organization … and a given context (see Arnett et
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al., 2007a, p. 160). Arnett, Fritz, and Bell (2009) cite the work of Kenneth Andersen on the
public expectations of academic communication professionals as an exemplar of the
communication ethic that derives from codes, procedures, and standards:
Andersen was instrumental in the development of the National Communication
Association (NCA) Codes of Professional Responsibility for the Communication
Scholar/Teacher. The NCA Code … includes statements such as the following
“…We believe that responsible behavior is guided by values such as integrity,
fairness, professional and social responsibility, equality of opportunity,
confidentiality, honesty and openness, respect for self and others, freedom and
honesty” (p. 50)
As Johannesen (2002) suggests, codes, procedures, and standards organize and provide a
communication ethic situated within the “useful functions” which “stimulate continued
discussion and reflection leading to possible modification or revision” of public regulated
professional conduct (p. 183). The useful characters move conducts from narcissistic adherence
to “the ‘strict’ letter of the code” to “the ‘spirit’ of the code” (p. 185). It is the public
proclamation and adherence to the spirit of the codes and standards of a professional
organization that drive and shape an ethical responsiveness to the signs of the time.
Contextual ethics embraces difference and multiplicity as a communicative response to
particularity of standpoints. As Chesebro (1997) sees it, standpoints “make us consider our
established and habitual symbol-using practices” (p. 145; cited in Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009, p.
xviii). Communication ethics is energized by these same “symbol-using practices” not as a
monologic demand, but as a dialogic invitation to engage plurality with “a pragmatic hope” that
attentiveness to radical alterity broadens horizons, authenticates the self as a derivative I, and
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confesses to taking false comfort in isms and generalizations. From this perspective, as
Johannesen suggests, communication ethics is neither a prescriptive nor an absolute response to
human behavior, but rather a context driven response to a given good. A communication ethics
framed within the contextual approach point to the “communicative ‘ought’” as “listening to the
needs of a given context before offering ethical response. The ‘good’ that is protected is
attentiveness to” (Arnett et al., 2007a, p. 162) particularities not generalities.
Narrative ethics “recognizes the story-laden nature of human experience, framing
guidelines appropriate to ‘character’ in a given story” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 53). This assertion
endorses Walter Fisher’s commitment to the notion of “narrative paradigm for human
communication” (p. 52) over a utopian paradigm of rationality. In his foreword to Arnett’s
Dialogic Confession, Christians argued,
Narrative ethics has turned the ethics of rationalism on its head. It has
contradicted the metaphysical foundations on which the modernist canon has been
based. It has worked from the inside out, from the backyard and grass roots.
Social constructions have replaced formal law systems. Moral values are now
situated in the narrative context rather than anchored by philosophical
abstractions. The moral life is developed through community formation and not in
obscure sanctums of isolated individuals. Contextual values have replaced ethical
absolutes. (Arnett, 2005, p. xi)
Arnett, drawing upon Fisher and MacIntyre, returns to the notion of narrative ethics repeatedly
(Arnett, 1986, 1997, 2011a), inviting us to view its complexity with humility, a humility that
embraces fundamental prejudice as an embodiment of human communicative experience:
narrative or story “places ground under one’s feet without embracing an inflexible ideology”

31

(Arnett, 2005, p. 28). Ground remind us of the necessity of “narrative bias that situates an ethic”
(Arnett et al., 2007a, p. 169). Narrative ethics takes a communicative look at prejudice by taking
us from the originative assumption that epistemology is the first principle of human
communicative behavior to drawing upon the plurality of narrative frames as a primordial
ground of dialogic ethics.
Narrative ethics connects prejudice with “a story of conviction that places ground under
one’s feet without embracing an inflexible ideology” (Arnett, 2005, p. 28), suggesting “petite
narratives” (Lyotard, 1984) as the inevitable “good” before us. Such is the reason Lyotard was
wary of the totalizing feature of modernity, grand narratives (p. 82). Petite narratives assume
attentive listening to “a multiple collage that enriches our life together” (Arnett, 2005, p. xii).
Narrative ethics invites awareness to layered story frames that do not begin with universal
validity, but with the biased ground “upon which we stand” in every dialogic encounter (see
Arnett et al., 2009).
Narrative ethics presumes prejudice. Such is the interpretive otherwise of Buber and the
listening otherwise of Levinas. Buber and Levinas worked with the assumption that narrative
bias informs the anthropological and the phenomenological reality of difference. Both Buber and
Levinas remind us of the efficacy of what Gadamer calls “effective history”—a consciousness of
the inevitability of the bias narrative that “background” and “foreground” (Arnett, 2011b) the
“everydayness” (Heidegger, 1962) of a community of memory.
Dialogic ethics assumes a public welcome of competing narratives and virtue contention.
In the words of words of Arnett, Fritz, and Bell (2009), postmodernity is marked by fragmented
viewpoints. As such, it “calls to learn about and negotiate” differing viewpoints, bringing us to
linking communicative ethical responses that privilege learning from difference rather telling,
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dictating, and demanding commonality (p. xviii). Learning from difference requires “standing”
our “own grounds while being open to the” standpoints of others, “conceptualizing meaning that
emerges in discourse situated between persons” (Arnett et al., 2007a, p. 164; emphasis added).
The Buberian metaphor of “between” begets discovering new possibilities emergent in
difference.
Difference is central to dialogic ethics. It calls for the constructive engagement of “unity
of contraries” (Arnett, 2011b, p. 59). Dialogic ethics involves a public admission of unity of
contraries through a confessional recognition of radical alterity. Lipari (2004) underscores the
importance of dialogic ethics when she questioned monologic encounters that exert control in the
spirit of a therapeutic sense of self. In her words, dialogic ethics “avoids reducing recognition of
the other to a kind of mimetic re-cognition of the other in which we view the other solely in
terms of our precognitions and thus assimilate them into what we already know (or think we
know) about their point of view. Rather, communication is a process of opening to the other”
(pp. 130-131). The process of opening to the other is an “epistemological humility” (Makau,
2011, p. 503) come of age, a notion foreshadowed by Ronald Jackson’s (2000) assertion: “It is
impossible to … approach a complete version of reality that is fully representative of all human
and cultural activities” (p. 49; cited in Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009, p. xi). The insights of Lipari,
Makau, and Jackson assume the need to engage competing or multiple narratives, paving the way
for attentive listening. It is this understanding of dialogic ethics that enables the pursuit of
happiness otherwise than the pursuit of authorial progress.
These various ethics of communication—democratic, universal-communitarian, codes,
procedures, and standards, contextual, narrative, and dialogic ethics—are interpretive
standpoints, rhetorical sense-making choice that require attentive listening and learning from
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narratives that frame the phenomenological-ethical conviction of situated and embedded
otherness. This attentiveness speaks to the value and necessity of prejudice. This work advances
dialogic communication ethics by framing the notion of prejudice within a history of the
problematic term, prejudice with the objective of displaying the pragmatic reality that dialogic
communication ethic begins neither in objectivity nor in commonality itself, but in the very
ground of prejudice that shape the conversation and its conventional patterns. This work
unmasks the past assumption that prejudice can and should always be eradicated, a thinking that
falls prey to the modernist assumptions hostile to the existential reality reflected in Buber’s
insight that “All real living is in meeting” (Buber, 1958, p. 11).
The main purpose of this work is to contribute to a richer and more systematic conceptual
understanding of prejudice in dialogic communication ethics. This work further intends to
provide a framework that integrates a wide range of prejudice from the historical perspective. To
demonstrate the relevancy of this connection, I provide a historical analysis of the concept of
prejudice from the classical period (Aristotle), early Christianity (Paul), Renaissance
(Shakespeare), modern era (Kierkegaard) and the postmodern (Levinas). Through the history of
the notion of prejudice, the rhetoric of prejudice is explored from the perspective of dialogic
communication ethics.

Preview of Chapters
This work will proceed through a historical analysis of the concept of prejudice from the
classical period (Aristotle), early Christianity (Paul), Renaissance (Shakespeare), modern era
(Kierkegaard) and the postmodern era (Levinas). Through the history of the notion of prejudice,
the rhetoric of prejudice is explored from the perspective of dialogic communication ethics.
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Although my concern is the rhetorical implication of the concept of prejudice, my emphasis upon
ethics is intended to reveal dialogue as pragmatic aspect of communication ethics necessary to
the rhetorical nature of prejudice in post modernity. In next chapter (chapter two), I discuss the
dialogic elements of Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical discourse, looking specifically at the nature
of the enthymeme as it relates to subjective universality as a dialogic concept. The rest of the
chapter describes the uniqueness of subjective universality as episteme, technê, and phronesis.
The interplay of these Aristotelian elements speaks to the value and necessity of prejudice as the
ground upon which we stand in every dialogic encounter.
In chapter three, following the Pauline notion of universalism, I argue that a rhetorical
conception of prejudice constitutes varied locative truths that link up provincially to adumbrate
universal singularity. Universalism through the lenses of prejudice reflects difference as
rhetorical modes of subtracting and/or grafting self-reflexivity, individual accounts of inquiry
from/on common sense and tradition. In Paul, universalism nurtured as the tainted ground bears
witness to the Christ event as constitutive of a contextual phenomenological reality which
privileges the negotiation of multiple traditions. In other words, the notion of truth is a
subjective process of faithfulness to the Christ event.
Chapter four discusses Shakespeare’s epistemological suspicion as a communicative
problematic that rest on the assumption that the tainted ground—human imperfectibility—“must
be offered in a coherent and public fashion, pointing toward a theory and away from selfproclamation” (Arnett et al., 2010, p. 114). This chapter offers a fine-grained analysis of the
problematic—epistemological suspicion at the intersection of prejudice and dialogic
communication ethics. I situate the problematic in the context of sixteenth century English
Renaissance epistemological skepticism, an epoch that anatomized the operation of reason and
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endorsed the epistemological pretention of an absolute foundation, a background that immensely
influenced Shakespeare’s doubt of human perfectibility.
Chapter five situates the ongoing problematic of prejudice in the context of modernity’s
prejudice against individuality by coining and employing the metaphor “irony” and the “ethical
single individual” from the philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard to substantiate the relevancy of the
fundamental prejudice. Kierkegaard saw the existential presuppositions of modernity as
symptoms of a deeper, historically and culturally rooted misunderstanding of individuality. This
chapter argues for a Kierkegaardian conception of the self as derivative and ethical that realizes
itself by standing its ground through irony.
Chapter six provides an explanation of how Levinas’s a priori ethics articulates the call
to attend to the face of the Other by focusing on his claim that ethics is “first philosophy” prior to
ontology or epistemology. Following this, the chapter explores the relationship between ethics
and Otherness: one’s relations with the Other in relation to a multiplicity of biases. The chapter
contributes to the ongoing scholarship on the necessity of prejudice as the ground on which we
stand, outlining Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and its connection to the radically different
biased ground of the Other. In Levinas, we see the biased ground not as a mere subjective
ground, but charged with an ethical relation, the responsibility to respond to the Other—an
engagement with the Other—that places ethics as the primary philosophical category that
precedes the self.
Finally, chapter seven—the concluding section—frames prejudice as postmodern
dialogic communicative necessity that calls for and welcomes the tainted ground upon which one
stands. I will end with a series of general conclusions from the work, explaining how these
conclusions bring to light the ongoing assertion there are multiple ethics, each grounded upon a
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fundamental bias, and how my inquiry fits into the general body of philosophical assumption that
the problematic nature of the concept of prejudice offers a privilege place for attentive listening
and learning from difference.

Significance of Work to the Discipline of Communication
In era marked by a plurality of narratives, the notion of prejudice offers richness to
dialogic communication ethics, bidding farewell to unreflective allegiance to common sense.
Arnett, Fritz and Bell (2009) implied this when they referred to the work Gadamer “who reminds
us of the importance of the bias in human communication and learning. Dialogue begins with
difference” (p. 23). Difference exemplifies the inevitability of prejudice. The dialogic nature of
prejudice holds the potential to address the notion that “ dialogue begins with the “desire to learn
from the Other through engagement of difference” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 95). The dialogic
nature of prejudice reveals prospects within dialogic communication ethics with transformative
potentials, which include the possibility to work with competing narratives and virtue structures
that inform any discussion of human communication.
The transformative potentials and its proclivity to attentiveness to competing narratives
suggests a hermeneutic of understanding reminiscent of Gadamer’ (1987) call “to seek and
acknowledge the immanent coherence contained within the meaning claim of the other” (p. 87).
A hermeneutic of understanding suggests fundamental prejudice, a narrative standpoint whence
one interacts with others. The interaction involves an epistemological humility: we cannot “stand
above the historical moment of engagement and cast judgment” (Arnett et al., 2007b, p. 115);
rather, we are called to bear witness to the historical moment by owning up to our own
fallibilities and the vulnerabilities of others, however radically different. It is within
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epistemological humility that prejudice emerges directly or indirectly as an unavoidable
communicative praxis that is ever listening, attending and learning from to particularity of the
other. Such is the reason for this work.

Summary
This introduction offers the inevitability of prejudice in dialogic communication ethics in
the postmodern era, calling for a paradigmatic move away from the universal assurances of
homogeneity, monolithic impositions, and despotic ideologies to “narrative conviction” as the
dialogic home for engaging Otherness. This work assumes that prejudice propels the pragmatic
reality that dialogic communication ethics begins neither in objectivity nor in commonality itself,
but rather in the very ground of prejudice that frames the conversation and its conventional
patterns. Finally, prejudice calls for walking the concept through its various historical periods as
well as exploring its necessity from the viewpoint of dialogic communication ethics.
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CHAPTER TWO—Dialogic Judgment: Subjective Universality
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle shows how judgment involves perception,
evaluation and decision making. In using the term “judgment” as rhetorically synonymous with
perception, discernment, and insight, Aristotle’s conception of judgment underscores the essence
of subjective universality. In other words, our worldviews are conditioned by contexts where
judgment is rendered according to tacit, personal subjectivities—I call them endoxic premises—
that foreground human communicative praxis.
The thrust of this chapter is that Aristotle held “subjective universality” as a state of
judgment. Aristotle identifies five states of judgment: technê (art/craft), episteme
(knowledge/scientific knowledge), phronesis (practical wisdom/prudence), sophia (philosophic
wisdom), and nous (comprehension/understanding). These states of judgment—Aristotle calls
them “states of the soul”—are epistemological discernment processes “in which the soul
possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial” (1984, 1139b15; p. 1799). In this chapter, I call
Aristotle’s states of judgment “subjective universality” because they inform “narrative
conviction” (Arnett, 2005). For purposes of this study, I will restrict my analysis of subjective
universality to the enthymeme—though not mentioned as one of the states of judgment in
Aristotle’s works—episteme, technê and phronesis. The metaphor “subjective universality”
hinges on an attentiveness that supersedes the normative. This extra-normative sense of
communicative competence expresses a practical dialogic wisdom that is cultivated both
individually and communally, emphasizing the need move from conventional thinking per say to
the ethical aim of “dialogic engagement” open to the negotiation of meanings (see Arnett &
Arneson, 1999, p. 298).
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Subjective universality has many implications for dialogic communication ethics. First, it
allows us to make a connection between what Aristotle calls “states of the soul” with dialogic
engagement. Using the work of Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede (1984), John Gage (1984),
Gregory Clark (1990), Richard Enos and Janice Lauer (1992), and Thomas Farrell (1993), I
argue that the dialogic component of subjective universality is enthymematic understanding.
These essays create a sense of reflective coexistence of difference—multiple subjectivities—in
rhetorical discourse by way of the enthymeme. The enthymeme seems to be a carry-over of the
notion of subjective universality into the communicative world, which I believe cashes out in
terms of prejudice as ground on which one stands. The desired result of this discussion is a more
thorough sense of what dialogic judgment and subjective universality mean given the problems
of prejudice in communication ethics.
I begin the chapter by discussing the dialogic elements of Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical
discourse, looking specifically at the nature of the enthymeme as it relates to subjective
universality as a dialogic concept. The rest of the chapter describes the uniqueness of subjective
universality as episteme, technê, and phronesis for establishing the ground of one’s bias in every
dialogic encounter. I begin with the enthymeme. The concept is used in this chapter to mean the
co-creation of meaning between rhetor and audience. The enthymeme encourages genuine
dialogue in which rhetors and audience persuade themselves of their individual biases or
subjective universalities while remaining open to the truth of the other. In the section on
judgment and enthymematic dialogism, the enthymeme will be introduced as an ethics that
privilege the dialogic engagement of subjective universality. This discussion reveals the dialogic
nature of the enthymeme, questioning the assumption that common values are incapable of being
multivocal. The second part of this chapter explores the immediate goals of subjective
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universality in the context of relationship between prejudice and judgment. Third, is the
treatment of subjective universality as a craft and wisdom applied to and made manifest in
communicative action. Last, are the implications of a dialogic understanding of subjective
universality: narrative contention emphasizes difference; subjective universality propels genuine
dialogue; and subjective universality privileges a movement toward dialogic engagement of the
self and other.

Judgment and Enthymematic Dialogism
The urge to elevate the dialogic elements of Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical discourse
have been advanced by Lunsford and Ede (1984), Gage (1984), Clark (1990), Enos and Lauer
(1992), and Farrell (1993). They maintain that Aristotle’s understanding of the rhetorical
discourse is dialogic. Lunsford and Ede (1984) argued that Aristotle’s rhetorical discourse
privileges a rhetor-audience relationship (p. 44). Central to this relationship is the role of
language in the creation of knowledge and belief and its relationship to subjective universality.
Aristotle viewed language as the medium through which judgment about the world is
communicated; he situates judgment within convention and reflective participation.
Gage (1984), advances the viewpoint of Lunsford and Ede by adding a dialogic
component to the Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical discourse. Aristotle’s rhetoric, Gage argued is
“an exchange of ideas among parties whose mutual goal is the discovery of [probable]
knowledge” (p. 155). Dialogue begins in “moment[s] of meaning,” (Cissna & Anderson, 2002),
moments in which
knowledge can knowledge can considered as something which people do
together, rather than as something which any one person, outside of discourse,
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has… and is likely to bring modification when minds bring new understandings
… carried out in relation to the intentions and reasons of others and necessarily
relative to the capacities and limits of human discourse, rather than a commodity
which is contained in one mind is transferred to another. (Gage, 1984, p. 156).
Gage’s conception of Aristotle’s rhetorical discourse is akin to the postmodern epistemological
assumption that genuine dialogue is a “moment where meaning and relation merge into some
new form of engagement” (Poulos, 2008, p. 117). Whedbee (1998) located the new form of
engagement in “‘endoxic’ premises that legitimately inform and initiate deliberation” (p. 172).
This dissertation adds that the dialogic engagement is an epistemic activity which connects
prejudice with discourse to co-create meaning. The implication is that Aristotle understands the
relationship between parties to rhetorical discourse as dialogic.
Like Gage, Clark (1990) addressed the epistemic and dialogic dimensions of Aristotle’s
rhetorical discourse. Epistemologically, rhetorical discourse constitutes reality. Dialogically,
rhetorical discourse is a “negotiative exchange” (p. 28). The negotiative exchange component of
rhetorical discourse “is a cooperative endeavor sustained upon a foundation of shared meanings
for the purpose of establishing further shared meanings that will support further cooperation and,
thus, further” dialogue (p. 37).
Shared meanings involve the cumulative weight of common sense and the inevitable, yet
uncertain fact of otherness. Viewed this way, it important to offer a public welcome to subjective
universality as a prior construction of a situated ethical self in any rhetorical discourse. This is
because rhetorical discourse transcends common sense; it is a rhetorical platform that involves
“civility” emanating from “the tainted ground” Arnett (Arnett & Arneson, 1999; Arnett,
McKendree, Fritz, & Roberts, 2008). As such, the Aristotelian meaning making or shared

42

meaning process provides a space for multiple expressed positions to encounter one another. In
its most developed conditions, rhetorical discourse is laden with biases for co-creating discourse.
Arendt (1961) provides us with a postmodern rendition of the role of subjective universality in
discourse in the Aristotelian sense when she reminds us that “an enlarged mentality presupposes
[the] ability to reverse perspectives, to see from another’s position, permitting” the
implementation of “a given universal” in the gathering of “more and more particular
understanding” (Arnett, 2007a, p. 70). This is another way of saying that a sense of the situated
or autonomous ethical self and its accompanying prejudice or tainted ground emerges whenever
there is the potential for dialogue. It is one reason why, in principle, rhetorical prejudice may
never irrevocably be dismissed.
Enos and Lauer (1992) argued that epistemic rhetoric, when viewed from Aristotle’s
understanding of heuristic (invention), is dialogic. They claimed that Aristotle viewed heuristic
“as creating meaning within the rhetor and co-creating meaning within the audience” (p. 80). The
work of Enos and Lauer, from the standpoint of this study, implies the emergence of subjective
universality, in all of its plurality, “initiate[s] dialogue in tensional exigencies whose urgency and
saliency are reciprocally enacted” (p. 83). However, I would add that from a postmodern stance,
prejudice is an epistemic invention which propels dialogue.
Finally, Farrell’s Practicing the Arts of Rhetoric (1999) claims that Aristotle understands
rhetorical discourse as an epistemic praxis: “Aristotle … says … is to practice judgment … and
achieves its aims in ways that allow virtually anyone to participate effectively within the practice
itself” (p. 81). For Farrell, rhetoric commands discourse, and so rhetorical discourse is, in a
sense, primarily dialogic. Farrell argued that rhetorical practice is relational because “it requires
another person in order to be practiced and thereby cultivated” (p. 81). Within the act of practice
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are the elements of reciprocity and collaboration, important “inventional capacity” with
“responsive interested others” (p. 81). Farrell’s point of view offers a public welcome of a
dialogic rhetoric otherwise than a rhetoric of domination and control. Rhetorical practice is not
an authoritarian, rhetor-centered, monolithic imposition. Instead it is a dialogic engagement of
plurality of activities and reflective judgment. This may be another way of saying that propriety
is always possessed of both differences and particulars.
The works of Lunsford and Ede, Gage, Clark, Enos and Lauer, and Farrell underscore the
postmodern assumptions that Aristotelian rhetorical discourse privileges the co-creation of
meanings between rhetor and audience. In the presence of this prevailing argument, what can be
offered as the basis for the claim that subjective universality is vital in every dialogic
communication, a la Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical discourse?
Implicit in the above question is the role of the enthymeme, in rhetorical discourse.
Arthur Walzer (1997) says the enthymemes are “common cultural beliefs which the audience
accepts,” and are framed “within the context of the general views of the audience” (p. 48).
Walter adds that the audience is a passive participant in the rhetorical discourse, thus questioning
the dialogic nature of Aristotle’s rhetoric. This study, on the hand, draws upon Lloyd Bitzer
(1959) and William Grimaldi (1972) and to make the claim that enthymemes are the rhetorical
markers that direct the co-creation of meaning or shared meanings a priori to dialogic rhetoric in
Aristotle. The enthymemes are a dialogic embodiment of negotiative other-centered praxis which
Bitzer sees as “syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and examples, whose function is
rhetorical persuasion. Its successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of
speaker and audience, and this is its essential character” (p. 408). Grimaldi describes the
enthymeme “the confrontation of speaker and audience” (p. 58). The assertions of Grimaldi and
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Bitzer describe the dialogic nature of the enthymeme. In other words, the enthymeme is an
embodiment of discursive thinking. The enthymeme, according to my understanding, encourages
“the importance of localities,” (Roberts, 2008), attentiveness to unique potentialities (Arnett,
2007b) or listening to subjective universality while remaining open to the provincial, situated
meaning of others.
The dialogic nature of Aristotle’s rhetorical discourse, as intimated earlier, is otherwise
than monologic imposition. In communication ethics, dialogic discourse can mean anything from
the face-to-face negotiation of difference to questioning monologic impositions (Hammond,
Anderson, & Cissna, 2003). Gadamer’s classification of dialogue as authentic or inauthentic
further clarifies this point. In Truth and Method (1975/1989), Gadamer describes dialogue as a
communicative act that we “fall into” (p. 385) and as a result come “to an understanding”:
it belongs to every true conversation that each person himself to the other, truly
accepts his points of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an
extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is
to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one
with each other on the subject. Thus we do not relate to the other’s opinion to him
but to our own opinions and views. (p. 387)
Gadamer’s statement here reinforces his distinguishing between two types of dialogue—
authentic and inauthentic. Authentic dialogue embodies “listening to what the other has to say.”
Inauthentic dialogue involves “being right, with ‘winning’” (Mangion, 2011, p. 168). Thus the
enthymeme as a rhetorical discourse is genuinely dialogic because it requires engaging differing
perspectives in ways that allow them to make their “own meaning heard” (Gadamer, 1975/1989,
p. 304). Furthermore, rhetorical discourse stresses unique potentialities. This is evident in the
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nature of the enthymeme—relationship between rhetor and audience—upon which meaning is
co-created or shared. I call this process enthymematic understanding.
This study specifies a definition of dialogic discourse and applies it to discussions on
Aristotle’s enthymeme. Dialogic discourse identifies those dialogues that maintain engagement
as a search for reciprocity without sacrificing difference or disregarding “provinciality.”
Descriptions of discourse as dialogic generally emphasize difference, multiplicity, or otherness.
Amit Pinchevski (2005) asserts that dialogic discourse rests in the “concern for the Other” (p.
73). The idea that Aristotle’s enthymeme is dialogic, that is, “concern is expressed in
communicating the approaches, addresses, and the contacts of the Other in order to signify
difference from what has been said—which is to say, in order to relate to the Other on the basis
of difference, rather than sameness; of dissensus, rather than consensus,” (Langsdorf, 2008, p.
249) is an important focus. For Gadamer, this concern derives from authentic dialogue: rhetor
and audience are bound by an “ethical relationship” which involves accountability to and from
each other in dialogic conversation (Vilhauer, 2010, p. 100).
The values that give subjective universality its ethical force in dialogic rhetoric derives
from Aristotle. There is, for example, the value of subjectivity in universality. In dialogic
rhetoric, subjectivity—the tainted ground—is not co-opted or manipulated. Dialogic rhetoric
from this perspective views subjective universality ideally as negotiative exchange between a
rhetor and audience without disregarding the subjective-endoxic ground of each other. The
relationship of this view of dialogue to prejudice is obvious.
This study expands upon Aristotle’s notion of rhetorical discourse to contend that
individual subjective universality is an embodiment of biases which give texture and content to
dialogue. In the context of dialogic ethics, discourse a la Aristotle, then, welcomes prejudice as
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an ethical necessity in a dialogic conversation rather than an epistemic goal which favors
unconditional certainty of knowledge and truth propelled through dogmatic imposition. Aristotle
would probably view subjective universality as a concatenation of biases within the telos of a
polis. This conclusion presumes that Aristotle would be committed to the dialogic ideal of an
enlarged negotiative exchange and concerned with the co-creation of meaning as enthymematic
understanding.
My analysis, so far, outlined the dialogic elements of Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical
discourse as it relates subjective universality. What makes rhetorical discourse dialogic is the
enthymeme, a negotiative exchange between rhetor and audience. Within the framework of the
enthymeme, subjective universality flourishes as communicative action tied to the notion of
multiple communication ethics that is attentive to otherness. In addition, Aristotle offers
rhetorical discourse as a telescopic view of subjective universality, calling forth the rhetorical
necessity for communication ethics as laden with bias.
To recap, the enthymeme is a derivative of epistemic endoxa—opinions, beliefs,
ideology, experiences, and knowledge. The character of the enthymeme places a premium on the
heuristic platform of the dialogic process because it is the stage where rhetor and audience
negotiate and exchange knowledge without disregarding the viewpoint of the other, and finally
co-create meaning. The rhetorical necessity of subjective universality foregrounds the
enthymeme as dialogic engagement. The emphasis on dialogic engagement supports a
communication ethics grounded in situatedness. Unraveling the connection between subjective
universality and the enthymeme provides distinctions between certainty and uncertainty,
authentic and inauthentic dialogue, and dialogic and monologic notions of judgment and
subjectivity.
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In the account that follows, the dialogic characteristics of subjective universality will be
explored via Aristotle’s means of judgment, namely technê, episteme and phronesis. By
examining these means of judgment, this study adds to the ongoing conversation about the place
of subjective universality in dialogic judgment. The next section treats subjective universality, as
an appropriate mode of discourse, and one aimed at reasoned judgment.

Judgment in Episteme Endoxa
The immediate goal of subjective universality is to perceive in a given context those
biases that influence the process of judging. This characterization, according to Christopher
Johnstone (1980), described Aristotle’s rhetoric as “affecting judgment” (p. 6). Following
Johnstone’s lead, I will argue that subjective universality affects judgment in deliberation, and
the assimilation of subjective universality to internal reasoning and dialogue articulates or
includes many of the unique characteristics of reasoning and choice making in episteme.
Stemming from this thrust is the axiom, subjective universality involves knowledge. In other
words, subjective universality is knowledge that is constitutive of the world. Knowledge as used
here is not objective knowledge but what Michael Polanyi (1958) called “personal knowledge.”
Polanyi’s personal knowledge is analogous to Aristotle’s reference to episteme as knowledge in
general.
In the Aristotelian system, there are two kinds of general knowledge: necessary and
contingent. Several scholars have argued that though Aristotle does not make a clear-cut
distinction between the two kinds of knowledge, he “establishes the difference between episteme
and phronesis primarily in terms of the object with which each is concerned. The object of
episteme is necessary … that of phronesis, contingent” (Long, 2004, p. 200). Aristotle attributes
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the former to scientific knowledge and the latter to opinions, endoxa. In his Posterior Analytics,
however, Aristotle “attempts to explain how it is possible to have both opinion and knowledge
about the same object” (Harari, 2004, p. 57). With Orna Harari, this study engages knowledge
and opinion of the world as “affecting judgment”—to use Johnstone’s (1980) term—to coin the
metaphor epistemic-endoxa as a rhetorical aid key for explaining subjective universality from the
perspective of dialogic communication ethics. Furthermore, the metaphor epistemic-endoxa is
used in this study in the tradition of Martha Nussbaum (1986) as a non-scientific approach to
Aristotle’s means of judgment.
For Nussbaum, epistemic endoxa are ordinary “beliefs” and “appearances” (phainomena)
and “openness.” These elements, especially openness, form the “basis of true flexible
perception” of the world of ordinary (p. 421) which foreshadows the postmodern assumptions of
dialogic ethics as attentive to difference. Nussbaum portrays Aristotle as attentive to the accepted
beliefs, values and practices of the time: “Aristotle promises a return from the search for external
justification to an internality that is deeply rooted in Greek tradition, if at odds with one
specifically philosophical tradition” (p. 242). Nussbaum argues that Aristotle’s search for
external justification to an internality cannot be separated from the notion of subjective
universality as the tainted ground—the culturally and historically rooted beliefs—and upon
which one stands. However, to grasp the relationship between epistemic endoxa and subjective
universality, one must take into account Aristotle’s theory of perception.
Nussbaum’s treatment of Aristotle’s theory of perception can be summed up as epistemic
ethics. She cites Aristotle—“discrimination lies in perception”—in proposing that perception is
about ethical relationship, and involves the recognition of subjectivity as a priori to universality
(p. 69). Recognition follows from correct perception, and is an “ethical reflection” in “its own
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right, embodying” epistemic endoxa not as inimical to sound judgment but as subjective
universality that fragments common sense (see p. 13). Nussbaum’s analysis is an implicit
reference to epistemic endoxa as speech act, for perception serves the function of language and
meaning:
experiences have in fact been differently constructed by different cultures. In
general, first of all, our best accounts of the nature of experience, even perceptual
experience, inform us that there is no such thing as an “innocent eye” that
receives an uninterpreted “given.” Even sense-perception is interpretative, heavily
influenced by belief, teaching, language, and in general by social and contextual
features. There is a very real sense in which h members of different societies do
not see the same sun and stars, encounter the same plants and animals, hear the
same thunder. (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 14)
Nussbaum assertion has been corroborated by some scholars of Aristotle, like Irwin (1986),
Denyer (1991), Modrak (2001), Haskins (2004), among many. These scholars, apart from
making linkages between perception and language, also argued that the linkages “pave[s] the
way for a systemic understanding” (Haskins, 2004, p. 4). This work further extends the
perception-language-systemic understanding relationship to the metaphor epistemic endoxa.
Such a hyphenated metaphor situates judgment within both particular and universal principles
(Arnett, 2007a, p. 70).
From a postmodernist point of view, epistemic endoxa functions as enthymematic
dialogism as it corroborates Aristotle’s insistence on acknowledging a multiplicity of opinions.
As Most (1994) and Wardy (1996) point out, much has been made of the fact that in his
enumeration of the resources of enthymemes, Aristotle doesn’t hasten to rein in the multiplicity
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of seemingly arbitrary cultural norms (see Haskins, 2004). The impulse behind this assertion is
key. In the dialogic formulation of the enthymeme, the audience is not assumed to univocally
assent to a commonsense opinion; rather an audience interpretation of common values is capable
of being provincial and unstable. Therefore, what is probable for an audience becomes
problematized. It implies that subjective universality gains greater salience because epistemic
endoxa expressed enthymematically have the potential to elicit different values from an
audience.
The main contention of this section is that Aristotle’s attention to popular beliefs and
expressions as a discursive substratum of judgment is a communicative welcome and respect for
culturally situated opinions and the beliefs as well as the ability to acknowledge the truths or
viewpoints of the other. Added to Buber’s conditions for genuine dialogue, there is a linkage
between dialogue and of epistemic endoxa in dialogic settings, enriching the idea of subjective
universality. Grounding epistemic endoxa so thoroughly in opinions or knowledge requires a
fitting definition. In this context, epistemic endoxa privileges subjective universality. In the next
section, I will argue that genuine dialogue and relational good outline identifiable standards for
accomplishment in rhetorical discourse and implies an analogy of subjective universality as
technê and phronesis. The idea is consistent with the rhetorical impact of prejudice on dialogic
communication ethics, the focus of my study.

Judgement in Technê and Phronesis
Aristotle defined technê—translated as craft or art—as “a state of capacity to make,
involving true course of reasoning” (1984, 1140a10; p. 1800). Technê has both theoretical and
practical aspects. The theoretical aspect is “is closely associated with practical judgment (sophia,
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gnome), forethought, planning, and prediction” and aimed at precise management of exigencies
(Nussbaum, 1986, p. 95). Technê requires a combination of insight and dexterity. Technê in this
sense involves discerning productivity—a true course of reasoning—in the light of excellence
and the vice versa. As Aristotle said, “… any action is well performed when it is performed in
accordance with the appropriate excellence … human good turns out to be activity of the soul in
conformity with excellence …” (1984, 1098a14-18; p. 1735). The communicative importance of
discerning productivity is framed in Arendt’s The Human Condition (1998) as “fabrication”—
shaping “material in order to bring about a preconceived end” (Villa, 2001, p. 137). That
preconceived end for Aristotle is an active engagement with production intended at some good:
But certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are
products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart
from actions, it is the nature of products to be better than the activities … the end
of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity … in all
of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends.
(Aristotle, 1984, 1094a5-10; p. 1729)
Art/craft is about production, a “coming into being” (1140a12-14; p. 1800) and aimed at a good.
The craft analogy highlights the ethical aspects of a preconceived end, a good and productive
bias. In his book, Plato’s Craft of Justice (1996), Richard Parry argues that the craft analogy has
two dimensions: “other-regarding” and “self-regarding” (p. 2). The craft analogy privileges the
acknowledgment of one’s potentials as well as those of others. For example, a “horse trainer
finds something intrinsically valuable about for herself as a horse trainer in exercising her craft,
and by doing so she trains a fine horse” (p. 2). This is craft analogy. What is required to pursue
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craft dialogically is ethical “maturity” which, according to Parry, involves a craftlike ordering of
live “often inspired by ideals” which “have an intrinsic value … recreated in a craftlike” manner
(Parry, 1996, p. 2). Craft, in this sense, is framed within the spirit of productivity and is “situated
within” an ethics of responsibility (Arnett, 2005, p. 142). Communicative actions are shaped
within the framework of productive and responsible actions ever sensitive and attentive to a
given good.
This dissertation understands dialogic ethics to be technê or craft with subjective
universality as its primordial handiwork. The basic idea is that dialogic ethics as craft, a
productive and responsible human discourse, begins with a given good (subjectivity) within the
depths of universality. By way of judgment, subjective universality privileges the bias ground by
enthymematically shaping communicative actions as ethical relationships within the framework
of co-creation of meaning. Enthymematic shaping is just another word for a rhetoric of
persuasion. Enthymematic shaping goes beyond passive acquiescence to an active engagement
with differing narratives. The active engagement is not a given; it must be co-created in other to
allow difference to flourish. Difference emerges in the co-creation of meaning, not in syllogistic
imposition.
The notions of enthymematic shaping and co-creation of meaning are placed in one
hypostasis; they interanimate to frame the dialogic nature of the enthymeme. By dialogic is
meant a rhetorical platform that is open to and engages multiple narratives. To paraphrase
Thomas De Quincey (1897), enthymemes derive from and manifest in local narratives (p. 90).
From this perspective, it becomes possible to acknowledge narrative bias through a public
welcome of plurality “located in the multiple arenas of a reticulate public sphere in which”
difference is engaged through “vernacular rhetoric” (Hauser, 1999, p. 12). If vernacular rhetoric
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is considered the tainted ground upon which one stands to co-create meaning in a rhetorical
discourse, prejudice as expressed in this dissertation is compatible with the postmodernist
assumption that enthymematic understanding is a dialogic craft. Contrary to tyrannical
determinations of what constitutes discourse, enthymematic understanding is about framing
subjective universality as a dialogic standpoint, a standpoint shaped by “cooperative” meaning
making (Bitzer, 1959, p. 407).
This dissertation calls for broadening the notion of the enthymeme to include prejudice as
living a “sense of the appropriate with responsive interested others” (Farrell, 1999, p. 86). Like
the understanding of rhetorical prejudice itself, the enthymeme needs to be broadened to include
productive cooperative encounters for crafting ethical relationships. Such an understanding point
to “how humans can most productively engage with others in meaningful dialogue—where
dialogue goes beyond conversation, or even simple understanding” (Nakayama & Martin, 2014,
p. 105). But a broadened understanding of the enthymeme requires recalling its intimate link
with “dialogic ethical competence” (Arnett et al., 2009). Dialogic ethical competence becomes,
among many other activities: listening, attentiveness, and the negotiation of differing senses of
the good; self-reflexivity, a discernment process which Arnett et al. (2009) say is a “reflection
upon one’s own” and “narrative commitments” (p. 95).
Taking the enthymeme into dialogic ethical competence requires discerning “the potential
effects of our communication and how those effects themselves find meaning, judged by
standpoint, situated in a narrative ground, informed by moments before us, and responsive to the
Other’s position” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 94). The enthymeme gives currency to the ground we
stand on or the ground our feet by responding to “moments of meeting” (Arnett & Arneson,
1999) with difference. The enthymeme is essentially “letting the other happen to me while
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holding my own ground” (Stewart & Zediker, 2000, p. 232) as well as an “[an] interactive
multivocality, in which multiple points of views retain their integrity as they play off each other”
(Montgomery & Baxter, 1998, p. 160). This sense of the enthymeme is akin to Aristotle’s notion
of phronesis.
Phronesis is practical wisdom; “it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with
regard to the things that are good or bad for a [wo]man” (Aristotle, 1984, 1140b5-7; p. 1800).
Implicit in this definition of phronesis is making prudent judgment calls about actions, whether
productive or practical. In the words of French philosopher André Comte-Sponville, phronesis
“could be called good sense, but in the service of goodwill. Or intelligence, but of the virtuous
kind” (2001, p. 32). In this context, “the agent” who makes a prudent judgment calls “must have
knowledge … must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and … must proceed
from a firm and unchangeable character” (1105a30; p. 1746). From a postmodernist perspective,
phronesis is an ethical competent action or activity which derives from the distinctive actions of
a prudent person, phronimos.
Distinctive actions result from learnedness and experience. As Aristotle said, “Hence
anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about
the subject of political science must have been brought up in good habit” (1984, 1095b5; p.
1731). The phronimos is a “refined and well-bred [wo]man” (1128a33; p.1780) and a role model
(see Carden, 2006, p. 22; Yu, 2007, p. 49). The phronimos is attentive to particularities. The
attentiveness “requires perceptiveness” and the ability to bring the general and the particular
“into illuminating connection with each other” (Dunne, 2005, p. 376). For Aristotle, moral
excellence—a necessary character of the phronimos—plays a vital role in the acquisition of
phronesis. Thus, Aristotle argues that “it is impossible to be practically wise [phronesis] without
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being good [phronimos]” (1984, 1144b1; p. 1807). The phronimos, possessing phronesis,
deliberates well, paying attention to the multiple goods. Though Aristotle did not use the term
“multiple goods,” the metaphor of multiple goods is used here in line with Aristotle’s own
assertion that phronesis is not only concerned with universals.
Phronesis, Aristotle says involves the ability to ability to deliberate and negotiate
contending goods, listening attentively to particularities. “Nor is practical wisdom concerned
with universals only—it must also recognize particulars; for it is practical, and practice is
concerned with particulars ... practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore, one should
have both forms [the universal and the particular] of it” (1141b15-23; p. 1802). Joseph Dunne
(1993) characterizes phronesis as “personal knowledge” because it expresses individuality (p.
244). For Thomas Farrell (1998), it is a “by product” of multivocality (p. 9). Eugene Garver
(2004) contends it “emerges when we deliberate together, persuade each other, are persuaded by
each other, and consider how we should persuade and be persuaded” (p. 1). The phronimos
possesses phronesis; s/he’s a person of experience, character or moral excellence, and engages
the views of others in the polis. Such a view lends credence to a non-conventional view of
phronesis as a dialogic ethical competent action propelled by “relevance, appropriateness, or
sensitivity to context” (Dunne, 2005). Arnett in Dialogic Confession (2005) suggests such a
view of phronesis.
Phronesis, practical wisdom responds to the historical situation … and attentive to
the particulars in a given situation (responsive to change) … works within limits
while creatively adding new ideas responsive to the historical moment …
recognizing that embedded agency makes a difference as we engage practical
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wisdom that frames an appropriate … response to a unique set of circumstances.
(pp. 47-48)
Phronesis is both attentive to and receptive of difference. A primary feature of phronesis is that
it often mediates between the universal and the particular, between generalizations supported by
biases and specific responses to the particularities of cultures, traditions, or narrative structures.
My understanding of judgment in technê and phronesis is informed by Gadamer’s thinking on
the ancient problem of the many and the one as well as my placement of rhetorical prejudice
within this problematic.
The intent of this chapter has been to set Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical discourse within
the context of subjective universality, an implicit reference to prejudice as dialogical opening for
communication ethics. The enthymeme, epistemic endoxa, technê, and phronesis are specialized
enterprises that foreground human judgment. Epistemic endoxa is treated as popular beliefs and
expressions as well as a discursive substratum of judgment. The discourse of epistemic endoxa is
enthymematic cognition. Epistemic endoxa is a non-scientific endoxa that privileges respect for
culturally situated opinions or beliefs as well as the ability to acknowledge the truths or
viewpoints of the other. Though non-scientific, epistemic endoxa has the potential for the
construction of a more rigorous system of knowledge.
A technê grounds production within the framework of excellence, and is guided by
virtues which are acquired through habits or instruction (MacIntyre, 1984). Rhetoric’s aim as a
technê is to cultivate and enact “practical reason” (Frentz, 1985, p. 1), which when applied to
phronesis yields moral excellence (Warnick, 1989, p. 309). When applied to rhetorical discourse,
technê guides the rhetor and audience to aim at persuasive reasoning otherwise than
manipulative reason. The former is akin to individuality in the realm of subjective universality
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while the latter is akin to individualism in the realm of the individualistic bad faith project of the
enlightenment. Furthermore, as true art, technê guides discourse as rhetorical transaction in
particular and human action in general as crafted communicative acts (see MacIntyre, 1984, p.
197). This dissertation locates such crafted communicative acts in petite subjectivities and
dialogic deliberation. For Aristotle, crafted communicative acts propel enthymematic reasoning
in ways that that allow one to acknowledge subjective opinions of the generalized opinion
without losing one’s own ground.
The centrepiece of technê as crafted communicative acts is to create effective discourse
in which individual biases are articulated to others (Enos & Lauer, 1992). For MacIntyre (1984),
technê—as crafted communicative acts—is a rhetorical practice in “which goods internal to” a
discourse “are realized in the course of” co-creating meanings “which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of” a discourse aimed at “excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended” (p. 175). In other words, technê is value-laden and
is aimed at right actions as one approaches the telos of excellence. Phronesis is concerned with
value and its starting points are biases produced by subjectivities directed toward the telos of
excellence and happiness. Although rhetorical discourse is productive of phronesis, the action
the discourse produces could be read and judged as grounded in bias. Bias is, therefore, a state of
judgment according to Aristotle. The states of judgment that underlie the enthymeme, epistemic
endoxa, technê, and phronesis are constitutive of the nature and relevancy of subjective
universality in rhetorical discourse. Within the framework of the enthymeme and the various
states of judgment, rhetorical prejudice flourishes as a communicative action that is welcoming
of otherness.
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Implications
Given postmodernity’s emphasis on difference, a dialogic proposal seeking otherness
must offer a full account of the local as it seeks subjective universalist terms of rhetorical
prejudice. In a practical sense the local which Aristotle calls means of judgment describe an
epistemic gap between “implicit and explicit goods underlying human communication” (Arnett
et al., 2010, p. 113). Thus the question: How do we account for the epistemic gap between
“cosmopolitanism and provinciality” (Roberts & Arnett, 2008) without sliding into “a bland
relativistic toleration of multiple viewpoint” (Anderson & Cissna, 2008, p. 278)? Such is the
reason that Martin Buber alerts us to the dialectal tension between subjective universality and
universal generality. He writes:
It is only when reality is turned into logic and A and non-A dare no longer dwell
together, that we get determinism and indeterminism, a doctrine of predestination
and a doctrine of freedom, each excluding the other. According to the logical
conception of truth only one of two contraries can be true, but in truth reality of
life as one lives life they are inseparable. (Buber, 1997, p. 17)
An overemphasis on either subjective universality or universal generality can lead to perilous
communicative corollaries, e.g., monological mutation of a narrative into a master narrative.
Consistent with Buber’s caution is the assumption that one can stand above history and cast
judgment, an epistemological overreach that is dismissive of the narrative ground of the different
Other (Arnett et al., 2007b). Buber’s caution invites the suggestion of Clifford Geertz (2001):
What we need are ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to
individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities, responsive to
what Charles Taylor has called “deep diversity,” a plurality of ways of belonging
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and being, and that yet can draw from them—from it—a sense of connectedness
that is neither comprehensive nor uniform, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless
real. (p. 224)
Geertz’s suggestion offers pragmatic insights to the communicative phenomenon of subjective
universality and how its constitutive elements, namely, “particularities,” “individualities,”
“oddities,” “discontinuities,” “contrasts,” and “singularities” all point to the pragmatic and
philosophical necessity of rhetorical prejudice. This necessity seeks and acknowledges otherness.
Subjective universality is responsive to rhetorical prejudice.
Aristotle’s notion of the enthymeme, the states of judgment, and the metaphor of this
chapter, subjective universality underscore the necessity of prejudice in so far as it impacts
dialogic judgment. Carlo Sigonio, a 15th century Italian humanist, connected judgment which he
called the “power and habit to reason” to dialogue dependent upon a person’s biased ground, that
is, “what truth is within oneself” and the truth of the other. “The first consists of a certain silent
activity of the mind, the second consists of an open questioning and answering with the person
with whom we engage in a disputation” (in Spranzi, 2011, p. 138). Connecting judgment and
dialogue directs attention to the situatedness of prejudice in every dialogic encounter. The
situatedness of prejudice grounds dialogue in the ethical sensitivity and sensibility to the truth of
the other. In this sense, Aristotle invites us to an ethical discernment process (phronesis) that
opens individuals in a communicative relationship to be attentive and responsive to narratives
that both shape and ground dialogic conversation.
This chapter’s focus on subjective universality is a contribution to the ongoing
conversation that there are multiple ethics to dialogic communication (Arnett et al., 2009). With
its theorization in attentive listening and learning from difference, subjective universality
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engages prejudice to connect sensitivity to the self and other. In this sense, subjective
universality fosters “enlarged thought” (Arendt, 1978; Benhabib, 1988, 1992), cultivates “fusion
of horizons” (Gadamer, 1975/1989), provide opportunities for “a special convergence—born of
openness to possibility and happenstance—of dialogic imagination, dialogic courage, and
narrative conscience” (Poulos, 2008, p. 117), and helps to balance the “metaphors of discourse”
with the “metaphors of action” (Schrag, 1986 in Arnett, 1992, pp. 17-18). James Marsh (2014),
working in the tradition of Bernard Lonergan elaborated on this process:
The desire to know, our questioning orientation to being, expresses itself in ever
increasing identification with otherness as it is in the otherness. Being as other to
me and as including me is the object of the pure desire to know. To experience,
understand, judge, choose, in line with the transcendental precepts, is
progressively to say “yes” to the other, to be converted to the other. We have here
a deepening receptivity to the other. “Receptivity” and “otherness” are
correlatives. (p. 47)
When tied to “receptivity” and “otherness,” rhetorical prejudice provides a ground for
conceiving the dialogic form of the enthymeme, the various states of the judgment various means
of judgment—episteme endoxai, techne and phronesis—which I call subjective universality. In
recognizing the relevance of subjective universality in dialogue, this chapter conceptualizes
prejudice as rhetorical openness to difference.
The next chapter takes us into conversation about locative truths, introducing the basic
terms of the conversation from a non-conventional understanding of the Pauline concept of
universalism. The chapter places locative truths against monolithic discourses and practices that
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are tyrannical to difference. Locative truths, the chapter will argue, demystifies the dialogic
nature of rhetorical prejudice.
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CHAPTER THREE—Universal Singularity: Dialogue and Particularities
This chapter advances the assumption that subjective universality (as discussed in the
previous chapter) is constitutive of dialogic engagement according to tacitly understood practices
of enthymematic understanding. This understanding presumes attentiveness to episteme endoxai
which favor a dialogue as dialectical (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996), agonistic, (Smith, 2008)
“tensional ethical practice” (Stewart & Zediker, 2000). These conceptions of dialogue are central
to Saint Paul’s notion of universalism, which I argue, is founded on the notion of “universal
singularity.” The metaphor “universal singularity”—borrowed from Alain Badiou (2003)—is a
“dialogic ethical competent” (Arnett et al., 2009) act that offers both theoretical and practical
framework for questioning the prevailing abstractions of totality. As Levinas contends,
“singularity cannot find a place in a totality” (quoted in Eskin, 2000, p. 19). Universal singularity
engages “the necessity of the urban and the different” (Roberts & Arnett, 2008, p. 2), calling
forth an attentiveness to locality, locative truths, or particularities.
In this chapter, following Badiou, I argue that universal singularity, a non-conventional
derivative of Saint Paul’s notion of universalism constitutes locality, locative truths, or
particularities—biases—that link up the “paradoxical connection between a subject without
identity and a law without support” (Badiou, 2003, p. 5). Such an understanding provides ground
for conceiving prejudice as the biased narrative ground upon which one stands in every dialogic
encounter. Universal singularity, as discussed in this chapter, should be thought of as a necessary
communicative gesture that welcomes rhetorical prejudice as the engagement of provinciality to
express meaning in the face of difference. Meaning, here, “pertains to the individuated
components of stories—whether they represent accurate assertions about social reality and
thereby constitute good reasons for belief or action” (Fisher, 1987, p. 105). This work
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understands prejudice through the lens of concatenated understandings of the Christ event as
local representations of truth. Thus, the Christ event is at odds with the western epistemological
coordinates of truth as pragmatic, coherent, and consistent narrative. From this perspective, truth
is a locative phenomenological response to context-driven stories. Context(uality) is about
difference, and difference is about context(uality). Thus, the Christ event is meaningless to any
culture, tradition, or narrative structure unless it is context-driven.
I wish to advance a conception of Pauline rhetoric of universal singularity that considers
context-driven narratives that frame communication within an ethics of attentive responsiveness.
My conception of the Pauline rhetoric of universal singularity is derived from Badiou’s reading
of Paul. Badiou’s Pauline rhetoric questions unreflective loyalty to commonality and a given
“hypergood” tied to what Saint Augustine of Hippo described in the City of God as “lusts to
dominate the world” and the “passion for dominion” (Saint Augustine, 1958). A prosaic
understanding of Pauline universalism as an opportunistic lust for monological control
undermines narrative bias by dictating “the practices that shape a given narrative structure”
(Arnett et al., 2010, p. 118). This work links Badiou’s notion of Pauline universalism and
“grounded conviction” within the framework of dialogue and particularities. Such as proposal
calls for understanding universal singularity as situated subtractive provinciality.
Universal singularity addresses Paul’s notion of universalism as fundamental prejudice
which bears witness to the Christ event as situated subtractive provinciality otherwise than a
provincial commitment to absolute difference. The former is interactive, quite like Benhabib’s
(1992, 2002) interactive universalism. The latter has roots in Hegelian dialectics, a monologic
perception of truth, and is incongruous with the former, the postmodern assumption that
difference is an originary first principle of human communication and relationship.
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This chapter first addresses the concept of subtractive universalism, a heuristic metaphor
I coined to situate Badiou’s treatment of Pauline universalism within a postmodern
communicative context. Second, the chapter takes on the “provincial” nature of universal
singularity in the Pauline context of universalism. Third, the chapter suggests the facticity of
universal singularity as dialogic affirmation of difference. Fourth, the chapter concludes with a
consideration of “dialogic ethical competence” which attends to particularities as universal
singularity.

Subtractive Universalism
Saint Paul’s universalism, an implicit reference to prejudice as the ground on which we
stand is evident in Badiou’s conception of what constitutes provinciality and locative truths.
Badiou (2003) corroborates this assertion, arguing that Paul does not allow any ethnic group to
possess the truth to the exclusion of others: “Paul’s unprecedented gestures consist in subtracting
truth from the communitarian grasp, be it that of a people, a city, an empire, a territory, or a
social class” (p. 5). Through the prism of postmodern rhetoric and dialogic communication, it
could be argued that much of Paul’s notion of universalism a la Badiou is about narrative
conviction if one understands by the term, universal singularity, the provinciality of locative
truths. His writing also provides insights into the attempt to synthesize the nature of prejudice
rhetorically construed in the body of the diverse Pauline communities whose experience of the
Christ event defines provinciality as a public admission of situated bias that privileges listening
to a narrative of a locality otherwise than dictating the universal common sense of a totality.
In engaging with Badiou’s Paul, this chapter underscores the possibilities of shifting the
terrains of monologic dogmatism as particular narrative structures interrogate hegemonic
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epistemic impositions. This interrogation constitutes the notion of subtractive universalism as a
turn away from provincial reclusivism or a provincial detachment from an imposed leviathan
narrative or absolute difference. The emphasis here is a rhetorical conviction that seeks
“narrative agreement” as an enthymematic response to a narrative event. John Caputo (1993)
describes an event as a “happening” which possesses with “intensity” an intensity that leads to
the interpretative otherwise, and a “singularity” that is grounded in contextual truth, (p. 94), a
truth subtracted or distanced from a metaphysical grand narrative, an evental truth grounded in
fundamental prejudice. In fact, Caputo’s definition of event has kinship with Arnett’s oft-used
extended metaphor, “dialogic response to the demands of the historical moment” (see, for
example, Arnett, 2005, p. 5) as well as my own metaphor of enthymematic responsiveness. The
two metaphors—Arnett’s and mine—make the notion of event, as explained by Caputo, dialogic
moments, opening interactions between the particular and the universal, the non-sense narrative
and the common-sense narrative. Event particularizes a given narrative. This is only possible
when subjectivity is distanced from the subsumptions of universal-ontological assurances.
Hegel and the was a philosophical force behind universal ontological assurances. His
“synthesis-driven dialectic” (Trott, 2015, p. 63) attracted criticism from several continental
philosophers like Schelling, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Popper, Adorno, Levinas, and
Derrida, to mention a few. For these philosophers, Hegel’s dialectics offered an ontological
“totality of absolute knowledge” that promises completeness and an overview of what there is,
and of what can thought, thereby … imposing closure and homogeneity” (Hodge, 2010, p. 52).
Badiou, in a similar philosophical tradition, questioned the tyranny of the Hegelian dialectics and
its obsession with totality. For Badiou, truth is not totality. Thus, totality is a phenomenological
myth and an ethical impossibility.
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Despite questioning the Hegelian dialectics and its emphasis on totality, Badiou, engages
Hegel’s dialectics within the interplay of universal singularity and the universal generality,
suggesting a phenomenology of totality that universality, in fact, affirms subjectivity. Badiou
writes,
Of course, we share with Hegel a conviction about the identity of being and
thought. But for us this identity is a local occurrence and not a totalized result. We
also share with the Hegel the conviction regarding the universality of the True.
But for us this universality is guaranteed by the singularity of truth-events, and
not by the view that the Whole is the history of its immanent reflection. (LW 1413). (Bosteels, 2014, p. 142)
This is the source of Badiou’s famous philosophical maxim: “subject-truths” (p. 60; see footnote
1), and the beginning of his concept of subtraction, a notion that would be alluded to in several
parts of this chapter. The subject-truth, is a rejection of the Hegelian dialectic, which is rooted in
ontological truth, i.e., truth as infinite. The Hegelian dialectic engages a violent differentiation of
difference, and by so doing, colonizing difference into an ontological whole, and offering
generality as the truth of being, a new truth which he (Hegel) alluded to in the Phenomenology of
Spirit as new spirit-propelled awakening (Hegel, 1977, p. 6), a new awakening to “Absolute
Truth … achieved within a dialectical process in which mind or spirit, through the process of
alienation and negation, arrives at an ever-higher unity …” (Phillips, 2009, p. 76). (see p. 61,
footnote 9). The Hegelian dialectic, properly called Hegelian negation, resonates with the
colonial strategy of divide and conquer. In other words, differentiation becomes an opportunistic
avenue for colonizing difference, individuality, or singularity into a truth system of an infinite
whole, Absolute Truth.
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Badiou would argue that the notion of colonization is tantamount to the usurpation of a
subject space. Such colonization is based on what he described as the excesses of “an expansive
typology … the effectuation of a global interiorization” (Badiou, 2009c, p. 119). Badiou
critiques Hegel’s dialectics, a speculative idealism based on the “interiorization of Totality”
(Bosteels, 2014, p. 142) that was receptive purely to the “objective plinth of ‘social formations’
or even … the great ideological, religious or mythical discourses” (Badiou, 1999, p. 33). Such
Hegelian proselytism constitutes a Deleuzean univocity, which is at odds with plurality (see
Badiou, 2005, p. 23; De Beistegui, 2005, p. 53) or plural-entities. Badiou understood pluralentities not as a derivative of an ontological addition (amalgamation), but a phenomenological
subtraction (separation). As it was for Nietzsche, ethics is a disclosure of a facticity that had
otherwise been absorbed into a Great Value system aimed at fossilizing metanarratives.
For Badiou, ethics holds together unity “without totalizing” difference or singularity.
Subtraction reveals the prevarication of a Great Value system, disrupting the “bad faith” (Sartre,
1953) assumption that system driven narratives are the sites of truth. Subtraction separates from
system driven narratives, pointing to petite narratives, instead, as the originary sites of a truth
procedure. The roots of difference are found in subtractive universalism, which is included in a
truth procedure. Subtractive universalism works within Arendt’s enlarged mentality (1982) and
plurality of publics (1998)—broadening the conversational horizon to include other views—on
the one hand, and Morocco’s “phenomenological distance” (2005)—“permitting appropriate
space to texture relational development” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 124), on the other hand, to
develop an enthymematic conception of relationality that is not aloof, but aware of a different
narrative ground. Subtractive universalism engages a narrative ground as a particularity
narrative.
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Gadamer (1975/1989) reminds us of the communicative relevancy of particularity from
the perspectives of the fusion of horizons as otherwise than standardizing narratives (p. 305).
Gadamer calls for overcoming absolutist particularism, a form of despotic subtraction that is
“based on subjection and abdication of reason” (p. 281). Particularity, on the other hand belongs
to a theory of prejudices free from the extremism of the Enlightenment” (p. 281). Like Gadamer,
Arendt (1951) rejected absolutist particularism, calling for—in the spirit of enlarged mentality—
“broadening one’s perspective with other perspectives such that one reaches a genuinely pluralist
and, therefore, more” dialogical and less monological (Vasterling, 2011).
Furthermore, subtractive universalism provides a way of thinking about grounded
conviction, a localized truth phenomenologically, existentially, and philosophically. From a
phenomenological perspective, grounded conviction is a “subjective fidelity” to the Christ event.
For Badiou, the Christ event is a provincial truth: “it is the truth of a specific situation that, once
declared and maintained by a subjective fidelity, has universal scope” (Riera, 2005, p. 11).
Badiou’s universal is not monologic; rather, it is dialogic because it is attentive to particularities.
These particularities are non-sense narrative sites of the evental truth, not common-sense
narrative structures for the evental truth. The defining feature of non-sense narrative sites is
prejudice. Thus, it is by focusing attention on prejudice that the Christ event becomes a
pragmatic communicative event or reality which is otherwise than a conventional discourse
whose narrative structure is grounded in an absolutist Newtonian language aimed at totality and
control (See Christians, 1995, p. 59; Riera, 2005, p. 11).
Existentially, subtractive universalism could be considered an enthymematic response
“tempered by a listening to and learning” from a provincial narrative (Arnett, 2005, p. 15). The
provincial narrative becomes the sense-making site for the Christ event. Badiou stresses the
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importance of the Christ event as an existential turn away from totalitarian representations.
Subtractive universalism could stand in for Karl Jaspers’ understanding of the event as existenz
(Reynolds, 2014, p. 166). For Jaspers, existenz, like an event, transcends hegemonic epistemic
evaluation and translation. Thus, existenz defies clarity. The Christ event is a subjective
communicative encounter with the unknown as well as the willingness to responsively engage—
whether Buberian or Levinasian—the paradox of contradictions that characterize the postmodern
era of narrative contention (see Jaspers, 1955, p. 27).
From a philosophical point of view, Subtractive universalism addresses the multiple
philosophical issues that “background” and “foreground” the Pauline concept of universalism.
Paul lived and worked in an era of multiple philosophies. To bring the gospels from within a
purely “conservative vision of Jewish law” (Badiou, 2003, p. 14) to a Greek world rooted in the
language of philosophia, calls for engaging the “tainted ground” (Arnett, 2008b) of each
culture—Jewish and Greek. For Badiou’s Paul, a formulaic response to the Christ event is
problematic because truth “is neither, structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal” (Badiou, 2003, p. 14).
A structural, axiomatic, or legal truth procedure would lead to an identitarian theory of discourse.
Such a discourse, in Bonhoeffer’s rhetoric of responsibility would lead to “perplexity,” and
eventually “to insensitivity” (see Arnett, 2005, p. 200), an apathetic dismissive stance.
In weaving the phenomenological, existential, and philosophical components of
subtractive universalism together, this work teases out of Badiou’s Pauline notion of
universalism, an ethics between universal singularity and universal generality. It is, therefore, no
accident that Paul mobilizes an entirely different discourse structure, a universal singularity,
which Badiou (2003) claims “is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a condition of
belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address” (p. 14). The discourse of universal
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singularity is rooted in a philosophical ethics of non-conditionality; it embraces singularities as a
rhetorical and hermeneutical entrance into the Christ event. For Badiou, conditionality breeds a
“militant process of truth” (see Barker, 2002, p. 101). The metaphor of non-conditionality, which
is the basis of the discourse of universal singularity, on the other hand, works for the concept of
subtractive universalism. This subtractive universalism is the subject of the Pauline notion of
universalism.
Subtractive universalism is about newness, i.e., a renewed experience of the Christ event.
In the experience of the event, a singular truth is subtracted from the general truth. In other
words, the Christ event comes as renewed affirmation of truth, a novel truth devoid of any statist
dictate or interest. Like the Badiou notion of subtraction, subtractive is not a Hegelian dialectical
negation, but a phenomenological-existential affirmation, a becoming—resurrection (Badiou,
2003, p. 66). It is a resurrection that gives birth to subjectivity (p. 68). Subtractive universalism
becomes the condition for grounded conviction. Badiou called grounded conviction, a “declared
conviction” (p. 87). The Pauline notion of universalism calls for subtracting a provincial
affirmation from the Christ event. As Badiou (2009b) puts it, “the event is ‘grace’ … and is
presented as pure donation. Our subjective constitution depends on this event: ‘You are not
under law but under grace’ (Rom 6:14)” (p. 33). The event allows the subjective individual to
experience, relive, and reaffirm its subjectivity by subtracting itself from totalitarian abstractions.
From a communicative standpoint, Badiou’s Paul frames a subtractive universalism like
Benhabib’s notion of “interactive universalism.” Benhabib sees difference as the genesis of
every human communicative encounter. Context is important for Benhabib. Truth for her, is
meaningless without context. Thus, attempts to decontextualize truth only reifies “uniform
rational moral autonomy” (Johnson, 2002, p. 25), and undermines the ground of others. Uniform
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rational moral autonomy is determinate, and levels the narrative ground and the singularity of the
different other. Interactive universalism, on the other hand, privileges learning to the different
other. According to Benhabib (2002), we “can learn the wholeness of the other(s) only through
their” biased narrative grounds (p. 14).
Interactive universalism is bias-sensitive, and implies that the Christ event is grounded
conviction, an acknowledgment of the narrative bias. Benhabib, by way of her interactive
universalism, would situate dialogue within the context of a Christ event, the narrative bias of
other people, culture or tradition. With Benhabib and Badiou, this work calls for acknowledging
the inevitability of fundamental prejudice or grounded conviction. Fundamental prejudice, like
the Christ event, constitutes the procedural truth upon which universal singularity thrives.
Through the notion of subtractive universalism, we engage difference through the interpretive
lens of pragmatic humility—we cannot stand above history to interpret the world, but be part of
history to inculturate the event as a local resurrection experience.
Aristotle warned Athenians of the dangers of excessiveness. Grounded conviction when
pushed to the extreme, Sissela Bok (2002) warned, might lead to a Cartesian fascination and
obsession with absolute certainty. For Badiou, it is this obsession with absolute certainty that
gave birth to “militant universalism” and totalitarianism, which is a form abstract
homogenization, ever detrimental to difference, the provincial home of universal singularity. The
next section recasts the relationship between provinciality and universal singularity as a postdialectic engagement of difference.
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Provinciality and Universal Singularity
Badiou’s reading of Paul turns on four interrelated concepts: truth, event, subject and
fidelity. What is most important to see in Badiou’s reading of Paul is the provincial nature of
universal singularity evident in Paul’s proclamation that “Jesus is resurrected” (Romans 1:4, 1
Corinthians 15:1–4). Badiou (2003) sees Paul’s proclamation as a “Christ event,” an invocation
of a singular truth procedure that is otherwise than “identitarian singularity.” Badiou writes,
“Truth is diagonal relative to every communitarian subset; it neither claims authority from, nor
… constitutes any identity. It is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a condition of
belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address” (p. 14). The communicative terminus of
this truth procedure is provinciality, “a new kind of universal subjective figure” (Dunning, 2014,
p. 40) that interrogates normative customs and epistemic structures that protect tyrannical
hegemonic spaces as sites for engaging difference.
Badiou’s Paul privileges provinciality over cosmopolitanism. Provinciality rallies
universal singularity against “prevailing abstractions” of homogeneity (p. 14). That is, locality
cannot be co-opted into a global ethic. Locality is both embodied subjectivity and situated
singularity that co-exists with agreed upon understanding of content. Thus, “Badiou believes that
there is no truth in general; there are only particular truths in particular situations” (Hallward,
2003, p. 154). Truth is also heterogeneous (Badiou, 2001). For Badiou, truth—to use an
expression of Arnett, Fritz and Holba (2007b)—is a “touchstone” which “provides a temporal
marker of location, a general indicator of direction without the definitiveness of an absolute”
(2007b, p. 130). Truth, as Badiou understands it through the prisms of Pauline universalism,
privileges provincial articulations of biases or subtraction of diverse subjectivities in discursive
spheres that have otherwise been co-opted, silenced or erased.
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Badiou is attracted to Paul’s fearless articulation of the biased ground in the face of
universal generality:
For me, Paul is a poet-thinker of the event, as well as one who practices and states
the invariant traits of what can be called the militant figure. He brings for the
entirely human connection, whose destiny fascinates me, between the general idea
of a rupture, an overturning, and that of a thought-practice that is this rupture’s
subjective materiality. (Badiou, 2003)
Badiou is especially attracted to the “thought-practice” that Paul brings to the Christ event, the
resurrection. The event is a radical novelty, an irruption unparalleled in history. As Badiou puts
it, “pure event, the opening of an epoch, the transformation of the relation between the possible
and the impossible” (p. 45). In this sense, the resurrection for Badiou is a truth event or
procedure that is akin to a “rhetorical interruption” that disrupts “normative patterns” (Arnett et
al., 2009, p. 163). The event instantiates truth as a particularity otherwise than convention. It is
this otherwise than convention that Badiou calls truth procedure, a process, in which truth
becomes subjective singularity through fidelity to the event.
Because the event is otherwise than convention, “it relates the particularity of a situation
from the bias of its void” (Badiou, 2001, p. 73). What Badiou means by this is that the event
trumps generality. Badiou (2005) talks about the event as otherwise than convention in the
tradition of Blaise Pascal as going “against the flow” of “the world”… in order to invent …
forms of … conviction … ” (p. 222) that embraces the deconstruction of any narrative structure
that endorses conventional discourses. For Badiou Badiou (2003), conventional discourses are
inimical to universal singularity because they—conventional discourses—oscillate “between the
abstract universal of capital and localized persecutions” (p. 12). For Badiou, truth is not some
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form of “identitarian occlusion” or a patented property of identitarian particularism neither is it
an unfettered confidence in the homogenization forces of universalism that annex local values
and economies. The demands of a truth interrupt the colonizing tendencies of master
contingencies.
The Pauline project, according to Badiou is about control and transformation. The former
is a “hostility” that betrays itself through nominal occlusions” and “identifies truth procedures
typologically (p. 12). The latter is dragging “the Good New (the Gospels) out of the rigid
enclosure” and confinement of “generalities,” and “mobilizing a universal singularity both
against the prevailing abstractions … and against communitarian or particularist protest” (pp. 1314). This is evident in contemporary discourses that pretend to be tolerant of plurality, especially
the space or locaility of the other, but in reality are involved in what I call phenomenological cooptation—the global threatens and annexes the local through monologic impositions that are
dismissve of difference. Phenomenological co-optation “imposes the rule of abstract
homogenization” (pp. 9-10). Contemporary examples of abstract homogenization include
neoliberalism, cultural imperialism, identitarian fanacism, nominal occlusions, minoritarian
pronouncements, to mention a few. These, Badiou, says, are derivatives of an ethical ideolgy
steeped in universal generality. The communicative problem of this ethical ideology is control
and domination of a culture, tradition, or narrative based upon the metaphor “homogeneous
expansion” (Badiou, 2003, p. 11).
This grounding in the habitus of abstract homogenization “plays a contraining role
relative to every truth procedure. It is organically without truth” (p. 11). On the other hand,
universal singularity, by interrupting abstract homogenization, elicits a response that transcends
and traverses received opinions and customs without having to silence multiplicity of voices.
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Could this be the reason behind Paul’s refusal to take a side on the issue of circumcision during
his stay in Antioch? Badiou seems to think so. Badiou’s Paul, in all faithfulness to the Christ
event, acknowledges the locative truths of each group, “the doctrinal sympathizers and the ‘true’
converts, initiated and circumcised.” According to Badiou, truth defies gradation, and when it
comes to the truth, there is no sitting on the fence. “Either one participates in it … or remain
foreign to it” (p. 21). After all, a truth event is a subjective recognition of singularity (p. 22).
“This is the reason why Paul not only refuses to stigmatize difference and customs, but also
undertake to accommodate them” (p. 99). Disconnecting the universal singularity from
difference is tantamount to “monopolizing and sterilizing” (p. 99) the Christ event. As such,
universal singularity is the provincial home of truth; provinciality underlies and shapes a truth
procedure by acknowledging difference as locative truth.

Dialogic Universal Singularity
A dialogic understanding of universal singularity is an originative form of awakening,
that of engaging multiplicity in the tradition of postmodern communication ethics. For Badiou
such an originative form of awakening constitutes a truth procedure that questions brazen
homogeneity. Calling this truth procedure “an immediate subjective recognition” of universal
singularity (Badiou, 2003, p. 22). The truth procedure interrupts the rules of a homogeneous
universal by welcoming universal singularity as a multiplicity of truths. For Badiou, it is
important that universal generality is not masqueraded as a singularity to tactically enforce the
rules of contemporary neoliberalism, which he (Badiou) describes caricatures forms as the
“globalized logic of capital,” “identitarian fanaticism,” “communitarization of the public
sphere,” and “automatisms of capital” (p. 9). Thus, for Badiou (2009b), universal singularity “is
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at variance the figure of the same,” and interrupts “the superpositions of the registers of
homogeny” (pp. 27-28). Universal singularity is in principle universal in scope, but committed
to “universal multiplicity” (Badiou, 2003, p. 45). Universal singularity, thus, entails a
responsibility to multivocality, and requires a disinterestedness that points to difference as a
communicative necessity. In this sense, universal singularity is, following Benhabib, dialogical
universalism (see Hutchings, 2013, p. 88). I call it dialogic universal singularity.
It is no accident that Badiou saw in Paul a universalism that interrupts the authoritarian
management of discourse. Control and domination was at the heart of both the Jewish and Greek
discourse. And so Paul offers a new perspective, a Christian discourse that embraces differing
viewpoints and the necessity of prejudice, bidding farewell to “figure of the master”—
totalitarianism of the Greek discourse and the exceptionalism of the Jewish discourse (Badiou,
2009b, p. 30). Johann Baptist Metz (1969), a Catholic theologian called for replacing “system
concepts” with “subject concepts.” The new emphasis—subject concepts—point to an
understanding of “historical consciousness” as primordially embodied in an ethical response to
systemic erasures of difference (Baird, 1999). Like Metz, Badiou calls for abandoning any truth
system that assumes communication begins in uniformity, not in diversity. Tied to the notion of
universal singularity, Badiou situates communication in the acknowledgement of universal
multiplicity.
The ethic of universal singularity emanates from a provincial sensitivity to truths which
takes us into the home of Existenz, an expansion of consciousness that is attentive to togetherness
not as homogeneity but as heterogeneity. Karl Jaspers’ (1957) communication of Existenz
presumes “a limitless mobility of standpoints” (p. 70). The notion of standpoints connects to W.
Barnett Pearce’s (1998) call to be open “to the possibility of transformations of our
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consciousness in ways that expand our horizons so that what we had thought of as ‘wholes’ in
themselves are seen as parts of larger ‘wholes.’ This not only expands our view of the world, it
expands that with which we view the world” (Pearce, 1998, pp. 229-230; quoted in Gordon,
2000, p. 109). Standpoints interrupt abstract homogenization, but promote provincial truths or
local narratives. Dogmatic truth is an existential obliteration of singularities, truths of others.
“For the most devastating threat to truth in the world is the overwhelming claim to the absolutely
true” (Jaspers, 1973, p. 99). For Jaspers there are multiple truths. It is within a given standpoint
that the event makes sense. Badiou presents an ethic of universal singularity as a standpoint
within of the Christ event.
For Jaspers, genuine human communication “respects, emphasizes, and intensifies the
differences between one’s existence and the other, instead of dwarfing, slurring, and hiding
them” (Kaufmann, 1957, pp. 212-213). Like Jaspers, Badiou’s Paul offers a non-conventional
understanding of universalism that welcomes existence as a locative understanding of otherness.
The existenz of the different other is a recognition of the Christ event, and the Christ event is
itself an experience of the existenz. It is within the existenz that the Christ event is revealed as a
locative truth, giving birth to the ongoing issue of multiple ethics. The relationship among
Badiou’s Christ event, Jaspers’ existenz, and an ethics grounded in narrative bias stresses the
importance of communication praxis. By communication praxis is meant an enthymematic
interruption that invokes fidelity to event, offering confidence in the local; it is a confidence that
frames the Christ event as a conversational home for difference, multiple ethics.
For Badiou, the Christ event is a discourse of and about the resurrection as the rebirth of
universal singularity, an originary difference. His understanding of difference is beyond
provincial attachments to small town normative ethics. Badiou would argue that one should be
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mindful of the potential dangers imminent in unbridled confident in normative ethics. Thus, his
argument that “there is no ethics in general. There are only—eventually—ethics of processes by
which we treat the possibilities of a situation” (Badiou, 2001, p. 16). The inevitable signs of the
time invite attentiveness to singularity of the Christ event. Signs are evental; they are irruptive,
and question generalities and status quos.
Such a questioning, Badiou would argue, consists in the declaration of new truth,
universal singularity, unlike the so called universal generality Hegel proposed in the
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel translated truth within a structural, axiomatic, and legal
framework, rendering truth a statist reality of perception. Such a view of truth guarantees an
absolute ethical life, breeding the illusion that “objective freedom satisfies the requirements of
the subjective will through supplying rational determinations” (Rose, 2008, p. 66; see footnote
28), which in itself, is a form of totalitarianism. For Badiou (2009a), truth is a becoming. It is “a
radical event” (p. 41), “which activates” singularity “in another logic of its appearing …
resurrection” (p. 65). “Another logic,” for Badiou, is a truth procedure, which like “grace …
occurs without being couched in any predicate” (Badiou, 2009b, p. 76). Grace permits a truth
procedure to function without what Judith Butler (1993) calls “ideological formulations,” and the
“desymolization” (p. 147) of difference. Grace finds answers outside of theories that valorize a
“law” (p. 147), subtracting singularity from ideological formulations that what I call habits of the
Sittlichkeit.
Badiou situates his ethics within an ethics of particularity which works in tandem with
narrative standpoints. Narrative standpoints provide a way for engaging universal singularity as
an ethical response to the signs of the time. As an ethical necessity, universal singularity
possesses a communicative challenge in the form of sublime dialogic questioning. In facing this
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questioning, difference, as contextualized truth event interrupts the status quo. Thus, the
universalism that Badiou reads out of Paul proposes a universal singularity based on an ethic
useful in engaging competing narratives and points to dialogic fluidity. Universal singularity is
dialogic rather than monologic, heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, fluid rather than fixed,
provincial rather than cosmopolitan, and listening rather than telling. Universal singularity is
about multiplicity of ethics, which constitutes genuine dialogue. “The only genuine ethics is of
truths in the plural—or more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of truth, of the labor that
brings some truths into the world” (Badiou, 2001, p. 28). Universal singularity creates spaces
within which locative truths (of the event) emerge.
At the crust of universal singularity is an ethical principle that both interrupts and listens:
“interrupts” attempts to totalize a truth and listens to locative truths that would otherwise be
erased under an absolutist framework; “listens” privileges an attentiveness “that suspends the
willfulness of self and fore-knowledge in order to receive the singularities of the alterity of the
other” (Lipari, 2009b, p. 44). Furthermore, universal singularity transforms the concrete reality
of everyday lives, whose living memories are sharpened by rhetorical prejudice, and whose
neglecting results in communicative displacement. What is presented in this annexation is a
normative concoction brewed in universal confidence and offered as a curative for all other
subjectivities. Finally, universal singularity projects a quest for rhetorical prejudice and presents
itself as a dialogic standpoint to yield a pluralistic vision. Thus, as a dialogic communicative
phenomenon, universal singularity presupposes a philosophy of communication that inevitably
results in a communicative grasp which acknowledges difference and heterogeneity.
We can see from the above discussion that Badiou’s understanding of a Pauline universal
singularity is a form of non-conventional universalism, and is unlike traditional universalism.
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What makes universal singularity different is its dialogic nature; it is founded on difference
grounded in bias. Thus, when Badiou (2009b) posed the question, “What are the conditions for a
universal singularity? (p. 13), he was teasing out of the Pauline notion of universalism, a
dialectic which offers an account of the truth procedure as “interpreting otherwise”—to use a
Levinasian term—than an ontological allegiance to status quo generalities, whether “statist or
ideological” (p. 13). The interpreting otherwise, I would argue, points to the truth procedure as a
sign of the time. We live in a moment of dialectical tension—tension between universal
singularity and universal generality—suggesting the need for a dialogic ethical competent
response (see Arnett et al., 2009) to a truth procedure therein a narrative structure. The picture of
the dialogic ethical competent response associated with a true procedure is the “context within
which dialogue occurs” (Cissna & Anderson, 1994, p. 15). Badiou contextualizes truth as an
ethical competent response to a dialogic necessity, universal singularity.

Universal singularity, a Derivative Ethical Competence
Often, Badiou frames ethical competence as the relationship between grace and
resurrection with an enthymematic impulse. For example, Badiou argues,
The Resurrection … in Paul’s own eyes … is pure event, opening of an event,
transformation of the relations between the possible and the impossible ... Its
genuine meaning is that it testifies to the possible victory over death, a death that
Paul envisages … in terms of subjective disposition. Whence the necessity of
constantly linking resurrection to our resurrection, of proceeding from singularity
to universality and the vice versa … It is in this sense that it is grace, and not
history. (Badiou, 2003, p. 45)
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Badiou’s choice of the metaphors, “relations between the possible and the impossible,” “linking
resurrection to our resurrection,” and “proceeding from singularity to universality and the vice
versa,” equates dialogic ethical competence with the enthymematic impulse to co-create meaning
without sterilizing fundamental prejudice.
The notion of universal singularity points to the importance of narrative bias or
fundamental prejudice as an ethical competent context for engaging difference or negotiating
contending virtues. Universal singularity, predicated on a grounded sense of narrative bias or
fundamental prejudice, is core to human communication. Badiou points to this necessity,
providing us with the example of Paul’s “grounded sense of conviction” (Arnett, 2005),
“becoming subject” to truth (see Critchley, 2005). The truth event interrupts a routine. For Paul,
routine constitutes the perpetrates totalitarian abstractions. Contrary to the universal generality,
universal singularity is an ethics of subjectivity that promotes an understanding of a provincial
conviction of a truth. This understanding echoes Arnett’s (1997) remainder of the necessity of
multiple ethics in an age of increasing diversity. Universal singularity as an ethics of subjectivity
embraces attentive listening to a multiplicity of narrative and virtue structures propelled by what
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell (2009) call “dialogic ethics competence.”
Universal singularity suggests an alternative between the abstractions of totality and
localized tyranny through listening and learning from the contradiction that are within opposing
narratives. For example, when confronted with the problematics of the Antiochian controversy,
Badiou (2003) says, Paul would not “consent to the distinction between the two circles … the
doctrinal sympathizers and the ‘true’ converts, initiated and circumcised” because “for him, a
truth procedure does not comprise degrees. Either one participates in it, declaring the founding
the event and drawing its consequences, or one remains foreign to it” (p. 21). Badiou’s Paul, in
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this case, seems to be attentive the dialectic tensions in the truth events of both groups,
acknowledging their grounded convictions of the Christ event, and inviting each group to
confront its particularities in the face of the Christ event which interrupts attempts to sterilize
difference. Thus Badiou says “there are differences” (p. 98), insisting that “there is nothing else”
(p. 99). Universal singularity interrupts hegemonic telling and promotes dialogic listening to
varying viewpoints. The dialogic demands of universal singularity is attentiveness to diversity in
other for its principle of shaping understanding truth, not as a centralized communicative event
but, as a decentralized communicative phenomenon. Thus, universal singularity, exemplifies the
necessity of a listening act that acknowledges the irreducibility of truth in absolutist terms.
What constitutes dialogic competence in universal singularity? If we follow Badiou’s
suggestions, it involves an ethical response to both the known and the unknown, the accepted
and the unaccepted, the familiar and the unfamiliar, including responsibility for the responsibility
of otherness, i.e., a sense of the biased ground in the face of events that defy commonality. This
ethical response is sustained in and around rhetorical prejudice as the ground on which one
stands, between and among universal singularities situated historically. Badiou’s Pauline
universal singularity in the sense advanced here provides insights into the radical sense of the
truth event with the emergence of difference.
The relationship between truth procedure and difference is in the form of an ethical
dialogic competent act of listening to singularity as ethics of truths which replaces the bad faith
presumptions of “nominal occlusions”—“which identifies truth procedures typologically”
(Badiou, 2003, p. 12)—with Richard Bernstein’s “‘engaged fallibilistic pluralism’ that seeks to
meet our fragmented moments with respect and full knowledge of the fragility of the learners
and the world before us” (Arnett et al., 2009, p. 222) and Bakhtin’s dialogic imagination where
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“we find an opening for learning, for growing, for changing, and for constitutive transformation
in encounter” (Poulos, 2008, p. 122). In essence, universal singularity prompts a meeting of
locative truths—a meeting of peoples, cultures, traditions, or narrative structures within the
framework of enthymematic impulse.
I ground the notion of universal singularity in the following enthymematic implicatures, a
la Cissna and Anderson’s (1994) ingredients of dialogue: “immediacy of presence,” “emergent
unanticipated consequences,” “recognition of strange otherness,” “collaborative orientation,”
“vulnerability, mutual implication,” “temporal flow,” “genuineness,” and “authenticity” (pp. 1315). These features of dialogue invite the co-creation of meaning, an encounter of truth
procedures without trumping universal singularity. Universal singularity is not about defending
one’s truth and standing one’s ground while tyrannically managing the truth of the other. Instead,
Universal singularity summons a listening and learning from the truth of the other. And this is
the dialogical ethical competence Badiou (2009b) alluded to as the “possibility opened by the
event” (p. 45). The next chapter takes on the significance of this possibility in the form of the
ongoing irony between suspicion and dialogue. Suspicion moves conversations from
“unreflective cynicism” (Arnett & Arneson, 1999) to an evental hope—making suspicion the
existential home of dialogic question.
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CHAPTER FOUR—Embodied-Situated Suspicion: The Dialogic of Difference
Epistemological prejudice addresses the question of how to recollect the past in the name
of making the future. Its memory is fraught with the Renaissance contention of knowledge and
the shifting subject of emotive doubt, suspicion. In the Renaissance, prejudice constituted a
suspension of judgment that indemnified human perfection. To William Shakespeare, its gift was
not endless suspension of judgment but a moment of human imperfectibility or “an awareness of
moral false consciousness” which John Cox (2006) calls suspicion (p. 70). In Shakespeare, we
see suspicion as a foundational dialogic process in an epistemic moral world of consciousness
charged with both reflexivity and intersubjectivity. Shakespearean suspicion is dialogic in that it
involves negotiating tensional core epistemic endoxai. In this sense, suspicion could be said to be
synchronous with the creative force of prejudice in every dialogic conversation.
In order to bring some tangibility to the creative force of prejudice in communication
ethics, this chapter explores Shakespeare’s epistemological assumptions in the context of
suspicion so as to illustrate why and how suspicion is foundational to dialogue as a constitutive
communicative problematic that embraces human imperfectibility as an invitation to the “first
home of provinciality” (Arnett, 2008a, p. 71). This chapter situates the ongoing problematic in
the context of sixteenth century English Renaissance epistemological skepticism, an epoch that
anatomized the operation of reason and forced an ersatz community of commonality.
Shakespeare resonates Glenn Tinder’s (1980) warning that “In truth, the idea that human beings
are fundamentally good and innocent is surprisingly treacherous … We do not simply experience
frustration in searching for community. We come face-to-face with our finitude, our mortality,
and our radical imperfection” (p. 9). Tinder’s warning guides this chapter as I explore grounded
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bias as situated-embodied suspicion that enacts the possibility of coming to terms with the
necessary dialectics in dialogue.
I argue in this chapter for a view of suspicion that directs attention to the heuristic reality
of situatedness. This chapter first starts with a historical foundation of Shakespearean
epistemological suspicion. Second, the chapter examines Shakespeare’s epistemological
paradigm, reflecting Shakespeare’s thought about knowing. Third, this chapter the notion
addresses Shakespeare’s suspicion of human perfectibility and its relationship to hermeneutics of
suspicion. The chapter concludes by offering a postmodern understanding of suspicion as a
situated embodied dialogic phenomenon in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty (1962).

Foundations of Shakespeare’s Epistemological Suspicion
Shakespeare’s epistemological suspicion is rooted in sixteenth century skepticism, an era
marked by a tyranny of disbelief due to a “shattered confidence” in what constituted the truth in
both philosophy and theology (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, p. 148). Sixteenth century skepticism
derives from the philosophical project of Sextus Empiricus. He describes skepticism as “an
ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and judgment, and thus—
because of the quality of force in the objects and arguments opposed—to come first of all to a
suspension of judgment and then to mental tranquility”(Empiricus, 1985, pp. 32-33). Skepticism,
for Sextus, is a philosophical “psychoactive therapy”; it relieves the mind of the problematics of
dogmatism, offering the mind peace through the suspension of judgment.
What is suspended in judgment is dogmatic truth, especially, the truth about appearances.
For the example, a glass filled halfway with water might seem half full or full empty, and
unemployment benefits might provide much needed care for those who cannot find work or stifle
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job seekers. These conflicting views shatter confidence in what the truth is. Thus, the Skeptics’
antidote: disowning knowledge of anything beyond appearance. By abandoning the demand for
truth, a tyrannical consequence of dogmatic judgement, one is no longer held hostage to
dogmatic judgment, but finds peace. Inherent in the transformation from being disturbed “at the
irregularity of things” and where to place one’s belief to acquiring mental tranquility is seeming
knowledge, that is, saying what appears to one and reporting one’s “own feeling, without
indulging in opinion or making positive statements about the reality of things outside” of one’s
perception (Empiricus, 1985, p. 37).
With its roots in the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Sextus Empiricus, sixteenth century
continental philosophy and theology saw “a revival of interest and concern with ancient
skepticism, and with the application of its views to the problems of the day” (Popkin, 1979, p.
xvi). The sixteenth century was riddled with the problem of knowledge, giving rise to its own
variant of skepticism that is often attributed to Rene Descartes’ principle of methodological
doubt. But as Cavell (2003) notes, the skepticism shown in Descartes’s philosophy “is all already
in full existence in Shakespeare” (p. 3). Both Shakespeare and Descartes—who were responding
to the intellectual crisis of the time, a result of the resurgence of Pyrrhonian skepticism—are
believed to have been influenced by Michel de Montaigne, an avid reader of Sextus (see Cox,
2007, p. 227).
Drawing from the basic tenet of Pyrrhonian skepticism, Montaigne argued against
sixteenth century dogmatism, making the claim that it is impossible to make rational conclusions
about truth. Thus with his famous motto, “Ques sais-je”—“What can I know?” Montaigne
question calls for embracing doubt with assurance. “It was doubt itself and the weakness of the
human mind in discerning the meaning and connection of events that sustained such minds as
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Montaigne’s in a condition of precarious faith” (Bell, 2002, p. 15). Doubt, for Montaigne, was an
integral aspect of the human condition (Bashaw, 2001). Thus, for Montaigne, human reason was
misleading and should not be trusted. The principles that could be relied upon are divine
revelation. Montaigne’s point is that skepticism alerts us to the dangers of dogmatic judgement
inherent in the humanistic philosophy of the time. It was a judgment that Pierre Bayle, a
seventeenth century French philosopher described in a caricature term as a “sad intellectual
plight”:
It [reason] is a guide that leads one astray; and philosophy can be compared to
some powders that are so corrosive that, after they have eaten away the infected
flesh of a wound, they then devour the living flesh, rot the bones and penetrate the
very marrow of the humanist philosophy on society. Philosophy at first refutes
errors. But if it is not stopped at this point, it goes on to attack truths. And when it
is left on its own, it goes so far that it no longer knows where it is and can find not
stopping place. (Popkin, 2003, p. 288)
Montaigne (2003) called for a new philosophical language to address the inherent defectiveness
of dogmatic judgement and human reason because “We ourselves, our faculty of judgment, and
all mortal things are now flowing and rolling ceaselessly: nothing certain can be established
about one from the other, since both judged and judging are ever shifting and changing” (p. 680).
This vicious cycle of reasoning constitutes an epistemological disturbance. The new language of
philosophy begins with disowning knowledge and transforms our thought process into an
acknowledgment, seeming knowledge. This leads to an epistemic epiphany, mental quietude.
The mental quietude or tranquility that ensured from skepticism was no coincident. It was
both an epistemic and a pragmatic necessity. After all, the Renaissance Period was laden with
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noise. The problematics of dogmatism was restricted to the philosophical domain. It was
theological as well. Questions began to arise about the source of divine authority, pitting
Protestants against Catholics and the vice versa “to give way to another (science and human
reason, a new social order)” (McGinn, 2006, p. 3). It is no accident, therefore, to find sixteenth
philosophers like Descartes, Pierre Charron, and Blaise Paschal, to mention a few, raised
questions and called for a paradigmatic shift in the philosophical approached to the signs of the
time. Their questions and calls were inspired by Montaigne’s sustained interest in interrogating
dogmatism with Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Shakespeare struggled with this epistemic turbulence. He lived in sixteenth century
England, and was familiar with the intellectual crisis of the time, and “there is a more specific
reason to link Shakespeare” to the philosophical trends of the time, Montaigne. He “was born in
1533, Shakespeare in 1564, and the French aristocrat was widely celebrated author when the
English commoner was composing his famous plays” (p. 6). Scholars like George Taylor (1925),
Millicent Bell (2002), Hugh Grady (2006), John Cox (2004, 2007), Collin McGinn (2006),
Stephen Greenblatt (2014), and Peter Platt (2014), to mention a few, have drawn parallels
between Shakespeare and Montaigne, arguing that Shakespeare knew the writings of Montaigne
(especially his Essays). According to Bell (2002), Shakespeare
seems to have shared with Montaigne, his near-contemporary, not only general
doubts of what had long been assumed about the universe and mankind but also
doubt concerning the reliability of our own power to perceive and conclude
anything. Montaigne’s ideas, expressed in the famous essays Shakespeare
certainly read, became a repeated reference … of a general skeptical viewpoint
emerging in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (p. x)
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A detailed discussion of the historical lineage between Shakespeare and Montaigne is beyond the
scope of this work. I do however, think that there are compelling reasons to make the assertion
that the skeptical thought that runs through Shakespeare’s work is about doubt. The issue,
however, is what kind of doubt? Is it a doubt propelled by what Cavell (1988) described as
“philosophy’s discovery of the limitation of human knowledge” (p. 5)? This doubt, which Cavell
(2003) suggests is a form of skepticism raises “The question whether I know with certainty of the
existence of the external world and of myself and of others in it” (p. 3). According to Cox
(2007), the skepticism which characterized the Shakespearean period Cavell speaks of suggests
that ‘suspicion’ is a more accurate term … than ‘skepticism’” (p. 26). Sixteen century England
was a time of (Elizabethan) epistemological crisis, grounding “Shakespeare’s suspicion of
human perfectibility” (p. 15). Shakespeare framed his response to the crisis around the
assumption that human imperfectibility made ethical relationships problematic.
The problem of human imperfectibility is its proclivity for “false consciousness,” and the
tandem efforts of it corollary companion, self-deception calls for a hermeneutics of suspicion to
uncover concealed meanings under apparent meanings (Kearney, 1990) in human
(communicative) relationships. Karl Marx located false consciousness in socio-economic
ideology. Nietzsche theorized it as a profound nebulous negation of life. Freud saw it as the
underlying hidden motivations and desires of people. All three “masters of suspicion,” as
Ricoeur would call them, sensed the tyranny of false consciousness and how it socially and
economically, genealogically and ethically, and psychologically estranged people from their
ground of conviction.
Ricoeur believed that suspicion animates both critique and understanding. Critique with
understanding is attentive and understanding with critique is responsive. Thus, the hermeneutics
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of suspicion is both attentive and responsive to the “what of the particulars about which one”
encounters “in relation to the spatiotemporal schema that contains it” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 32). The
hermeneutics of suspicion engages understanding to interrogate false consciousness
This work situates Shakespeare’s epistemological paradigm in Ricoeur’s postmodern
hermeneutics of suspicion. A postmodern approach to Shakespeare’s epistemological paradigm
makes sense historically as well as hermeneutically, because of the deep mistrust
of human nature that gave rise to early modern skepticism in the first place. In
other words, while the development of skepticism remained primitive by the
Enlightenment standards in Shakespeare’s lifetime, the suspicion of human nature
was very old and highly developed, and it touches postmodern suspicion in
important ways. (Cox, 2007, pp. 10-11)
Shakespeare’s suspicion begins with a postmodern assumption, situated within Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of suspicion (see Cox, 2007, pp. 11-12). Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion is
otherwise than routine suspicion. It both an interpretive action as well as an interpreting
otherwise. The hermeneutics of suspicion is an interpretive action because it is a pragmatic
communicative interpretation, offering a narrative that contends with fundamental prejudice. As
interpretive otherwise, the hermeneutics of suspicion interrogates the subject-object dialectics,
not as a negative dialectics, but as “creative tension,” leading to a “constructive use of suspicion”
(Scott-Baumann, 2009, p. 21). It is the interplay of the interpretive action and interpreting
otherwise that frames Shakespeare’s suspicion as a communicative discernment process with an
interrogative impulse.
Communicative discernment is introspective, permitting attentiveness to the existential
and phenomenological everydayness—habits of the heart—with suspicion within enthymematic
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encounters. Accordingly, it is within these enthymematic encounters that suspicion becomes for
Shakespeare a Foucauldian turn away from an annulled self to a transfigured self. The annulled
self is evasive and takes shelter in ideology. The transfigured self, through introspection, seizes
the phenomenological opportunity “for renewal and redemption” (Cox, 2007, p. 37) with
“cautionary conviction” (Arnett, 2005, p. 52) rather than an originative and therapeutic
conviction “in hopes of discerning temporal answers in daily communicative social life” (p. 53).
Foucault offers insight into discerning temporal answers, “inventing a mode of subjectification in
which this ethos would be a practice of thought formed in direct contact with” the signs of the
time (Rabinow, 1997). Ethos as practice thought situates suspicion within a confessional
humility which “tempers” (Arnett, 2005) the ontological comfort and assurances of false
consciousness.
Confessional humility works in tandem with acknowledging human imperfectibility.
According to Cox (2007) Shakespeare’s Love’s Labor’s Lost and Measure for Measure rests on
confessional humility, a moral derivative of suspicion (of motives). In the two plays,
Shakespeare draws upon Jesus’s teaching in Matthew 7:3-4 and Luke 6:41-42, and Matthew
18:23-27, narratives about duplicity to frame the problem of self-deception and the “hypocrisy of
abusive power” prevalent in sixteen century Elizabethan culture. The point of these narratives,
via Shakespeare’s plays
is not only that people impose intolerable burdens on one another, but a potential
solution exists in willingness to acknowledge one’s own failure and to forgive on
the other: “So likewise shall mine heavenly Father do unto you, except ye forgive
from your hearts, each one to his brother their trespasses” (Matt 18:35). Even a
desultory Elizabethan churchgoer would have heard in this story, and especially in
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its conclusion, an echo of the frequently recited “Lord’s prayer,” as translated in
the Book of Common Prayer: “and forgives us our trespasses, as we forgive them
that trespass against us” … This brief survey suggests … the … narratives
Shakespeare’s culture offered for suspecting human motives and actions. (Cox,
2007, p. 38)
Acknowledgment and its corollary invitation to/for forgiveness is central to suspicion; it is the
“good life-giving” side of communicative relationships. Foucault’s metaphor of “transfiguration”
points to the notion of suspicion as (good) life-giving. For Foucault (1997), “transfiguration
entails … a difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom … to
grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this
change should take” (pp. 311-316). The possibility for change begins, for Foucault, by defining
“the conditions in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the
world in which they live” (Rabinow, 1997, p. xxxvi). Shakespeare problematized the human
conditions of the Elizabethan era by suggesting that suspicion begins not in routine skepticism,
but in the confessional acknowledgment of human imperfectibility. Suspicion makes human
imperfectibility an ethical reality, and requires a reflexivity that engages uncertainty of the self
and others.

Shakespeare’s Existential—Ethical Paradigm
Suspicion requires dialogic reflexivity that engages the uncertainty of otherness.
Shakespeare works from an epistemological background that seeks to meet the other in a
sixteenth century world of mistrust, “suspicious of human perfectibility” (Cox, 2007, p. 15).
Human perfectibility makes obvious the problem of self-deception or moral false consciousness.
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Colin McGinn (2006), a British philosopher situates self-deception in “the problem of other
minds.” McGinn writes,
This is a multifaceted problem, but its most straightforward statement is simply
this: How do we know what other people are thinking, feeling, and intending?
Can we know these things? The problem arises from a basic duality in human
nature—the split between interior and exterior…There is something hidden about
other people’s minds, which we can only infer from what is publicly available…
and this puts us in position of not knowing. (p. 7)
The problem of the other mind presumes asymmetrical relationships. These asymmetrical
relationships generate oppositions and contradictions which make “self-deception possible”
(McGinn, 2006, p. 7). Shakespeare was inured to this problematic. Shakespeare worked out this
problematic as it affects people locked into exaggerated self-confidence, evident in the character
of Julius Caesar, whose “constant harping on his flawless valor,” MacCallum called selfdeception (Cox, 2013, p. 41).
Self-deception can be said to be an epistemological opacity that breeds communicative
tragedy (Bell, 2002). For Shakespeare, the tragedy is the disengaged, self-absorbed individual
like Iago who “knows quite well what is on his mind,” but led Othello to always guess him
(Iago) wrongly (McGinn, 2006, p. 60). Self-deception closes spaces of encounter with others
through manipulation or a know it all attitude. Shakespeare presents self-deception as epistemic
manipulation, a powerful, resourceful means of dominating and controlling relationships.
The role of manipulation in self-deception is central to postmodern ethical project of
dialogic relationality. Buber’s philosophy of dialogue illustrates the importance of reciprocity as
an existential responsiveness to otherness. Buberian reciprocity involves the courage to engage
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the unknown other. Self-deception, on the other hand, disengages the unknown while offering
the ethereal hope of communicative collaboration, negotiation, transaction, and relation (Stewart,
1994, p. xiii). Self-deception is at odds with the courage to confront the void before us. In the
words of Baird, the Buberian notion of reciprocity involves the courage to face the void before
us and understand the facing as a communicative relational activity. Like Heidegger’s aphorism,
“being is linguisticality,” Buber’s: reciprocity is risky-ality, and involves “transcending ‘vulgar
conscience’” through a wholistic response to the unknown other (Stewart, 1996, p. 152).
Shakespeare’s Othello best exemplifies Buber’s notion of vulgar conscience. For example,
although Iago appeared honest to Othello, Emilia, and Emilia, to mention a few, at base he
(Othello) was dishonest of them. This movement toward vulgar conscience, indicative of his
emotive-induced relationality, led to the ethical abdication of his responsibility towards his socalled acquittances.
There can be no meaningful interaction among people without a committed sense of
responsibility toward each other (Buber, 1949, p. 135). Iago, in his dishonesty, became attached
to what could be described as a Buberian stasis, “reflexion”—a monologue trammeled propelled
by the “therapeutic I”—elected to manipulate others to achieve his desired end. Manipulation can
lead to an “evil impulse” (Buber, 1958, p. 42) as the individual becomes the self-absorbed
Nietzschean superman who trades heavily on his genealogical impenetrability. The end result is
relational disintegration (see Buber, 1958). Without a hermeneutics of suspicion, knowledge and
trust become subsumed by a sense of “epistemological anxiety” (McGinn, 2006).
Epistemological anxiety can, in turn, lead to “unnecessary interpersonal surveillance”:
In such an environment, we no longer meet life on its own terms. We manufacture
a response that is beyond what is called for or we ignore what others say as we
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offer our attributed “real” answer of depth and insight…Persons are able to
convince themselves about the reality of something that, in actuality, never
happened. Lying to ourselves fuels an environment prone to unnecessary
interpersonal struggles, each person fighting imaginary actions and cynically
rejecting the other’s perspective while unknowingly fabricating one’s own
position. (Arnett & Arneson, 1999, pp. 16-17)
Considering epistemological anxiety in this sense can lead to totalitarian dogmatism as one
becomes dismissive of the viewpoints of others. Dismissiveness precipitate disconnectedness.
Dismissiveness involves “an intentional and proactive filter of disconfirmation and even
dogmatism that essentially represents the dismissive speaker as situationally invulnerable to the
entreaties of others” (Anderson & Cissna, 2008, p. 266). Dismissiveness levels the epistemic
home of the other. By epistemic home is meant “grounded conviction.” Arnett describes it “as a
commonplace to turn to for guidance.” Grounded conviction also prompts the “moral mandate of
service to Others” (Arnett, 2005, p. 107). Without grounded conviction, deception invades the
truth of others, disconfirming their radical alterity. This insight is at the core of Shakespeare’s
plays and comedies.
In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, the mandate of deputyship—service to others—
(Bonhoeffer, 1955) trumps self-deception. Proteus—a name indicative of duplicity in classical
legend—displays a remarkable sense of self-deception by grounding his betrayal of his friends—
Julia, his sweetheart, and Valentine, his close friend, whose sweetheart, Silvia, Proteus has
amorous feelings for—“in the language of friendship” (Masten, 1999, p. 209). Proteus conceals
himself from the circle of friends. Proteus perversely garners a noble accolade. He is “complete
in feature and in mind with all good grace to grace a gentleman” (Shakespeare, 1997, 2.4.73-74).
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Defying just about all the basic characteristics of dialogue, outlined in Anderson and Cissna’s
Communication and the Ground of Dialogue (1994)—and immediacy of presence, emergent
unanticipated consequences, recognition of strange otherness, collaborative orientation,
vulnerability, mutual implication, temporal flow, genuineness, and authenticity (pp. 13-15)—
Proteus tells Valentine, “I to myself, I am dearer than a friend (2.6.23). Proteus plots against
Valentine, the Duke, and slanders Valentine with hopes of wooing Silvia: “I cannot now prove
constant to myself without some treachery us’d to Valentine” (2.6.31-32). And Proteus slights
his sweetheart, Julia, calling her “a swarthy Ethiop,” a racial slur (2.6.26). Proteus’ duplicity, a
craft of self-deception accomplished through an act of vulgar conscience. As Buber (1999) said,
The vulgar conscience that knows admirably well how to torment and harass, but
cannot arrive at the ground and abyss of guilt, is inescapable, to be sure, of
summoning to such responsibility. For this summoning, a greater conscience is
needed, one that does not shy away from the glance into the depths and that
already in admonishing envisages the way that leads across it. (pp. 124-125)
Shakespeare countered vulgar conscience by drawing attention to the culture of “Renaissance
pride” (Fernie, 2002, p. 147) in the everyday social discourse of sixteen century England.
Through his plays and comedies, Shakespeare invited his audience to the pragmatic importance
of existential introspection. Within the spirit of existential introspection is a communicative
habit, suspicion—in the Ricoeurian hermeneutical tradition—that challenges human motives and
problematizes false consciousness and its communicative bad faith consequence, self-deception.
Suspicion confronts self-deception with a phenomenological, existential necessity, trust.
Like Maurice Friedman (1972), who called for “existential trust” as “the courage to address and
respond” (p. 322), suspicion is the courage to address and respond to the monologic opacity of
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self-deception. Shakespeare works point to the interrelations between trust and suspicion, and in
The Two Gentlemen of Verona (and Othello), Shakespeare sets the relationship against the
epistemological problem of self-deception. For Shakespeare, suspicion resides in the form of
grounded conviction, a commonplace to turn to for guidance to address and respond to the signs
of the time (see Arnett, 2005, pp. 104-108).
Address and response is a form of dialogic reflexivity that acknowledges the self, not as a
“self-proclaimed” expert who locates “the good within the self” only (Arnett et al., 2010, p. 114),
like Iago, Shakespeare’s Nietzschean superman, but as a reflexive self that is accepting of
multiplicity (see Stewart, 1995). Shakespeare’s project seems to unmask the epistemological
dangers of the self-absorbed individual, offering instead an epistemic view that fuels questions
critical of metanarratives and the growing power of dogmatism. The questions generate an
awareness, suspicion.
Part of my aim in this chapter is to work out exactly what Shakespeare’s view was,
insofar as it is represented in prejudice at the intersection of dialogue and communication ethics.
Shakespeare is not swayed by dogma or tradition. His epistemology counsels a proper suspicion
about human pretensions to knowledge, and distrusts of the notion of the self-absorbed
individual. Shakespeare’s project expresses one of the deepest and most enduring philosophical
problematic of the Renaissance, i.e., knowledge, which is addressed as an epistemological
suspicion and responded to as hermeneutics of suspicion. Shakespeare’s notion of suspicion
exposes reality for what it is, undermines dogma and complacency. In the end, of course, this is
nothing other than a dedication to prejudice as a concept that acknowledges human
imperfectibility.

98

Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Human Imperfectibility
Shakespeare’s notion of suspicion points to dialogic reflexivity as a resource for
unmasking and acknowledging human imperfection. Dialogic reflexivity comes with an
epistemic confession, “one never reaches the reality of the other. Reality cannot be derived, it is
simply given, to be acknowledge, to be rejected, but never to be established by proofs, and is
given only to the moral person as whole” (Arnett, 2005, p. 71). The moral person for
Shakespeare is the reflexive self that acknowledges its imperfection, thus opening up
opportunities for listening to and critiquing with understanding. Shakespeare offers a full account
of suspicion as a dialogic self-reflexive act that seeks its epistemological forms in the dialectical
meeting of minds.
The dialectical meeting of minds is a tensional problematic of human imperfection and
perfection, an epistemic gap between individual ground and the realm of otherness which is only
bridged through self-reflexive. For Shakespeare, self-reflexivity is essential for a hermeneutic
approach to suspicion. It brings us face to face with human imperfectibility and an
acknowledgment of this imperfection. A hermeneutics of suspicion shares with human
imperfectibility the necessity of self-reflexivity, which mirrors Husserl’s (2012) notion of
“‘phenomenological Reductions,’ setting “aside the limitations to knowledge essentially
involved in every nature-directed form of investigation, deflecting the restricted line of vision
proper to it, until we have eventually before us the free outlook upon ‘transcendentally’ purified
phenomena” (p. 3). This phenomenological reductions call guides the individual to address and
response to the problem of the self in relation to other minds. In other words, the self is
awakened to a new way (outlook) and approach to its interaction with the world, reminding us
that dialogue begins in an awakening: selves wake to a phenomenological daylight, with human
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fragility staring them in the face and so unable to hold themselves aloof from the cliché to err is
human. This awakening is key to Shakespeare’s notion of human imperfection. The selves are
alerted to the dangers of deception, an epistemological problematic that eventually evolved into
the crass belief that saying “we are on the same page” is tantamount to honesty, agreement
means openness, and difference is an aberration of sameness. It is this phenomenological lie and
epistemological tension that characterized Shakespeare’s world and plays. What Shakespeare
brings to this mono-hetero epistemic tension is the necessity of suspicion.
Questioning is a crucial aspect of suspicion. As Gadamer (1975/1989) said, “We cannot
have experience without asking questions. Recognizing that an object is different, and not as we
first thought, obviously presupposes the question whether it was this or that” (p. 356). Gadamer
valorized genuine questioning as key to gaining insight into the different other. Insight in a
hermeneutics of suspicion, is an enlarged mentality that is attentive to the uncertainty of the
other, an otherness that cannot be grasp (see Ricoeur, 1981, pp. 182-183). Shakespeare’s spin on
suspicion triggers a questioning that is respectful of uncertainty as a different other beyond
understanding. Uncertainty, for Shakespeare is a paradoxical phenomenon of seeming
knowledge; sometimes it draws selves into trusting relationship—hoping to know other selves,
and at other times it invites selves to “question the absoluteness of” their “ideas and the validity
of” their “impressions in the most radical way” (p. 3). This paradox, akin to Gadamer’s
dialectics, is ground for acknowledging differed viewpoints.
Human imperfection, steep in narcissistic egoism, breeds self-deception. Self-deception
creates an epistemic smoke screen which allows “the soul of the other” to remain “systematically
elusive” (McGinn, 2006, p. 71), leading to an epistemological anxiety. Human imperfection does
not only foment epistemological anxiety but also fuels monologic singularity which perpetuates
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the tyranny of the disengaged self. The disengaged self is apathetic to otherness. James Hatley
(2000) describes monologic singularity as a “narcissistic mirror” obsessed with the
communication of one’s “own vision, so that one’s history only articulates one’s own concerns,
one’s own needs” (2000, p. 63). The anticipated aim of the disengaged self is “the accumulation
of experience rather than awareness of the situation of communication with others” (Arnett,
2007b, p. 119). The disengaged self reifies imperfection as normative, rendering dogmatic
judgments that undermine difference.
In reifying imperfection, the disengaged self makes claim to infallibility (and
invincibility). This kind of self-deception is depicted in Shakespeare’s plays and comedies as “an
ironic vision of ethical folly... and of epistemological confusion” (Hassel Jr, 1980, p. 215) that
needs revisioning. This revisioning is evident in the metaphors of “mastered self” (Soellner,
1972) and “self-discovery” (Jorgensen, 1967). The two metaphors are both an indicator and a
basis of a hermeneutics of suspicion that works against unbridled confidence in false
consciousness. The metaphors of mastered self and self-discovery also suggest an epistemic
discernment with a moral underpinning, self-knowledge. For Shakespeare,
Self-knowledge connoted self-control or temperance in all things, patience and
humility. To us, and doubtless to Shakespeare, self-knowledge implies the
wisdom essential to right conduct, the ability to distinguish, as Socrates, says,
“between what one can do and what one cannot do,” and hence “obtain what is
good and guard against what is evil.” (Jenkins, 1963, p. 86; cited in Jorgensin,
1967, p. 4)
This epistemic discernment emergent from “the Socratic assimilation of … virtue to knowledge
or wisdom” (Guthrie, 1981, p. 348), becomes a pathway to authenticity. A pathway to
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authenticity, in this sense, resonates with Heidegger’s awakening—an alertness that motivates
being to elect to move away from inauthenticity in search of authentic existence. In essence, it is
breaking through from an ethereal world of false consciousness to self-consciousness.
Authenticity becomes a breakthrough and an acknowledgement of one’s ground. It is suspicion
that precipitates this acknowledgement, making way for an existential turnaround with focus on
self-reflexivity.
The existential turnaround for Shakespeare is essentially a self-reflexivity that reconnects
the individual to its ethical responsibility. It is a rediscovery of the self, not as disengaged but
“derivative”—to sound Buberian. This rediscovered derivative self becomes responsive.
Shakespeare pays tribute to the rediscovered self in his plays and comedies grounded in a
realistic understanding of human nature. Shakespeare reminds his audience through the
characters in his plays and comedies that the disengaged self is capable of transformation. Calvin
Schrag (2003) offers a postmodern rendition of Shakespeare’s transformed self in his exploration
of the “decentered self.”
The decentered self rediscovers itself through the acknowledgement of a lack of
grounded conviction and its damaging consequence, disconnectedness. In decentering, duplicity
and pretentions to exhaustive knowledge are questioned. The end result, however discomforting
to the disengaged self, is a renewed self with a new hermeneutical horizon, transporting the
renewed, rediscovered self into a new communicative sphere. Like Shakespeare, Schrag
reconfigures the self as a responsive and responsible self. Shakespeare’s depiction of his
characters’ self-reflexivity is identical to the decentered self. Shakespeare’s characters emerge in
his plays and comedies as selves acquiring their identity in a process of becoming. In The
Tempest, Shakespeare depicts this becoming in Prospero. He “controls his passions and
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renounces the magic of unlimited power,” acknowledges “his weakness, the weakness of being
human” (Soellner, 1972, p. 382).
[Prospero’s] future power to transform the world and to master others will lie not
in the magician’s wand, not in a power over nature, not in Machiavellian schemes,
but in a strength, that radiates from a mastered self. There are good reasons to
believe that Prospero will retain his mastery and become the fortunate man that
his name implies—good human reasons. (pp. 382-383)
The mastered self marks an existential becoming, a transition toward a new beginning. A
hermeneutic of suspicion is the site for this new beginning. Suspicion offers openings for
transformation. To paraphrase Ricoeur (1986), a hermeneutics of suspicion without
transformation is meaningless, and a self-reflexivity without transformation is futile (see p. 237).
The hermeneutics of suspicion is tied to a “distrust of symbols as a dissimulation of the real and
is animated by suspicion” (Josselson, 2004, p. 3). Self-deception is characterized by
dissimulation. From the context of Shakespeare’s sixteenth century what is concealed is human
imperfection, often masqueraded as perfection. Suspicion, on the hand, is characterized by an
opening to interactive listening.
The entire thrust of Shakespeare’s project is suspicion driven by self-reflexivity. It is the
courage to address and respond to self-deception. The end result is a self-disclosure that freely
relates to others and accepts difference. Thus, as said earlier, suspicion requires dialogic
reflexivity that engages the uncertainty of otherness. Suspicion, in this case, becomes a dialogic
competent act of questioning and reflecting upon oneself and relationship with other selves,
opening the self to enthymematic listening to others, otherness and difference otherwise than a
syllogistic demand for formulaic proceduralism. As dialogic self-reflexivity, suspicion
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recognizes and engages juxtapositions. Such a view of suspicion privileges the inevitability of
prejudice.
Shakespeare’s hermeneutics of suspicion is a summary statement on dialogue and its
relationship to prejudice. The basic idea of genuine dialogue is an openness to narratives of the
different other. Gadamer’s notion of genuine dialogue is within the coordinates of self-reflexivity
because it calls for acknowledging the biased ground—which in the context of this chapter
would include the disclosure of human fallibility—that one brings to a dialogic conversation.
Tied to the notion of suspicion, genuine dialogue involves openness. This openness, a derivative
of self-reflectivity, alerts the individual to reified small-town values as an ersatz petite narrative
to abandon and choose instead a community of welcome that privileges the meeting and
engagement of difference. I call the community of welcome a heteroglossic sanctuary where
suspicion “opens up a path that leads to the dismantling of the metaphysical idol of absolute
truth” (di Cesare, 2013, p. 102). Shakespeare demythologizes this metaphysical idol represented
in the monologic impositions of disengaged self. In his plays and comedies, Shakespeare’s
disengaged self starts off as preoccupied only with its own survival and is unresponsive to
difference, but ends up making an existential turnaround: admission of fallibility, of prejudice,
and being respectful of the ground of the other.
The interplay between suspicion and human fallibility stresses dialogic self-reflexivity.
Discursive interaction is not an existential ideal; it is a necessary human communicative praxis
which begins not in “monologic vacuum” (Holba, 2008)—a reminder of the danger of selfdeception, but in the acknowledgement of the grounds of conviction. With an acknowledgement
of the tainted ground of conviction, self-deception trumps self-reflectivity, false consciousness
subsumes self-consciousness, and that sensus communis should be seen as a precondition for
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discursive interaction. Suspicion takes into account the dialectics of everyday life through
sensitivity and sensibility to the self and the other, ever attentive to human fallibility. Suspicion
works not from within judgment—standing above history and ground to judge; rather it works
from within caution without losing traction under our feet.
The place of suspicion as that which structures and illuminates the negotiation of
difference must be examined more closely so that the connections between suspicion and
dialogue can be seen more clearly. In doing so, however, a turn to the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty (1962), whose work on embodiment provides the framework to make this
connection clearer. Accordingly, with the help of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy we can show how
it is possible to reconceive suspicion as an embodied-situated dialogic encounter.

The Embodiment of Suspicion
Embodiment offers insight into the illuminative nature of suspicion. In his essay,
Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology as Non-Conventionally Utopian, Greg Johnson (2003) defines
embodiment as “the movement of transcendent” with phenomenological consequences:
becoming, interrupting, and transforming (p. 390). This is a reminder similar to the interruptive
and transformative nature of the Christ event in Alain Badiou’s understanding of the subjective
and personal nature of the truth in Saint Paul’s notion of universalism (as discussed in the
previous chapter). The ultimate outcome of the event is not petite narratives or truths reified into
an ethic of universal generality, but an ethics of universal singularity that promotes locative
truths. Common to Johnson’s description of embodiment and Badiou’s understanding of the
Christ event is a concern for the struggle for vernacular expressions under “lived ambiguities.”
And it is in the struggle for vernacular expressions that suspicion is born.
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For purposes of this chapter embodiment is considered a pathway to discovery as the self
moves and transitions from its disengaged self to a decentered subject. What propels the
movement and the transition is suspicion. From a phenomenological perspective suspicion
“questions what it means to live authentically … How … can we live with a personal sense of
freedom, integrity, and self-fulfillment that does not promote self-indulgence or eclipse the wellbeing of “Self” and “Others?” (Eicher-Catt, 2005, p. 114). This quote points to the self as
embodied reflexivity inherent in interactive action. Embodied reflexivity becomes a bridge that
links the self to the other. The bridge emerges within an interactive action, intercorporeality of
human beings, opening the self to new transcendence-driven communicative possibilities—
becoming, interruption, and transformation—grounded in embodiment.
With Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, suspicion is engaged as an embodied reflexive
praxis. In other words, suspicion becomes a site for discernment (becoming), questioning lived
ambiguities (interruption), and responding to the signs of the time (transformation), which in
postmodernity involves an engagement with difference. Merleau-Ponty talks of embodied
reflexivity as an “originate reflection,” a radical reflection present in everyday human
communicative practice (Schrag, 1980, p. 72). Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) radical reflection is
grounded in an existential-phenomenological understanding of reflexivity. Radical reflection is
“a creative operation which itself participates in the facticity of that [unreflective] experience”
(p. 61). The creative operation opens the self to its original past, “a past which has never been
present” (p. 242) in an attempt to uncover the hidden and the apparent that give meaning to the
lived ambiguities.
In addition, embodied suspicion, prompts the self toward what Heidegger (1962) calls
“existential positivity,” a deceit and error which opens the self to “a modification of original
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being-in” (p. 62; cited in Wrathall, 2011, p. 60). In deceit, suspicion prompts radical reflection
and questioning which in turn lead to seeing “something essential about the nature of the world
and the things we encounter in the world—namely, that they are not objective and determinate”
(Wrathall, 2011, p. 61). Existential positivity points us toward “ambiguous transcendence”
(Young, 1990), necessitating reflection and response that begins with the question, what is? The
question assumes a sense of “confession” (Arnett, 2005) that is possible through reflexive acts of
embodied selves.
What embodied suspicion brings to the self and human relationship or communication is
what Charles Taylor (1991) calls “a voice within,” “inner depths,” and “new forms of
inwardness” which situates the self as embodied authenticity (p. 26). The authentic self is similar
to Schrag’s decentered self who, through embodied reflexivity, questions “reified static
concepts” (Arnett, 2005) as an essential problematic of the self and the other. At this threshold of
embodied suspicion, the contemplative self is awakened to “immediate, affective, intersubjective
connection” with difference (Kruks, 2006, p. 44).
An important point to remember about embodied suspicion is resilience. In The Protean
Self: Human Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation (1993), Robert Jay Lifton connects the
Protean self to the threat of despondency in our contemporary world. Rather give in to cynicism,
Lifton calls on individuals to emulate the resilience of the Greek god Proteus, who respond to the
problematics of the time. Embodied suspicion potentiates the self in a “world come of age”
(Arnett, 2005). Like the Greek god Proteus, embodied suspicion reminds the individual of the
necessity of meeting a “world come of age.” Embodied suspicion can also be considered through
the Merleau-Ponty’s operative intentionality, “I can” (p. 137). From the standpoint of
communicative praxis, “I can” is a reflexive process of human consciousness and experience
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which compels the self to potentiate ethical relationships in as dialogic productivity, not
monologic aggressivity. My thinking here is not oblivious to the limits of the bodily
experience—for example, intentionality becoming inhibited (see Johnson, 2003; Young, 1990)—
under tyrannical conditions. The claim I want to make, rather, is that embodied suspicion
communicates the potential for possibility inherent in the self. The key to this possibility is the
authentic self. Herein lies the illuminative nature of suspicion; it interrupts an inauthentic self,
transforms a disengaged self. The end result is a becoming, decentered, listening self “capable of
entering into a multiplicity of relations without losing itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p. 118).
Embodied suspicion opens the rediscovered, sublimated self to a rhetorical call to respond to the
difference of the other.
From a Merleau-Pontian perspective, Shakespearean suspicion is a reflexive embodied
act characterized by a “plurality of meanings” (Silverman, 1997, p. 79). Shakespeare responded
to Renaissance’s humanist epistemology that disavowed individual knowledge and discursive
encounters, and obliterated difference. Embodied suspicion celebrates the individuality and
authenticity. Together they present the possibility of a “listening, thinking being” (Lipari, 2010).
This points to diminishing “the dualism between self and at the same time” increasing “the
awareness of emptiness,” otherness, and uncertainty (p. 350). It is within the listening, thinking
being that embodied suspicion becomes a reflexive embodied act of listening-rhetorically
decentered subjects.
Within the spirit of Shakespeare’s epistemological assumptions, embodied suspicion
rejects narcissistic forms of the self that results in methodological self-absorption to derivative
freedom. Without thinking through the embodied and situated dimensions of suspicion, human
communication runs the risk of presenting difference as naïve, disinterested and pathological.
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Such a risk is evident in modernity’s indictment of individuality. The next chapter focuses on
individuality not as a therapeutic self, but as a derivative self. In Kierkegaard’s notion of irony, I
demonstrate that the ethical, responsible self is justification for departing from absolute searches,
and is the starting point for an ethics of dialogic practice.
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CHAPTER FIVE—Dialogic Irony: The Ethical Single Individual
The previous chapter brought some tangibility to the creative force of prejudice in
communication ethics by exploring Shakespeare’s epistemological assumptions and dialogue in
the context of suspicion so as to illustrate why and how suspicion is foundational to dialogue as a
constitutive communicative problematic that embraces human imperfectability. This chapter
situates the ongoing problematic in the context of modernity’s prejudice against individuality by
employing the metaphor “dialogic irony” from the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard to
substantiate the relevancy of the tainted ground. Kierkegaard saw the existential presuppositions
of modernity as symptoms of a deep, historical and cultural assault on individuality.
Modernity, according to Kierkegaard, (1996) was an “age of disintegration—an age of
crisis” (p. 350) that pitted the progressive self against the “single individual.” The individual,
rhetorically construed, became an atomized unit of “compliance, dominance, inducement, and
submission” (Burke, 1984). Kierkegaard, foreshadowed Francois Lyotard’s call to wage a war
against modernity, in other to preserve the ethical self, individuality—the ethically responsible
“single individual.” The new single individual emerges out of “irony”—a “quantification of
subjectivity” (Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 264), marking the advent of the “plurality of publics”
(Arendt, 1998).
Kierkegaard was a lived irony. His life and interaction with the signs of the time
highlighted irony as a communicative becoming in the context of a socially constructed world of
homogeneity that considered otherwise—the different other individual subject—as a “spoiled
identity.” The becoming necessitates an awakening, giving courage to the individual to resist
conformity, such as the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, that blur the distinction between individuality and
totality, the provincial and the cosmopolitan, the self and the other. Kierkegaard’s irony insulates

110

the individual against hegemonic monopole. This chapter examines the communicative
implicature of Kierkegaard’s work through the metaphor of dialogic irony. For Kierkegaard,
without irony, human life would be meaningless. First, I situate the legacy of Kierkegaard,
especially how the historical context affected his philosophical and his existential worldview of
the individual as irreducibly subjective. Second, I look at what Kierkegaard calls leveling,
modernity’s assault on individuality. Third, I look at how Kierkegaard uses the concept of irony,
an existential communicative praxis, for interrogating leveling. Finally, I conclude by suggesting
the dialogic relevance of the Kierkegaardian project.

Kierkegaard’s Legacy
Kierkegaard’s work and life were an existential and ethical response to the nineteenth
century Danish world steeped in Hegelian Lutheranism. “Danish Lutheranism, a part of the
Danish state, made becoming Christian one component of Danish citizenship rather than a
unique individual task” (Jothen, 2014, p. 2) At this threshold of control, Kierkegaard questioned
what it means to live by the authentic life, “the true shape of selfhood” (p. 2). How, in other
words, can the individual live a life of freedom without acting according to the ideals of the
Hegelian Sittlichkeit?
Kierkegaard’s questioning of conformity emphasizes the importance of subjective
individuality as the ground for ethical conviction. His response to the signs of the time point to
postmodernity’s concern for the struggle for an “ethics of self-expression” (Herder, 2001/2)
under the totalizing structure of Hegelian Sittlichkeit (and its handmaid, Hegelian Lutheranism)
and modernity. Kierkegaard (1992) considers the modern era an age that “had forgotten what it
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means to exist, and what inwardness signifies” (p. 223). This idea is grounded upon
Kierkegaard’s belief that subjective individuality is constitutive of genuine existence.
Between the world of Hegelian Sittlichkeit and Hegelian Lutheranism, on the one hand,
and the world of modernity, on the other hand, lies “the errors of dogmatism” (de Beauvoir,
1948) that stymies individual freedom. Simone de Beauvoir draws attention to the problem of
freedom in modernity, describing attempts to annihilate individual freedom as foreign absolutist
impositions which the postmodern “genuine [wo]man” rejects because s/he “bears the
responsibility for a world which is not the work of a strange power,” but of the subjective ethical
individual (see pp. 14 and16). For Kierkegaard, the individual freedom is living genuine
existence independent of the Hegelian and modern absolutist conviction that truth is conformity,
a direct communication from the powers that be. Genuine existence involves the individual
capability to discern truth qua subjectivity or inwardness.
Kierkegaard’s project brings to modernity existential inwardness: the individual turns
toward the self and its passions, not to become self-absorbed, but be awakened to a new
orientation—heeding to an individual response toward a world not as a knower but as a listener.
Kierkegaard’s inwardness alludes to listening as an existential competent act of the subjective
thinker who “becomes” a “dwelling place” whence the individual offers its “ethical response,”
“hospitality (Lipari, 2010, p. 350) and engagement with other thinking narrative selves. In short,
listening is a subjective act of the free individual with a renewed responsibility to engage the
truth of the self and the other.
Listening brings the individual to the truths the time, including an awakening to the
repressive conditions that tethers individual to a reified sensus communis. It is through listening
that the self becomes a subjective individual who comes to terms with its truth as well as the
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truth of the other. It is possible to describe this experience as a “transformation that is determined
by the self-interestedly relating to the truth by desiring to become it. Subjectivity is then about
the self-truth relation … Consequently … relating is the truth of subjectivity” (Jothen, 2014, p.
155).
Modernity, for Kierkegaard (1967-1978), interpreted the ethical as “scholarship and
science” (p. 269). Andrew Herrmann (2008) frames this very clearly: “One of Kierkegaard’s
complaints about modern philosophy was that academics come to learn so much about ethics as a
field that they forget that the primary task of the individual is to live, enact, and bring into being
an authentic and ethical life” (p. 77). Kierkegaard believes that the ethical communicates
“oughtness-capability” rather than knowledge (Kierkegaard, 1967-1978, p. 285). By way of
illustration, Kierkegaard speaks of a corporal in the military.
The military assumes that every country lad who comes into military service
possesses the necessary capacities to be able to stick it out. Therefore, he is first
of all examined so that there be no difficulties in this respect … Now the
communication begins. The corporal does not explain to the soldier what it is to
drill, etc.: he communicates it to him as an art, he teaches him to use military
militarily the abilities and the potential competence he already has. (p. 269)
The individual is inherently capable. What is needed is teasing out of the individual oughtnesscapability. For Kierkegaard, then, subjective individuality and ethical capability go hand in hand.
However, the Hegelian philosophy that dominated the Danish religious state of Kierkegaard’s
time was dismissive of particularities and individuals. Kierkegaard considered modernity,
epitomized in nineteenth century Denmark as emblematic of the problem of conformity and
uniformity. Kierkegaard believed that in his confrontation with Hegelian Sittlichkeit and its
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influence on the signs of the time, he was battling against the structures of religious faith,
dogmatic truths, and political actions that were bent on abstract power.
Kierkegaard’s project provides a way to think about the single ethical individual as a
primordial expression of one’s tainted ground. For Kierkegaard, without an individual ground of
conviction, selves situate truth within collective power. Thus, the fantasy of collective
advancement, rather than subjective individuality comes to define “common sense.” This was the
world Kierkegaard lived in. It was a world that framed epistemological and existential truth
within collective power. Kierkegaard was critical of modernity’s fascination with collective
advancement. “According to him there, cannot be a whole of individual individuals because an
individual in the whole is [itself]” (Gabriel, 2010, p. 97). Kierkegaard believed that subjectivity
and individuality are necessary because they are inherently ethical. In other word, the genuine
ethical individual is the subjective individual with an ethical responsibility toward the self and
others: “To have individuality is to believe in the individuality of every other person”
(Kierkegaard, 1998b, p. 253). Kierkegaard expresses individuality as the subjective single ethical
individual that we are and ought to be. This reengagement of the inevitability of individuality
rings familiar of postmodernity’s mistrust of abstract power or any communicative condition or
praxis that is inimical to difference.
Jacques Ellul and Thomas Merton draw upon Kierkegaard’s critique of abstract power to
contest the enforcement of mass public references and social imperialism in contemporary
society. Ellul (1964) expressed his contestation by way of the metaphor of “technique,” which he
defined as a “standardized means of attaining a predeterminate result” (p. 1). Ellul considered
technique as a communicative paralysis that continues to plague contemporary society. Driven
by “the totality of method” and “absolute efficiency,” (Ellul, 1964), technique absorbs every
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aspect of human discourse “into the monstrous technical mechanism” of abstraction (p. 319).
The end result is the abrogation of the foundation and the ethical capabilities of the subjective
individual. “For what is under attack in our present political society is the autonomous citizen,
his ability to judge for himself. He is set up against … propaganda in diverse forms” (Ellul,
1968, p. 749; cited in Shaws, 2014, p. 103). Technique is the demise of the ethical individual
subject, yet—through propaganda—its damaging effects are camouflaged persuading the
individual into believing that submitting the self to the mass is in its best interest (Shaw, 2014, p.
104).
Merton agrees with Ellul about the negative and devastating effects of technique on the
human condition. Technique, for Merton (1961), forges the “mass man … a dull collective
routine of popular fantasies maintained in existence by the collective dream” (p. 268). The “mass
man” celebrates grand narratives and derives its inspiration from social progress. This so-called
inspiration moves individual responsibility to the “laws of collective existence” (Merton, 1966,
p. 14). Inspired by mass movement, the self loses its individuality, consciousness, and bias
ground. Merton saw the danger of the tyranny of technique as an existential lie:
Now if we take our vulnerable shell to be our true identity, if we think our mask is
our true face, we will protect it with fabrications even at the cost of violating our
own truth. This seems to be the collective endeavor of society: the more busily
[people] dedicate themselves to it, the more certainly it becomes a collective
illusion, until in the end we have the enormous, obsessive, uncontrollable
dynamic of fabrications designed to protect mere fictitious identities—“selves,”
that is to say, regarded as objects … an illusion. (p. 15)
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Collective illusion, keen on reifying the mass man, becomes “an illusion of omnipotence” that
not only fails to acknowledge individuality (difference), but makes the individual to be
inordinately dependent on collective power.
Ellul and Merton were critical of mass totality. They believe that modernity’s prejudice
against individual subjectivity is Kierkegaard’s prophecy fulfilled. Like Kierkegaard, Ellul and
Merton question abstract power and its companion, social progress. Ellul and Merton see social
progress as a form of “monopole despotism” (Geertz, 1995) that negates individuality with the
illusion of an “enlarged mentality.” Monopole despotism, unlike an enlarged mentality, which is
attentive individuality, is predicated upon conformity.
Ellul and Merton engaged Kierkegaard’s charge against conformity and its “bad faith”
effect on human discourse, relationships, and ethical responsibility. Their work offer insight into
the dangers of mass totality, the product of technique. Mass totality can be perceived as the
primordial sanctuary of individual safety, which includes freedom and happiness, yet a threat to
that very safety it promises to offer. Ellul and Merton, in the tradition of Kierkegaard, recognized
that the fascination with mechanism and the unreflective embracement of social progress spurred
collective power based upon conformity.
Ellul and Merton, like their predecessor Kierkegaard, were leery of abstract power’s
corollary companion to sanction conformity. Abstract power levels subjective individuality.
Thus, when Kierkegaard critiqued the communicative dark side of modernity, he was aware of
the dominant social currents of the time—the power and constraint of the mass man. “The mass
man signifies a step backward in the development of the individual” (Malantschuk, 1980, p. 14).
José Ortega y Gasset (1932) decries the “leveling” constraints of the modern mass man. The
mass man “crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual,
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qualified and select” (p. 18; cited in Puchniak, 2011, p. 148). The mass man valorizes
homogeneity, controlling heterogeneity.
Kierkegaard understood the nature of the modern mass man and its totalitarian
tendencies—leveling individuals into a public, faceless mass: “The trend today is in the direction
of mathematical equality, so that in all classes about so and so many uniformly make one
individual” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p. 85). The mass man abstracts individuality into homogeneity.
The abstraction, a colonizing trait of mass movement forms constraints that endorses conformity
(consensus) and excludes deformity (dissensus) as a spoiled identity. The mass public
underscores Kierkegaard’s concept of leveling, the monologic “massification” (Tuttle, 1996) of
selves.

Leveling, the Individual as “Mass Public”
The totalizing nature of Hegelianism displayed itself in modernity’s hostility toward
subjective individuality. For Kierkegaard, modernity lived within the metaphor of the mass
public, tyrannical to “irreducible subjectivity” (Rubenstein, 2001). Kierkegaard criticizes the
tyranny of the mass public and its gratuitous emphasis on totality—a totalitarian phantom
aggregate that annexes subjective individuality. The single individual is massed “so that in all
classes about so-and-so many uniformly make one individual” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p. 85). It is
this totalitarian annexation of the singular individual into a mass society that Kierkegaard calls
leveling.
Kierkegaard defines leveling as “the public,” an abstract homogeneity that strips the
individual of its singularity and subjectivity as well its ground of conviction. Through leveling,
authenticity is effaced, offering the individual a false sense of security in the autocratic public.
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Kierkegaard (1978) considers the public a “monstrous nonentity” (p. 91) and a “cruel
abstraction” (p. 93) hostile to the subjective, existing individual. “Anyone can see that leveling
has its profound importance in the ascendancy of the category of ‘generation’ over the category
of ‘individuality’” (p. 84). Kierkegaard is critical of the totalizing structures of modernity and its
unfettered belief in abstract power.
In leveling, the individual forgoes its ground of conviction, giving in to ideological
control through an “abstract aggregate” (p. 94). In accepting this “dubious vision of communal
life” (Smith, 2003) “ridiculously formed by the participant’s becoming a third party”
(Kierkegaard, 1978, p. 94), the individual is stripped of its authenticity, loses its primordial
ethical meaning as a subjective, existing individual. Recognizing the dangers of what he called
“spiritlessness,” Kierkegaard accuses modernity of “the idolized principle of” (p. 86) of social
totality which “from an ethical point of view” (p. 106) undermines individual subjectivity. The
individual, in this case, suffers what Michael Hyde (2005) calls “social death.” Social death
occurs when the individual (or the self) loses its bias ground under totalitarian conditions or
when the difference of the other is intentionally ignored. From Kierkegaard’s perspectives, social
death signifies “the abrogation of the passionate disjunction between subjectivity and
objectivity” and the loss of “full-blooded individuality” (1978, p. 103). The result, of which, is
an existential disconnectedness. Thus, the individual “forgets himself, forgets his name … it does
not dare to believe in himself, finds it too venturesome a thing to be himself ” (Kierkegaard,
1980, pp. 166-167), seeking refuge in the mass public.
In mass totality, “the quantitative dialectic of numerical accumulation replaces the
qualitative dialectic of individual resolution,” mitigating individual ethical responsibility (Taylor,
2000, p. 58). In leveling, the individual chooses consensus over dissensus, locating ethical
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responsibility in the mass narrative. Leveling masks the hidden paternalism of mass totality,
making the individual opt to relinquish the self to social progress with the belief that freedom is
guaranteed in a collective dream. Yet mass totality offers nothing, but an abstract aggregate of
false selves, stymieing oughtness-capabilities.
Kierkegaard maintains that modernity defined human existence and being in monological
terms, destabilizing individuality and leveling the individual to a “neutral and criterion-less
station of” mass totality (Tuttle, 1996, p. 35). Modernity is fundamentally structured on an
abstract aggregate—an aggregate that promotes systematic leveling of subjective individuality.
In such a state, Kierkegaard (1978) writes,
In our age the principle of association … is not affirmative but negative; it is an
evasion, a dissipation, an illusion, whose dialectic is as follows: as it strengthens
individuals it vitiates them; it strengthens by numbers, by sticking together, but
from an ethical point of view this is a weakening. Not until the single individual
has established an ethical stance despite the whole world, not until then can there
be any question of genuinely uniting; otherwise it gets to be a union of people
who separately are weak, a union as unbeautiful and depraved as a child marriage.
(p. 106)
Leveling, through the mass public, obliterates difference, denies existence, and stagnates
becoming (Rubenstein, 2001, p. 451). Leveling positions the individual within the comfort of
“indolence” and passivity, relegating status and value to the mass public. Kierkegaard saw the
mass public as a social totality in which leveling—through chatter, everyday talk, and the
press—commodifies discourse (see Bové, 1992; Herrmann, 2008). For example, the press—
Kierkegaard argues—has become “the self-appointed arbiter of taste and the purveyor of socially
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accepted attitudes … genuine communication is undermined as words devolve into mere chatter
… The abstract voice of the faceless editors, posing as the representatives of the people, becomes
an instrument of manipulation” (Barrett, 2010, p. 26). Kierkegaard was privy to the negative
consequences of the press.
In 1845, an underground yet popular Danish weekly, The Corsair published a critical
review of Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way. Suspecting the review was a handiwork of two of
his nemeses—Peder Ludvig Moller and Adam Goldschmidt, Kierkegaard launched a rebuttal
titled “‘The Activity of a Traveling Aesthetician and How He Nonetheless Came to Pay for
Dinner’” (Garff, 2013, p. 393). The derisive rebuttal closed with the remark, “Where the Spirit
is, there is the Church: Where P. L. Moller is, there is The Corsair” (p. 394). The Corsair fired
back with articles that portrayed Kierkegaard “as a round-shouldered yet rather upright figure,
situated on a cloud and surrounded by a heavenly nimbus; he is located at the center of the
universe and around him orbit the Round Tower, the Church of our Lady, boots, bottles, pipes,
books, the sun, moon, stars and many other things” (p. 401). The scuffle made Kierkegaard a
target of street mockery, depriving him of his routine street strolls, “daily baths” (p. 308).
Unwilling to be defined by the totalizing caricatures of the press, Kierkegaard (1967-1978)
comments:
So goes it. I posed the problem which confronts the whole generation: equality
between man and man. I posed it in action here in Copenhagen. That is something
quite different from writing a few words about it; I expressed some approximation
of it with my life. . . . But people do not grasp this, but they do talk and I become
the victim; and I am supposed to have been guilty of pride, I who have fought
sacrificially for equality. (p. 114)
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For Kierkegaard his counterattack was defense against the totalizing effects of the press, a
monologic phenomenon of mass totality. In his response to the totalizing effects of leveling,
Kierkegaard charges that mass totality and its handiwork—the press—has worked itself out as
communicatively regressive, leaving no room for subjectivity, difference or otherness. In so
doing, the irreducible subjective individual is amassed and collapsed into totality. The irreducible
subjective individual, conceived in this zombie form, beckons and constrains what “it means to
be an individual in a society” come of age (see Herrmann, 2008, p. 74).
Kierkegaard embodied a dialogic of existential, temporal subjective conditions of truth
claims, calling forth the pluralism, the contextuality, and the performativity that privilege truth as
irreducibly subjective (see Wood & Medina, 2005, p. 43). This irreducible subjectivity or
subjective individuality is key to Kierkegaard’s notion of existential individual. “Not until the
single individual has established an ethical stance despite the whole world, not until then can
there be any question of genuinely uniting” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p. 106). Kierkegaard’s notion of
the existential individual foreshadows the postmodern thought that dialogue reflects a ground of
conviction that is constituted as difference which expresses individual responsibility and
authenticity. “The individual is the category through which … this age, all history, the human
race as a whole, must pass” (Kierkegaard, 1998a, p. 118). The individual is not an abstract
monological object of a Hegelian ethics of totality (see Ziarek, 2001) that culminates in the
numbing of the subjective ethical individual.
The subjective ethical individual is an ethical conscious self that “requires acceptance of
the quite different idea that one is a responsible agent” (Hannay, 2001, p. 178). The subjective
ethical individual for Kierkegaard is, therefore, a conscious, volitional being capable of cutting
“short passivity and imaginative manipulation,” asking what it is to be a subjective, existing
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individual, staking “out one’s own future according to a view of life, and revealing oneself “in a
context of familial and social responsibilities” (p. 178). Leveling, on the other hand, is a systemic
fraud that would have one believe that individuality is something to be countered because it
stands in the way of the normative life. For Kierkegaard (1992), the aim of leveling is “to turn
the subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turn” difference “into an
indifferent, vanishing something” (p. 193). This is why Kierkegaard valorizes inwardness as a
way to counter unreflective allegiance to mass totality.
Inwardness mirrors truth as irreducibly subjective, a subjectivity that expresses idioms
that would otherwise be leveled by an ethics of totality. Inwardness and the authentic selfbecoming it implies is not only a means for countering leveling but also an end to be engaged
communicatively in the struggle to reclaim petite narratives under the tyranny of the social.
Reminiscent of Badiouian universal singularity (see Badiou, 2003), inwardness offers a way to
think about subjective individuality as visceral struggle to express difference. In other words,
inwardness bears witness to difference by finding petite narratives to express it. For Kierkegaard,
inwardness is a dialogic necessity. In facing this necessity, the ethical individual expresses truth
as subjectivity (see Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 213).
In other to work out this subjectivity, Kierkegaard draws upon the notion of irony to
scrutinize the pretentions and social truths of the time as well as offer a model for selfexamination (Perkins, 2001, p. 2). Irony mirrors its inevitable references in times of difference,
fostering individuality as a dialogic necessity.
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Irony and Subjective Individuality
For Kierkegaard, irony is a form of dialogic positioning that interrogates the tyrannical
proclivities of Hegelian Sittlichkeit which blurs the distinctions between individuality and
totality. This blurring of distinctions works to undermine subjective individuality, a
Kierkegaardian cultivation of difference in human communication. Kierkegaard (1989) deploys
irony as an existential necessity: “Just as philosophy begins with doubt, so also life that may be
called human begins with irony” (p. 6). Irony functions as a preservative “to keep the space of
subjectivity open” (Perkins, 2001, p. 275), to protect universal singularity from universal
generality, and to free the individual from the monological impositions of mass totality, a social
opiate.
From a communicative standpoint, irony creates idioms to express individuality through a
reflective distancing of the self “from any believable universal telos” (Soderquist, 2007, p. 25).
With its theorization in the existential wellbeing of the ethical single individual, irony
interrogates the colonization of the spaces of subjectivity. These spaces constitute individual
“negative freedom” (Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 247), shielding the individual from the totalitarian
grasps of the Sittlichkeit Leviathan. Thus irony is the “way” to individual subjectivity (p. 327). It
suggests the inevitability of a biased ground of conviction. Kierkegaard alludes to this necessity
by pointing to how, through irony, the ethical single individual stands his/her ground of
conviction rather getting amassed by social conventions. “[Irony] requires an individual to be his
or her own authoritative interpreter and thus his or her own creator. The aim is to establish his or
her own way of acting in the world independently of divine input” (Soderquist, 2007, p. 27). This
sense of ground was a crucial aspect of Kierkegaard’s dissertation, On the Concept of Irony.
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Due to Hegel’s critique of (Romantic) irony as “infinite absolute negativity,” Kierkegaard
found it necessary to revisit Hegel’s concerns that irony was dialectically problematic because it
was it was self-negating. Kierkegaard (1989) states:
Thus we have irony as infinite absolute negativity. It is negativity because it only
negates; it is finite because it negates not this or that phenomenon; and it is
absolute because it negates by virtue of a higher which is not. Irony establishes
nothing, for that which is to be established lies behind it. (p. 254)
Kierkegaard nuanced his treatment of irony, calling instead for a controlled form of irony. For
the Kierkegaard, when left uncontrolled, irony stymies subjective individuality, an authentic
human life. Controlled irony, on the other hand, “makes a movement opposite to that which is
uncontrolled declares it life. Irony finitizes and circumscribes and thereby yields truth, actuality,
content; it disciplines and punishes and thereby yields balance and consistency” (p. 326). Unlike
Hegel who connects “infinite absolute negativity” to truth as self-actualization rather than an
attentive response to situated knowledge, Kierkegaard situates irony in subjective individuality.
In a way quite consistent with the insights of Arendt (1994), one could argue that
Kierkegaard, speaking the idiom of the human condition under totalitarianism, wants to put
forward the following:
Against Hegel’s system, which presumed to comprehend and explain the “whole,”
Kierkegaard for sets the “individual,” the single human being, for whom there is
neither place nor meaning in a totality controlled by the world spirit. In other
words, Kierkegaard’s point of departure is the individual’s sense of being lost in a
world otherwise totally explained. This individual stands in constant contradiction
to this explained world because his “existence,” that is, the very fact of his
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altogether arbitrary existing … can neither be foreseen by reason nor resolved by
it into something purely thinkable. (p. 173)
For Kierkegaard, irony preserves subjective individuality under autocratic conditions and to
strengthen the single ethical individual in contexts that perpetuate the tyranny of what Arendt
referred to as the “social” (Arendt, 1998, p. 38; cited in Arnett, Fritz, and Holba, 2007, p. 122).
The social must be ironized for individuality to thrive. Thus, holed up in the incessant
totalitarian workings of the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, Kierkegaard’s irony becomes a phronetic
(practical wisdom) response to a totally socialized world. Irony within Kierkegaard’s
philosophical project rejects abstract homogenizing ethics which ignores the single ethical
individual. Irony resonates with the tenets of the ethics of singularity which acknowledges
individuality. Such an understanding of irony conceptualizes the self as an ethical single
individual. The ethical points to response and responsibility. Lipari (2009b) used the notion of
response as the “voice of ethics” which receives “the otherness of the other” (p. 47). For
Kierkegaard, irony is the voice of ethics that acknowledges the narratives of others, contrary to
the communicative shadow side of the totalizing whole, the side that welcomes autocratic
impulses to erase difference. In sum, irony allows the ethical individual to engage Bonhoeffer’s
notion of “deputyship”—service to others.
We discover this kind of communicative responsibility in Kierkegaard’s subtle, yet
forceful advocacy of “indirect communication,” a dialogic ethos that responds to the needs and
interests of others according to enthymematically understood and presupposed prior
responsibility. The indirect communicator engages dialogue as enthymematic interactions with
other selves. Such enthymematic interactions—and the co-creating of meanings in solidarity with
difference—favor both the existential and phenomenological conditions of the individual or
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subjective spaces and embodied narratives of a culture or tradition. Kierkegaard (1998b) best
illustrates this with the metaphor: “to stand by oneself—through another’s help!” (Kierkegaard,
1998b, p. 275). For Kierkegaard, subjective individuality qua subjective individuality is an ethics
of responsibility toward others. However, this responsibility can only be engaged indirectly.
Jonathan Malesic (2009) offered an insightful analogy of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect
communication and its impact on the subjective individual.
… if, for instance, I publicly resolve to help an alcoholic overcome his addiction,
I have released that person from slavery to alcohol, but I have become the
person’s master in its place. I have not performed the greatest beneficence,
because—even if I am a less destructive master than liquor had been—the
recovering alcoholic is still not his own master. (p. 110)
On the other hand, the responsible, single ethical individual engages ironic indirect
communication to shift the terrain of a telling centered communication to a listening centered
communication. This way, the ethical individual creates a space for individuality and inspires
provincial articulations of subjectivity embodied in the other (subject) standing by itself—with
the help of another. Edward Mooney (2010) called this shifting of terrain “interpersonal
inwardness.” It involves “making oneself unnoticed” (Kierkegaard, 1998b, p. 274) while
spurring self-activity and critical engagement in the individual.
Individual critical self-engagement from a Kierkegaardian perspective highlights the
communication of ethical capability otherwise than the communication of knowledge
(Kierkegaard, 1967-1978, p. 307). Ethics, for Kierkegaard, is not an object of knowledge—It
“cannot be taught” directly (p. 463); ethics is an indirect communicative evocation of capability
(Tietjen, 2013)—It “is more or less indirect communication” (Kierkegaard, 1967-1978, p. 308).
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According to Kierkegaard, the most important proponent of indirect communication was
Socrates, who embraced the maieutic discourse of “synergistic as opposed to agonistic
pedagogy” (Halasek, 1999, p. 182) to assist individuals realized and express their ethical
potentials. Kierkegaard (1989) engaged the Socratic exemplar of indirect communication—the
art of conversation (p. 70)—to bring about self-awareness.

Dialogic Relevance
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the single ethical individual offers insight into the relevancy
of the biased ground in dialogic communication ethics. Kierkegaard’s philosophical project
connects the dangers of monologic communication to “unreflective consensus” (Arnett, 2007a).
As a precursor to postmodernism’s quest for difference, Kierkegaard offers a hermeneutic and an
existential mode of inquiry into the dialogic necessity of irony as a constituent element of
individuality. For Kierkegaard, irony is otherwise than originative totality because it privileges
subjective ethical individuality “by highlighting the contradiction between finite social
conventions and the infinite requirement of the self to develop into the ethical single individual,
who is greater than social conformity” (Williams III, 2012, p. 310). Irony, therefore,
encapsulates individuality.
With Kierkegaard, comes the understanding that irony problematizes yet makes possible
the relevancy of individuality in every communicative praxis. By questioning originative totality
and privileging the ethical single individual, Kierkegaard instantiates difference as a
communicative ground of conviction possible only through irony, which “accentuates one’s own
I in relation to the ethical requirement—and culture” (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 503; cited in
Westphal, 1996, p. 166). Climacus points to this I—a subjective individuality—as a rhetorical
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necessity for purging modernity’s overindulgence in what Kierkegaard would have called
Sittlichkeit-in-becoming (see Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 77; Westphal, 1996, p. 111). Contrary to
Sittlichkeit-in-becoming is the condition of becoming subjective which is “constituted in
relationality and multiplicity” (Russell, 2009, p. 6). Through relationality and multiplicity
emerge the subjective individual with a “commitment to the demands of the ethical” (Lippitt,
2000, pp. 92-93). From the standpoint of dialogic communication, the ethical commitment is a
responsibility toward others: “In Kierkegaard we encounter” the ethical single individual
“defined in terms of responsibility” (Gron, 2008, p. 29). The subjective individual is not the selfabsorbed individual, but an ethical single individual who “helps others toward responsible
individuality” (Williams III, 2012, p. 312). The ethical responsibility toward others forecloses
the therapeutic I while endorsing a rhetorical turn to a derivative I. Ethical responsibility, so
construed, is akin to the Kierkegaardian love mantra “to stand alone—by another’s help!”
(Kierkegaard, 1998b, p. 274) and leads to the dialogic revisioning of relationality and
multiplicity in the light of an ethics of responsibility.
In the revisioning of relationality and multiplicity in the light of an ethics responsibility,
this project calls for recognizing difference as a dialogic necessity, embodied in the biased
ground of individuality. As a dialogic necessity, difference provides the platform for
acknowledging the biased ground of the other. Such an understanding instantiates rhetorical
prejudice—the subject matter of this dissertation—as dialogic irony, that is, the biased ground as
protected spaces where individuality thrives or flourishes, and where “continual inner
appropriation of the demands of the ethical can take place” (Lippitt, 2000, p. 92). The ethical
mentioned here derives from the dialogic import of Kierkegaard’s irony, which unlike the
Hegelian ethics that obliterates individuality, is attentive to difference. The attentiveness to
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difference is a dialogic ironic act with emancipatory and counterhegemonic potentials constituted
through civility, respect, and responsibility (Arnett & Arneson, 1999), the meeting of minds
(Peters, 1999), acknowledgement (Hyde, 2005) realized within the dialectical conception of
dialogue (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996).
Dialogic irony, therefore, can be reconceptualized within the framework of a “dialogical
positioning” (Smith, 2008) that is attentive to difference. Although Hegel’s irony is actualized
through the principle of subjectivity, he situates ethics within the totalitarian structures of the
Sittlichkeit-in-becoming. Kierkegaard’s irony, on the other hand, is an ethics that valorizes and
protects subjective individuality from the totalitarian clutches of Hegelian ethics. What
Kierkegaard’s philosophical project brings to dialogic ethics is the ethical single individual who
is attentive to difference. I believe that Kierkegaard’s conception of the ethical single individual
would resonate with Luce Irigaray’s notion of ethical intersubjectivity, which she described as
the acknowledgement of the ethics of difference. In To Be Two (2001), Irigaray writes,
Does existing not mean offering you an opportunity to become yourself? …
Consuming does not produce one’s existence. Instead, difference can protect this
existence: I am if you are, to be together with you allows me to become. The two,
this two, is the bit more which is indispensable, if I am to be. Closing myself up in
consumption, in possession, in production, does not make me one. What makes
me one, and perhaps even unique, is the fact that you are and I am not you. (p. 15
and p. 16)
As a result, Kierkegaard believes that ethical single individuality recognizes and encounters
difference as an ontological irreducibility embodied in dialogic irony. For Kierkegaard, irony
works to nurture subjective individuality. The communicative consequence of such an ethical
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subjective individuality is a dialogical positioning which unfinalizes individuals in a continuous
ethical discourse. Continuous because discourse cannot be finalized; discourse is a continuous
communicative praxis demonstrated in a subjective commitment to difference in counterpoise to
the notion of abstract aggregation:
In community, the single individual is; the single individual is dialectically
decisive as the presupposition for forming community, and in community the
single individual is qualitatively something essential and can at any moment
become higher than “community,” specifically, as soon as “the others” fall away
from the idea. The cohesiveness of community comes from each one’s being a
single individual, and then the idea; the connectedness of a public or rather its
disconnectedness consists of the numerical character of everything. (Kierkegaard,
1967-1978, p. 318)
Numerical totalitarianism and numerical capitalism are birds of the same feather. Mass
totality is a commodity for negating difference—differing narrative grounds—with a pretense of
sensus communis. Kierkegaard understood the dangers of mass totality. Kierkegaard
demythologizes the Hegelian Leviathan—mass totality—pointing to the dialogic necessity of
irony. It is irony that gives birth to the ethical single individual. Kierkegaard offers a dialogic
suggestion: the ethical life is not sensus communis; rather, it is a personal and subjective
engagement of sensus communis. From a dialogic communication perspective, Kierkegaard’s
work offers insight into the postmodern assumption that the ethical life is not sensus communis;
rather, it is a personal and subjective engagement of sensus communis.
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CHAPTER SIX— The Derivative “I” for the Other: Dialogic Ethical Responsibility
Throughout its history, communication ethics has bristled with questions of response and
responsibility. The case for responsibility has been constructed through recent works by Ronald
Arnett (2003, 2004, 2008a), Michael Hyde (2001), Pat Gehrke (2010), Spoma Jovanovic and
Roy Wood (2004), Lisbeth Lipari (2004, 2009b, 2012), and Jeffery Murray (2000). The explicit
perspectives of these scholarships rest on Levinas’s task of tracing “out the obligation that is
always prior to any knowledge” (Levinas, 1985, p. 90; cited in Gehrke, 2010, p.5). Arnett (2004)
points to this Levinasian emphasis on obligation, calling it a “responsive ethical ‘I,’” which for
Lipari (2009b) is a “listening otherwise that suspends the willfulness of the self and foreknowledge in other to receive the singularities of the alterities of the other” (p. 44). Thus, the “I”
is tied to an ethics of responsibility.
This chapter works with Levinas’s ethics of responsibility in conjunction with the
dialogic metaphor “I for the other” as an ethics that emerge from engaging and acknowledging
the biased ground of the radically different other. In contributing to the necessity of rhetorical
prejudice in communication ethics, this project first takes up phenomenological notion of ethics
as “first philosophy” as Levinas conceives it. I then explore the relationship between the ethical
“I” and radical alterity. In other words, does the “I” have an ethical responsibility to respond to
the biased ground of the radically different other? The issue of response is a listening otherwise
that situates the “‘I’ as derivative of the Other” (see Arnett, 2004, p. 80). The chapter concludes
by looking at the Levinas’s derivative “I” in the context of the inevitability of the ground of the
Other.
This chapter contributes to the ongoing scholarship on the necessity of prejudice as the
ground on which we stand, outlining Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and its connection to the
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radically different biased ground of the Other. With Levinas, this project argues that (rhetorical)
prejudice or bias—one’s ground of conviction—is not some “‘hermetic closure’ of Leibnizian
origin” (Wehling-Giorgi, 2007, p. 63), but a rhetorical opening charged with an ethical relation,
the responsibility to respond to the otherness of the Other. This charge, a “voice of ethics”
(Lipari, 2009b) that calls forth attentive listening to difference is a phenomenological prima facie
principle of ethics.

Ethics as First Philosophy
Levinas, David Levin (1993) argues, was critical of modernity’s tyranny of
“ocularcentric philosophy,” which propelled an absolutist ethics that violently reduced “the
human other to transcendental sameness” (p. 18). This critique of the hegemony of
ocularcentrism, Paul Davies (1993) contends, is evident in Levinas’s “ethical alterations of
sensibility,” a phenomenological “thought of the singular and irreducible alterity of the … Other
as face—expressed in those places, then, where it is impossible to separate or to abstract the …
alterity from the specific encounter with the other person, the other human being” (p. 252).
Irreducible alterity articulates an ethical responsibility, a “givenness, of the Other as other”
(Crowell, 2010, p. 7). This givenness, a derivative command, involves an ethical responsibility
for the singularity of the alterity of the other (Lipari, 2009b). That givenness, for Levinas, makes
ethics prior to ontology.
By prioritizing ethics, Levinas questions the ontological assumptions of Being (Arnett,
2004). Levinas (1969) writes,
ontology is as first philosophy which does not question the Same … subordinates
the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains
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under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to
imperialist domination, to tyranny … Being before the existent, is … a movement
within the Same, without regard for any obligation to the Other. (pp. 46-47)
Ethics is prior to Being. Arnett, Fritz, and Holba (2007b) allude to the primacy of ethics,
questioning the advancing of human agency at the expense of otherness (pp. 117-118). Their call
to return to otherness resonates with an earlier call from Levinas which involves “interpreting
otherwise than being,” a phenomenological-communicative turn away from humanistic agency
to an ethics of responsibility toward the Other:
Interpreting otherwise suggests interpreting otherwise than Being. Levinas offers
a counter to Being and willfulness—he interprets otherwise than Being…suggests
a pragmatic and natural concern for the Other—without the Other there is no “I.”
Levinas posits ethics not being, as first philosophy. Ethics is primordial, a priori
to being. (Arnett, 2004, p. 80)
Levinas’s otherwise than being is an “alternative phenomenology” (Peperzak, Critchley, &
Bernasconi, 1996, p. 150) that privileges an ethics of responsibility to and for the Other despite
the overwhelming demands of “originative agency” (Arnett, 2008a). Levinas’ ethics of
responsibility privileges derivative agency by offering “a responsive ‘I’” that is attentive to the
voice of the Other (Pat Arneson, 2007, p. 56). The responsive I commands a “listening
otherwise” (Lipari, 2009b) and is driven by the “ethical echo,” “I am my brother’s keeper” (see
R. Arnett, 2012a, p. 140). Such a listening otherwise is the glare of responsibility in the face of
the Other (Levinas, 1969, p. 24). Arnett (2012a) calls the listening otherwise an “impersonal
attentiveness.” For Lipari (2004, 2009b), it is a “listening for the Other” or a “listening
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otherwise,” a “voice of ethics” that is welcoming of difference. I call the listening act ethical
givenness.
It is in the ethical givenness that the “I” becomes a responsive I that is attentive to the
ontic difference of the Other. Levinas makes a distinction between “Other” and “other.” The
former, autrui—“the personal other, the you”—represents radical alterity; the latter, autre—
represents the other as another (Levinas, 1991, pp. 24-25; cited in Gehrke, 2010, p. 8). For
Levinas, the Other is a radical, singular otherness that transcends totality (Ponzio, 2008). This is
what is meant in Kierkegaard’s existential ethics as the ethical individual whose singularity
defies universality (see Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 61) and perhaps what Bonhoeffer (1955) means by
“deputyship” (see Arnett, 2005, p. 9). Bonhoeffer writes, “Deputyship, and therefore
responsibility, lies only in the complete surrender of one’s own life to the other … only the
selfless … lives responsibly, and this means only the selfless … lives” (p. 222). Deputyship is an
ethical givenness “come of age,” and is founded on an ethics of responsibility that places the I in
a derivative consciousness (Arnett, 2005). In the words of Michael Morgan (2007), it is “my
responsibility as responsivity” (p. 160).
As Gehrke (2010) said, “It is not merely anti-humanism that drives Levinas’s
philosophy” (p. 7). Levinas shifts ethics from the realm of Hegelian phenomenology and its
obsession with the totalitarian Sittlichkeit to a postmodern revisioning of ethics from the
standpoint of Plato’s “Good beyond Being” (Levinas, 1969, p. 293). Levinas engages Plato’s
notion of the good beyond being to interrogate the systemic “ontologies of the Western tradition”
(Hamblet, 2009, p. 15), calling forth an “answerability to the other” (Levinas & Kearney, 1986,
p. 27; cited in Shepherd, 2014, p. 115). What Levinas means by answerability is a responsibility,
which is an “involvement, exposition, proximity of one-for-the-other” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 121).
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Contrary to the Hegelian preoccupation with ontology, and its proclivity to reduce heterogeneity
to homogeneity, Levinas ethics preserves particularity and singularity. For Levinas, the Hegelian
Sittlichkeit privileges “ontology as first philosophy,” and is tantamount to “a philosophy of
power” (Levinas, 1969, p. 46). The Hegelian I is an embodiment of negation and is “integrally
violent” (Kosky, 2001, p. 5). The Hegelian phenomenology creates an autonomous I with the
proclivity to co-opt and colonize alterity.
The Hegelian I, ethically conceived, is therapeutic. It is a master I, a self-absorbed,
desiring I concerned existentially with its own recognition. Such an I transports the self into
provincial individualism, making dialogue impossible. Hegel alludes to the danger of provincial
individualism as “postures of coercion and domination” that “contradict and undermine”
reciprocity (Williams, 1997, p. 85). The Hegelian I is a parochial monologic economy which
privileges relations with the other as ontological, and ontology as prior to ethics. Hegel’s
confidence in ontology typified in the autonomous desiring I, valorizes the enlightenment
thinking that responsibility to the self is prior to responsibility to the Other (Knights & O’Leary,
2006). At the heart of such thinking is a phenomenological problem, a routinized negation that
makes the experience of difference a communicative pariah.
The autonomous deserving I makes the self an absolute I. The absolute I reduces the
particularity of the other to the commonality of totality. The absolute I presuppose an
understanding of autonomy as negative dialectics evident in the Hegelian master-slave dialectics
(Houlgate, 2013, p. 97). The dialectics constitute a phenomenological point of desire—the desire
to subjugate the other.
Levinas, on the other hand, reverts the Hegelian absolute I and its penchant to wrestle the
ground of the other. The I for Levinas is an a priori givenness, an ethically engaged
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phenomenology inextricably linked to responsibility. As Levinas advocated in his Entre Nous:
Thinking-of-the-Other (1998a), the ethical responsibility of the I is an “interhuman order,” an
ethical implicature that is propelled by “altruism,” not “egoism” (p. 86). As Levinas said, The I is
an “ethical event” that interrogates “indifference” (p. viii):
When the human existence interrupts and goes beyond the Spinozan conatus
essendi—there is a vocation of an existing-for-the-other stronger than the threat of
death: the fellow human being’s existential adventure matters to the I more than
its own, posing from the start the I as responsible for the being of the other;
responsible, that is, unique and elect, as an I who is no longer just any individual
member of the human race. It is as if the emergence of the human in the economy
of being upset the meaning of and plot of and philosophical rank of ontology: the
in-itself of being-persisting-in-being goes beyond itself in the gratuitousness of
the outside-of-itself-for-the-other…(p. viii)
The I is constituted as a responsive ethical I in the tradition of Isaiah’s prophetic response, “Here
I am” (6:8)—which Levinas, in fact implicitly alludes to in Otherwise than Being (1991, p. 114).
In other words, the I for Levinas is constituted not as a Spinozan therapeutic I, a dominant
western ontology of the self, which Tocqueville would call individualism, but a derivative I that
is attentive to the individuality of the “wholly Other” (John D Caputo, 1993, p. 210). This work
connects attentiveness to Otherness as an intersubjective dialogical positioning (Smith, 1997;
Smith, 2008), which resonates with Francois Lyotard’s (1988) The Differend. For Lyotard, The
Differend “is a sense of obligation toward others in concrete spatio-temporal fields marked on
their grounds of” rhetorical prejudice, and “constitute[s] a “quasi-ethical imperative that Lyotard
develops out of his reading of Levinas” (Smith, 2008, p. 167). Like Levinas and Lyotard, this
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work argues that the dialogic is an ethical givenness, a derivative implicature, an attentive
response to the radical difference or the singularity of the other. This embodied givenness is the
origin of human responsibility, and the grounds of Levinas’ ethics of responsibility as first
philosophy.
Zygmunt Bauman (1993) identifies with Levinas’s ethics of responsibility, calling it
“answerability to the Other and to moral conscience” (p. 11). Like Levinas, Bauman argues that
ethics is an infinite responsibility to the Other—i.e., “meeting with the Other as a ‘face’” (Crone,
2008, p. 64). This ethical implicature, with emphasis on “moral responsibility,” teases out of the
self a commitment “to the interhuman order and interrupts complacent and self-satisfied
existence” (Hughes, 2005, p. 157). Moral responsibility is understood here as a derivatively
engaged conscience. It is marked by a response I; It is an I that is supportive and responsive to
the Other. The responsiveness cannot be ignored or jettisoned. As Levinas (1985) said, “It is in
this precise sense that Dostoyevsky said: ‘We are responsible for all men before all, and I am
more than all others’” (p. 101). When the I is responsive to the Other, it becomes neither a
Hegelian master nor slave, but a “signification” (Ponzio, 2008) of givenness. The ethical
givenness implied here entails “the condition of being a hostage” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 122). The
hostage “represents itself (‘here I am’) in its responsibility for others” (Derrida, 1999, p. 55).
Levinas says:
Responsibility for the Other is not an accident that happens to a subject, but
precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom, in which a commitment to the
Other would have been made. I have not done anything and I have always been
under accusation—persecuted. The ipseity, in the passivity without arche
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characteristic of identity, is hostage. The word I means here I am, answering for
everything and for everyone. (Levinas, 1991, p. 114; cited in Derrida, 1995, p. 55)
Lipari (2009b) clarifies the linkage between the metaphor of hostage and responsibility when she
said, “The self is called to responsibility for the other before it is free” (2009b, p. 55). Anne
Fadiman’s title, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down suggests the responsibility to listen
to the alterity of the radically different other. Making the connection between the self being held
hostage by the “other’s call” would make statement “the spirit catches you, and you fall down”
attractive to Levinas.
By ethics as first philosophy, Levinas meant being caught by the “voice of ethics,” and
most importantly, subordinating the self to “a listening that is awakened and attuned” to the
alterity of the Other. Levinas’s work points to an I whose “everydayness” is conditioned by an
ethical givenness to the singularity of the Other.

Ethical Givenness and the Singularity of the Other
David Miller, in ‘Are They My Poor?’ (2004), revisits the ethical necessity of
responsibility to others. Miller called this responsibility altruism—a “behavior that is intended to
meet the needs of others, where there is no immediate self-interested reason to help, and where
there is no institutional requirement that one should” (p. 109). What Miller refers to as altruism
has kinship with the notion of ethical givenness in the tradition of Levinas’s “ethics of infinite
otherness” (Gehrke, 2010, p. 9), “the voice of ethics” (Lipari, 2009b) attentive to the inviolable
and irreducible difference of the Other. This “recognition of difference” (see Arnett, 2004, pp.
84-85), frames the relationship between the I and the Other as an “other awareness” (Lipari,
2009a, p. 354) This other awareness is grounded in service otherwise than power. Service entails

138

an engagement with the “irreducible alterity” (p. 354) of the Other. By irreducible alterity is
meant the “absolute otherness of the Other” (Gehrke, 2010, p. 10), an absolute other whose
singularity becomes an ethical site of sensibility and subjectivity (Drabinski, 2001).
Sensibility is an ethical acknowledgment of the absolute singularity of the Other,
emphasizing the inevitability of difference. Thus, any attempt to undermine the radical alterity of
the different Other constitutes a totalitarian evisceration of the singularity of the Other: “For
Levinas, the other singularly frees itself from the power of being … to erase its alterity and
incorporate it in its universalizing and totalizing ‘said’” (Ziarek, 2014, p. 232). For Levinas’s
ethic, prior to being, interrogates attempts to systematize the singularity of the Other, calling
forth a phenomenological recognition of the Other as an absolute otherness. Levinas’s Other is
not an ontological recluse, but a phenomenological Other whose alterity transcends Heidegger’s
Mitsein—being with others. This is “because in being-with-others in the world, the other is not
encountered in his or her singularity; the other does not count or signify as such, but only
through those shared projects that give the mit its particular consistency or pattern” (Perpich,
2008, p. 203). The alterity of the Other, explains Levinas, is singularity. Diane Perpich (2008)
states the following about Levinas’s notion of singularity:
[It] expresses the idea that each human being is a unique, irreplaceable self,
irreducible to any attributes or qualities that could be used to describe her and that
would inevitable reduce her to what she has in common with others. In addition, it
expresses the idea that the other has ethical standing. As such, singularity contains
with it the idea of persons having equal moral worth and dignity … expresses the
idea that the other concerns the ego not in view of some shared or universal
property … but simply as such. (p. 188)
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Singularity, therefore, defies instantiations of a totalizing “concept” (Long, 2004).
For Levinas, the recognition of the radical singularity of the Other is grounded in ethical
givenness, giving rise to the experience of the Other as an embodied infinite Other “located
inside … the I, which is itself a dialogue, relations between same and other” (Ponzio, 2008, p.
118). This relationship presumes as ethical givenness grounded in a “transcendent desire for
good” (Lévinas, 1989, p. 117). The transcendental desire for good involves an unconditional
responsibility to the otherness of the Other. Thus, the responsible I “yearns for the good” of the
Other” in a “face-to-face relationship” (Hutchens, 2004, p. 77). Here lies the ethics of Levinas. It
is an “ethics of authenticity” (Taylor, 1991) which is otherwise than an ontological selfcenteredness.
Levinas’s ethically constituted good—non-consequentialist in nature—is not selfcentered, but other-centered. In the words of Ponzio (2008), “otherness is not out of the sphere of
the I” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 119). Since the I is derivative or imbued with ethical givenness, it avails
itself to the Other. Thus, attentiveness to the singularity of the Other is an ethical implicature
which addresses responsibility as an exercise of the “good beyond being.” To Levinas
responsibility presupposes an “‘open inexhaustible’ horizons” of inviting and hosting the Other.
Zygmunt Baumann and Charles Taylor, drawing on Levinas, critiqued the “diminished
moral responsibility” prevalent in the history of modern ethics (Mason, 2001). Baumann and
Taylor attributed the problem to an exaggerated confidence in universal epistemological
foundations of ethics, leading to the erasure of alterity in systemic epistemic structures. Such is
the problem of the Hegelian negative dialectics, which Levinas problematized as totalitarian
persecution of alterity (Lyotard, 1986). As Brian Schroeder said,

140

In Hegelian dialectics, otherness has no meaning apart from its relation with
sameness and vice versa. This holds true for every dialectical opposition. While
each dyadic term is distinct and knowable as such, its true value lies in the holistic
relation that it has with its opposite. Absolute knowing is the process of arriving
at this truth since “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only
as substance, but an equally as Subject (PhG, 19, 10). In the Phenomenology and
Logic the problem of otherness is reconciled in the [negative] dialectics …
Substance is only realized as Subject only by virtue of its having been mediated
by the object of its reflection … (Schroeder, 2000, p. 48)
Schroeder, in the light of Levinas, pilloried the Hegelian dialectics as an epistemic hegemony
that “renders the Absolute as Totality” (p. 49), constituting the Other as the Same. Levinas’s
ethics qua ethics, which is otherwise than the Hegelian negative, bring the I “into a genuine
relationship with otherness preserving” the singularity of the Other (p. 45). This assumption is
corroborated by dialogic ethics scholarships on subaltern studies(see Dutta & Pal, 2010). These
scholarships argue—with implicit reference to Levinas—that “epistemic structures” that
constitute the singularity of the Other as pariahs “create” an imbalance “in the economy of
knowing” (Drabinski, 2011, p. 52).
Levinas’s ethical-phenomenological departure from the West-ontic totality which he
considers tyrannical, privileges ethics over epistemology. As Drabinski contended, “If knowing is
obsessed with totality, then we should see the reflection of totalitarianism as such in
epistemology” (p. 52; emphasis original). In other words, epistemic totality is epistemic reducity.
For Levinas, modern ethics, like the rhetorical aphorism, enlightenment’s prejudice against
prejudice, is an ethics against ethics. Levinas, however, reverses this thinking, calling forth a
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phenomenological ethics that restores the irreducible alterity of the Other. With this radical
reversal, Levinas questions the modern understanding of knowledge, especially the bad faith
epistemological assumption that alterity finds its identity only in totality. Such flawed
methodological assumptions tyrannically homogenize otherness.
Levinas’s questioning of epistemic erasures that eclipse the singularity of the Other
underscores postmodernity’s contestation of grand narratives. For Levinas and postmodernity,
ethics qua ethics raise questions about the relationship between ethical givenness and the
singularity of the Other. The relationship between the two suggests the primacy of responsibility,
which for Levinas “is involvement, exposition, proximity of one-for-the-other” (Ponzio, 2008, p.
121). Relationships based on epistemic inequality serve to colonize the singularly different Other
under the totalitarian model of abstraction. The totalitarian model of abstraction constitutes a
violent imposition of hegemonic views through monolithic constructions that “alter the status
and signs of the Other” (Drabinski, 2011, p. 65). Marie Baird (1999), using the Holocaust as an
example of epistemic alteration of the Other said,
In my estimation, and in accordance with Levinas’s ethical stance, such
subservience has the ironic and unintended effect of perpetuating the very kind of
thinking that made the Holocaust possible … because it replaces the ethical
preeminence of individual inviolability with the primacy of the ontologically
based conceptual system within which the individual … is then to be understood
in an a posteriori fashion. Individual inviolability falls prey to the conceptualizing
system that defines who may “qualify” as an individual in the first place, thus
excluding those whom the system labels “life unworthy of life” because they do
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not meet the criteria the system has already established a priori as constitutive of
human personhood. (pp. 343-344)
Baird’s take on the totalizing effects of epistemic imbalance or in the economy of knowing,
signal the inevitability of rhetorical prejudice otherwise than ontological and epistemological
prejudice. Rhetorical prejudice interrogates the dialectics of epistemology, reverting the
conventional ideological belief that prejudice as methodological skepticism is prior to prejudice
as a “ground of conviction.” This work links the ground of conviction with the singularity of the
Other, and situates alterity within the infinity of the Other. The infinity of the Other defies
epistemic signification, a routinized caricaturing that fueled inhuman projects that considered
defacing the face of the Other a norm.
Jacques Ellul (1985) points to the problematics of epistemic signification, which he
argues, breeds a conflation of reality, “believing that a scientific hypothesis is true when it is
confirmed by experiments. Such a hypothesis has nothing to do with truth, and is merely
accurate … this preeminence of reality and this confusion coincide with the universal belief in
the ‘fact,’ taken to be ultimate value” (p. 31). Taken to the extreme, the “fact” delignifies,
declaring the face of Other persona non grata (as in the Holocaust). Levinas warns against the
dangers of Ellul’s problematic “fact.” The fact points to a commitment to totality as the site of
alterity—an argument of Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre—which Levinas vehemently opposes.
Epistemic signification, like Ellu’s problematic “fact,” have the proclivity to, from the
perspectives of Levinas, skirt subjectivity, and address objectivity through axiomatic frames. By
so doing, the face-of-the-other becomes a commodified object according to normative
denotations and connotations. This makes the other a finite, signified other. Levinas’s ethics, on
the hand, privileges an infinite Other whose singularity cannot be calculated or defined through
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the whims and caprices of autarchy. For Levinas, the Other is not object of objectivity, but a
subject whose subjectivity is infinite.
The infinite Other cannot be rationally assessed, neither can it be comprehended and
described by totalitarian language games. The infinite Other can, therefore, not be sustained by
an epistemic dialectic proper to ontological totality. The infinite Other cannot be “sublated” nor
interiorized. The infinite Other is irreducible, and “resists any attempt to convert it … into
something that is my own; [it] is not even a theme or a noema that I could “grasp” or encompass
by representing or comprehending it” (Peperzak, 1993, p. 134). The infinite Other breeds a
derivative awareness. From the stand point of this work, the derivative awareness is a
phenomenologically engaged dialogic grounded in an ethical relation.
An ethical relation is a derivative experience of alterity. Levinas describes it as a
relationship “where the Other is not merely heard, seen, or felt, but where the self is receptive to
the revelation of the difference and it thereby moved to a level of responsibility” (Todd, 2003, p.
52). This ethical responsiveness to the alterity of the Other could be described as
phenomenological agape in the tradition of Pauline unconditional love. For Levinas, the
unconditional is asymmetrical because it entails an obligation “to the other without any
expectation of obligation in return” (Katz, 2003, p. 70). Judith Butler (2012) speaks of the
Levinas’s ethical relation as ethical responsiveness to the Other. Butler states: “Levinas … gave
us a conception of ethical relations that make us ethically responsive to those who exceed our
immediate sphere of belonging and to whom we nevertheless belong, regardless of any choice or
contract” (p. 23). For Butler, the ethical relation is an infinite obligation.
Infinite obligation is an “unavoidable call” to respond to the ethical givenness of the
subjective I. In Levinas’s (Levinas, 1991; 1986) terms, infinite obligation is an a priori condition
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of “answerability” and being “hostage.” The conditions of answerability and being hostage
intrinsically connect “the experience of conscience” to “horizontal relationality” (Fleming,
2015). The experience of conscience is a primordial moral responsiveness—a voice of ethics—to
the alterity of the Other. In this case conscience is prior to consciousness. Conscience is a moral
responsibility that engages the good as beyond being. Consciousness, on the other hand,
valorizes being, giving rise to an abstract ethics constituted by conditionalities that problematize
infinite obligation as an embodied derivative ethical responsibility.
For Levinas, infinite obligation derives from the experience of conscience, bringing the
notion of horizontal relationality as a dialogic standpoint central to the nature of the responsible
I. The I assumes the derivative call of responsibility to the alterity of the Other. The derivative
call is not an option but an obsession with the relational face of a command through which the I
becomes, first and foremost, “a servant of” the Other (Levinas, 1991, p. 87). The metaphor of
servant, in the Levinasian context is otherwise than the Hegelian master/slave relationship. The
servant is a relational, responsive and dialogic ethical I whose singularity is not egocentric but
altruistic. This understanding of infinite obligation is similar to what is meant in Ubuntu ethics as
“I am because you are.” In Ubuntu ethics, the I is derivatively constructed, emphasizing the
ethical responsibility of the individual toward others. Key to Levinas is the idea that the Ubuntu
ethics of “I am because you are,” is an infinite responsibility.
The Levinasian ethical givenness is a responsiveness. It is an ethical phenomenological
response that involves the recognition and protection of the singularity of the Other. Arnett, Fritz
and Holba (2007a) describe this as a “turn toward Otherness” (p. 127). This work engages the
metaphor of turning toward Otherness as a Levinasian phronetic response to the inevitability of
prejudice. Bias is the ground of the Other. Attempts to colonize and sanitize the ground of
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conviction of the Other is tantamount to phenomenological genocide. Levinas reminds us of this
banality when says, “It is banal to say we never exist in the singular … I see the other; but I am
not the other” (Levinas, 1985, p. 58; cited in Arnett, 2005, p.200). Levinas bring to this project
and communication ethics a theory that frames the inevitability of rhetorical prejudice within the
phenomenological assumptions of dialogic ethic.

The Dialogic of Ethical Responsibility
Levinasian ethics is a turn toward an a priori command. It is a derivative “command to
action” (Wyschogrod, 1974, p. 94), not an originative agent of metaphysics. At the heart of the
response is a dialogic that requires the primacy of ethics. Levinas defines ethics in terms of
horizontal relationality—“otherness” within “the sphere of the I” (Ponzio, 2008). It is within
horizontal relationality that the face of the Other is encountered. The encounter invokes a sense
of obligation, an infinite responsibility. For Levinas, horizontal relationality, which is otherwise
than a metaphysical relation, is a primordial response to the face of the Other. Horizontal
relationality points to a phenomenological presence (see Arnett, 2004, p. 86), and commands a
derivative response within the Levinasian notion of invocation: “Levinas maintains that the
relation with the other which is preceded by neither representation nor comprehension can be
termed ‘invocation’” (Wyschogrod, 1974, p. 94). Levinas engaged the metaphor of invocation
within the Kantian construct of obligation. The obligation takes the form of a command—infinite
responsibility to the face of the Other. That is to say, “the experience of the infinite demand of
the other’s face defines the ethical subject in terms of a split between self and an exorbitant
demand that it can never meet, the demand” of infinite responsibility (Critchley, 2007, p. 40).
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Dialogue stems from the responsibility to the face of the Other. The relationship between
dialogue and responsibility is a “voice of ethics” (Lipari, 2009b), which Levinas (1969) says, “is
to recognize the mastery of the other, to receive his command, or, more exactly, to receive from
him the command to command” (p. 178). The recognition and reception of the Other points to a
“listening otherwise,” (Lipari, 2009b), a sense of a “gymnastics of attention” (Weil, 1952; cited
in Eppert, 2004, p. 46), which involves the waiting of the I to receive the singularity of the Other.
The dialogic, for Levinas, and the sense in which it is engaged in this work, is about the
responsibility of the I—“responsive ethical I” (Arnett, 2004)—whose responsiveness is not
therapeutic but derivative. The dialogic is an ethical reversal of the ontologic. While the former
is about asymmetrical relations that recognize difference, the latter valorizes dialectical relations
which “rest[s] upon the totalitarianism or imperialism of the Same” (Peperzak et al., 1996, p. 14).
The responsive ethical I, by virtue of its derivative openness to difference, dialogically engages
the singularity of the Other from the standpoint of a “bad conscience,” a moral conscious act that
propels the I to examine its conscience by asking, “Did I deface the face of the Other?”
The dialogic relation is inseparable from responsibility. “Responsibility is involvement,
exposition, proximity” of the I for the Other. The infinite responsibility of the I to the singularity
of the Other is reflected in the obligation of the responsive ethical I “to the otherness
relationship, to dialogism. The I in itself is already in dialogue” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 121). This
primordial dialogic is always comprised, according to Levinas (1969), of the metaphor “ethics is
an optics” (p. 23). For Levinas, the optics proceed from an ethical responsibility that transcends
epistemic experience. Rather, it is an experience beyond epistemic vision “bereft of the synoptic
and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or intentionality of a wholly different
type” (p. 23). The optics are a phenomenological presence of the Other.
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From the standpoint of the dialogic and ethical responsibility, the responsive ethical I is
constituted as an implicature of infinity, not totality. Thus, dialogic responsibility finds its
articulation in an optics that invoke the vision of the face of the Other in terms of an infinite
command. The infinite command involves seeing the face of the Other as a visual infinity rather
than a visible totality. This sense of the infinite command as visual recognition of the singularity
of the Other is reflected in Levinas’s response to Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s The Little Prince’s
obsession with conventional, epistemic-ontologic perception of reality. The little prince claiming
knowledge of the image of a sheep, rejects several versions of the sheep he wants drawn for him.
Finally, he accepts a drawing of a box with holes in it, when he was told the sheep was in the
box, asleep. Levinas’s (1999) response to this quandary was,
I do not know how to draw the solution to insoluble problems. It is still sleeping
in the bottom of a box; but a box over which a person who have drawn close to
each other keep watch. I have no other than the idea of the idea that one should
have. The abstract drawing of the parallelogram—cradle of our hope. I have the
idea of a possibility in which the impossible may be sleeping. (p. 89)
Levinas’ response is, in fact, a reaction to the apocalyptic epistemic-ontology of the modernist
project: ontology’s dismissiveness of ethics. For Levinas, ethics is a possibility within which
visuality is sleeping. Visuality connotes infinity—the visual face of the Other is (far in) infinity.
The face of the Other is not according to the perceptions of mass totality since, according to
Levinas (1969), the face of the Other is a “vision without an image” (p. 23). In a similar vein,
attempts to reduce ethics to epistemic ontological perceptions of reality constitutes a
“phenomenological lie” because ethics is a “vision without an image.” In others words, Levinas
infinitizes ethics, making it prior to the totalizing effects of ontological judgment.
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Infinity like visuality can only be “experienced in the most radical sense since we can
never bring to it a structure of intentionality adequate to it. It is therefore a genuine relation with
what is other than ourselves. We cannot reintegrate its alterity into the same” (Wyschogrod,
1974, p. 92). Levinas’s ethics apropos of horizontal relationality visualizes the face of the Other
as an infinite alterity that transcends totality. Totality is about visibility, and it judges a book
prior to its content.
Dialogic responsibility is a question of visuality, an attentiveness to the
phenomenological presence of the Other that commands the I to assume a responsive vocation,
such as Albert Camus’s courage to confront absurdity, steeped in ethical calls. Attentiveness to
the phenomenological presence of the Other is a response to ethics as visuality becomes “the
listening eye” (Schroeder, 2005). The listening eye in Levinasian ethics is an ocular response to
the disclosures of singularities. It is an ocular response to the alterity of the Other which allows a
polyvisual attention. It originates in the infinite space of the Other. Polyvisual attention
commands an unconditional obligation, a responsibility that cannot be ignored. It is a vision that
is beyond ontological prescriptions and proscriptions. These constitute, to Levinas, a possessive
epistemic compulsion that makes claim of absolute knowledge of the alterity of the Other. The
responsive ethical I, according to Levinas, recognizes the alterity of the Other within an infinite
ethics of responsibility for the face of the Other. Levinas’s infinite ethics of responsibility is
attentive to—not possessive of—the demands of the face of Other.
Reflecting on the dialogic imports of Levinas’s view on ethical responsibility, Arnett
(2012a) argues that
The “I” is called to responsibility, particularly through thought on how to assist a
unique Other and how to take into account the neighbor, ever attentive to
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implications of a given action for an unseen neighbor. It is the neighbor that
decenters dialogue; one only grows in and through acts of responsibility for a
unique Other within a neighborhood composed of the unknown, the unseen, and
the unforgotten. (pp. 152-153)
Unlike Sartre’s ontological solidarity, Levinas’s dialogic responsibility emerges from what
Irving Greenberg (1981) calls “covenantal responsibility,” i.e., responding to the hidden
presence—the hidden sheep in the little prince’s box—of the infinite alterity of the Other.

Dialogue and Otherness
The issue of dialogue and otherness is a phenomenological-ethical relationship that
transgresses totality (see Levinas, 1969, p. 30), bringing the Same and the Other within the
proximity of each other—“distance in the proximity of the Other.” Proximity does not mean the
collapse of distance, rather it is an “absolute distance” between the Same and the Other. By way
of what I call enthymematic intersubjectivity, Levinas’s notion of proximity illustrates “moments
of meeting” (Cissna & Anderson, 2002), charged with the ethical exigency for responsibility for
the singularity of the Other. The ethical exigency points to “an ipso facto election … This
election signifies the most radical possible engagement” (Peperzak et al., 1996, p. 18).
Enthymematic intersubjectivity is a performatively engaged ethics that confirms the singularity
of the Other “in its ipseity” (p. 18). Central to Levinas’s notion of dialogic relationality is
enthymematic intersubjective. That is, the I is ipso facto obligated to the face of the Other. The
obligation to the face of the Other involves a recognition and/or acknowledgment of radical
alterity.
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It is perhaps, in this context, that Levinas speaks of transcendence as signification of
difference. Levinas (1998b) writes, “The distance or absolute alterity of transcendence signifies
by itself the difference and the relationship between the I and the You as interlocutors … This
absolute distance is refractory to the synthesis that the synoptic gaze of a third would like to
establish between two humans beings in dialogue” (p. 145). The absolute distance between the I
and the You denotes a phenomenological-enthymematic relationship where signification
signifies itself in the saying that interrogates the said. Interrogation is an essential component of
the ethical relationship for Levinas, especially “to his rethinking of subjectivity, to his demand
that we acknowledge the founding role of the Other … and to his insistence that” relationships
that sublimate “the alterity of the Other” are, in fact, violent interiorization of difference into
similarity (Chanter, 2001, p. 145). In contrast to the ontological interiorization of the singularity
of the Other—through “the subordination of the Saying to the Said” (Levinas, 1991, p. 7)—
Levinas posits an ethics of radical exteriority which prioritizes the Saying, and provide ethical
openings to listening.
The Saying’s corollary companion to engaging an ethics of openness with and from the
Said is tantamount to authenticating subjectivity. Bernard Lonergan, Jesuit theologian and a
philosopher in the phenomenological tradition, uses the metaphor authentic subjectivity to
connect the bias ground of the Other with self-transcendence to warn against dangers of
epistemic omniscience. Lonergan (2014) argues that postmodernity, an era of plurality of
subjectivities, summons an a priori command: “Authentic subjectivity, the subjectivity of the
person who is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible” (p. 339). Lonergan’s warning offers
insight into Levinas’s evolutionary phenomenological ethics of radical exteriority: an ethical
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opening to listening with the added emphasis, the Saying which invites the Said to open itself to
the difference of the Other as well as listen to the alterity of the Other.
Thus, the Saying is an ethical openness to the singularity of the Other or the otherness of
the Other. Unlike the Said, which is an “ontological closure,” the Saying is a dialogic openness
in the form of enthymematic listening; that is, listening to the difference between the I and You.
It is in listening to this difference that the I makes a “phenomenological movement” from
totalitarian ethics to an “ethics of responsibility for the Other,” connecting “one to the universal
charge for another, charged with the obligation to discern the particulars of response and
communicative engagement” (R. Arnett, 2012a, p. 140). For Levinas, the Saying is prior to the
Said because the former prioritizes attentive listening to the Other—listening, not in the Lockean
epistemic tradition, in the “listening for the Other” construct of Lipari (2004). With Levinas,
Arnett, and Lipari, this work contends that the Saying entails a proximate listening to the bias
ground of the Other.
Thus, Levinas’s phenomenological ethics emphasizes the proximate listening to the
Other. Lipari (2009b) proposes a call for listening otherwise as “a doorway to the ethical
response” (p. 45) to radical alterity. Listening is important for the relationship between dialogic
and otherness. Listening is dialogic because it intuits—visualizes, not visibilizes—the face within
the proximity of the Other. The Said creates the illusion that prejudice is grounded upon
ontological infallibility of common sense, the fallacy of the Enlightenment project. The Saying,
with its proclivity to listen to Other, assumes a derivative responsibility in the form of proximate
attentiveness Levinas would call “impersonal attentiveness” (R. Arnett, 2012a). Simone Weil
(1952) describes this attentiveness as “gymnastics of attention” (Eppert, 2004). For Levinas, the
gymnastics is a proximate listening that summons the derivative I to receive the uniqueness of
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the different Other. Listening is responding to the summons “of the Other, and to recognize the
other as other yet also in proximity” (Gehrke, 2010, p. 17). I might go as far as to say that
listening is a category of enthymematic intersubjectivity, receiving the incomprehensible Other,
including the bias of the Other and the trace of illeity, AS IS.
The relation between the Saying and the Said is enthymematic intersubjective echo:
“‘Here I am’ … a posture of openness—a readiness to listen to the other who is at once hidden
and about to be revealed” (Lipari, 2012, p. 238). A microcosm of “this posture of a listening
receptivity” (p. 238) is reflected in
Levinas’s focus was on an unseen neighbor who shapes us with a haunting call —
do not forget that you affect our neighborhood and your unseen neighbors; be
responsible for those not present. He answered the call to be the principal and
director of École Normal Israélite Orientale (ENIO), a school for Jewish students
in Paris, from 1946 to 1979. Levinas lived in an educational neighborhood and
each day reminded the young of their responsibility to attend to the neighbor, to
those not present. Levinas and the young found the reality of dialogue in a life
ever cognizant of responsibility “beyond dialogue.” (R. Arnett, 2012a)
In Beyond Dialogue, Arnett (2012a) explores the relationship between dialogue and alterity,
drawing on Levinas’ phenomenological ethics. Arnett situates Levinas’ “beyond dialogue”
within the embedded responsibility of the “I” toward the Other and “impersonal attentiveness
guiding both the engagement with a unique human face” (p. 152). Arnett explains Levinas’
impersonal attentiveness as engaging a responsive ethical “I” “that is played out in the particular
with thinking about a concrete person situated within a larger world” (p. 151). Impersonal
attentiveness gives rise to listening that is attentive to difference without imposing epistemic
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endoxa in a coherent public fashion, pointing toward what Richard Sennett (1974) calls tyranny
of intimacy (see Arnett et al., 2010). Christopher Poulos (2008) describes this as “dialogic
imagination”; it “opens up in the aimless, uncharted spaces of talk merging … of transcendent
meaning and connection emerging spontaneously from our co-presence” (p. 122). It is in this
imagination that we find in an opening for listening to Otherness.
For Levinas, the I is derivative, (Arnett, 2003), and its responsiveness to the Other
“manifests in what we might call ‘dialogic ethics’”(Lipari, 2012); it is an enthymematic
intersubjective relationship that involves an invite and a response within proximate distance. The
enthymematic intersubjective relationship opens the I to the invitational response of the Other.
Levinas considers this response a prior condition of the I. The invitational response moves the I
from the “nominative” to the “accusative” from the “willful agent” to the “responsive
derivative” (Arnett, 2003). The I responds to the accusations of the Other. Levinas articulates
this in his reference to the Brothers Karamazov: “We are all guilty for everything and everyone,
and I more than all the others” (2001, p. 133; see Lipari, 2012 and Ponzio, 2008). As Lipari said,
within every response is a latent “prior action,” listening. The responsive I ethically “bears
witness” to the summons of the Other, listening attentively to the singularity of the Other.
From the standpoint of dialogic and communication ethics, attentive listening is integral
of dialogue. A Ghanaian Ewe proverb alerts people to the importance dialogic relationship with
nature and others within the safe stance of attentive listening: The pig always keeps a listening
eye while wallowing in a mud hole. This proverb foregrounds the notion of dialogic sensitivity
and sensibility reflective of the polymodal metaphor of a listening eye/I. Levinas’s work
represents a paradigm shift, a watershed that the ethical I represents in marking responsibility as
attentive listening, and poses a dialogic challenge to epistemic constructs that colonize and
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totalize radical alterity in the name of “universal truths.” Karl Rahner, a Jesuit theologian, alerts
the Western Catholic of this danger, calling on the church to recognize “the essential
differences” of others with a “Pauline boldness” (1979, p. 274). Within the spirit of Levinas’s
ethics, Pauline boldness is “a listening that does not merely tolerate but openly embraces
difference, misunderstanding, and uncertainty, and invites entrance to a human communication
and consciousness beyond discursive thinking, to dwelling places of understanding that
language cannot, as yet, reach” (Lipari, 2010, p. 360). The metaphor of Pauline boldness permits
the courage to accept the invitation to acknowledge the singularity of the Other. It is an ethics of
otherness that might be called a listening eye/I. The listening eye/I situates connection between
dialogue and alterity within the phronetic enthymematic intersubjectivity: “I see the other; but I
am not the other” (Levinas, 1985, p. 58).
I want to sum this project by revisioning the Buber-Levinas encounter, not as a dialogic
impasse, but as an enthymematic intersubjectivity respectful of the alterity of the Other. The
encounter could be perceived polymodally as a Galileo proof that the earth is spherical, not flat.
In their journey around the world, Buber and Levinas head in an opposite—east/west—direction.
The two encounter each other midway in their journey around the earth, and with each holding
on to his ground of conviction, voyaged pass the each other only to come face-to-face whence
they started their journey. Holding on to one’s prejudicial ground does not foreclose on
attentiveness to the ground of the Other. The prejudicial grounds of alterity invite and command
listening to the “dialectical unity of contrasting extremes” (Arnett, 2005, p. 205) underscoring
responsibility for the Other.
Just as I was about wrapping up this chapter, a message popped up on my WhatsApp. It
was from a friend, sharing an inspirational quote with me:
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When the two ears are put side by side it forms the shape of the heart.
Interestingly, the word ‘ear’ sits right in the middle of the word ‘heart’ (h-ear-t).
The ear is the way to the heart. So, if you want someone’s heart, learn to listen to
him/her. If you want God’s heart, learn to listen to His Spirit in you.
Levinas’s project is not about wanting the heart of the other person in an erotic sense, but anting
in a phenomenological sense, wanting as an ethics of listening in and to the heart of the Other,
though radically different is beyond commensurability and comprehensibility.
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CHAPTER SEVEN—The Ground of Dialogue: Prejudice Otherwise than Closure
The history of prejudice problematizes epistemic and ontological impositions that are dismissive
of the “ground of conviction.” Caricatured as “prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies
tradition of its power” (Gadamer, 1975/1989, p. 273), the concept constitutes a volatile
mixture—episteme and doxa, which breed an apocalyptic violence against the ontologically
constituted other. In the context of this dissertation, prejudice is constituted as recasting
subjective universality, universal singularities and particularities, embodied and situated
suspicion, the ethical single individual, and the derivative “I” as non-conventional approaches to
understanding bias as a communicative necessity. Prejudice, thus outlined, is about opening
otherwise than closing that culminates in the inviscid flow of dialogic communication.
In emphasizing opening, prejudice, from the standpoint of this work, is reminiscent of epideictic
discourse—to bring aletheia out into the open (Jasinski, 2001). The aletheia here is a not an
ontological truth, but a phenomenological truth with an ethical underpinning. The former is
characterized by method and control that seek to destroy grounds of conviction through systemic
colonization of difference. The latter, on the other hand, activates “dialogue as a discursive
interaction that seeks understanding and involves asking questions, expressing opinions, making
assertions, passing judgment, and intuiting needs of others according to tacitly understood
practices of mutuality and reciprocity even in the face of opposition and contradiction” (Smith,
2008, pp. 161-161). In other words, prejudice is a fundamental opening that possibilitizes
difference as dialogic. Difference is an unavoidable condition of human plurality (Arendt, 1998).
The point here is not to posit some form of dialogic prejudice, but make the argument that
“philosophy’s forgetfulness” of prejudice is tantamount to what called Don Ambrose (2012)
scornfully called “utopian dogmatism.” Utopian dogmatism becomes “a blind dogmatism that
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can generate … oppression” (p. 105). For Taylor (1985), the culmination of blind dogmatism
was the “ethnocentric gaucherie” of modernity (p. 127). Taylor’s warning calls for a
“perspicuous terms of understanding,” that is, “getting in tune” with difference (p. 128). The
existential attunement to difference resonates with the “dialogic ethical competence” of Arnett,
Bell and Fritz (2010), which prioritizes learning from difference. Learning from difference is
grounded in attentiveness and works within the Levinasian ethical praxis: a listening eye/I, an
attentiveness to the biased ground of the Other. As Iris Marion Young (1997) reiterated, the first
principle of dialogic engagement is acknowledging difference; what make this possible is when
we “open” and “suspend” our “assumptions in order to listen” (p. 53). For Gadamer (1975/1989),
“Anyone who listens is fundamentally open. Without this kind of openness to one another there
is no human relationship. Belonging to together always means being able to listen to one
another” (p. 355). Listening is a learning opportunity. It offers dialogic opening for
enthymematic interaction with the bias ground of the other. Likewise, prejudice takes shape
within the negotiated space of “fundamental openness” to difference.
In Situating Dialogic Ethics, Arnett argues that “the tainted or biased ground is the
beginning of a dialogic ethic engaged in the meeting of the Other. The dialogic emphasis upon
tainted ground requires, in addition, a pragmatic admission of bias as a public warning, a form of
dialogic confession in an era of narrative and virtue contention” (2011b, p. 58). Arnett explains
the relevancy of prejudice in detail when asked about relationship dialogue and communication
ethics in his work. He says:
…in the emphasis on ground or narrative as a priori—dialogue begins before
people in conversation meet; we carry a ground-laden, a tory-laden, bias into the
discourse…Ground is the bias, or what Gadamer would call the fundamental
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prejudice, with which one enters the interpretive act of dialogue…The notion of
ground or narrative difference moves communication ethics to a non-humanistic
position. The issue is not that I am in dialogue with you; I am in dialogue with the
ground upon which you stand—which is the issue of embedded agents discourse.
(Pat Arneson, 2007, pp. 64-65)
The above quote is a move away from an originative, monologic discourse to a derivative,
dialogic discourse that invites one to encounter the ground of the Other. Communication ethics
and dialogue come together as one comes to grips with the inevitability of encountering and
learning from differing narrative grounds without falling prey to relativism (Pat Arneson, 2007,
p. 65).
We live in an era of marked difference, making prejudice a rhetorical necessity in every
dialogic encounter. Rhetorical lingos such as “Black lives Matter,” “Make America Great
Again,” “Brexit” and ongoing crisis in the Middle East, to mention a few, exemplify prejudice as
dialogic necessity that call for attentiveness to both univocality and multivocality. This
dissertation is concerned with the rhetorical operations that appear within and support the
struggle to oppose and reconstitute difference. Rather than deploying totalitarian tools that are
dismissive of difference, Camus, for example, called for standing one’s tainted ground
courageously. In one of his famous mottos, “I rebel, therefore, we resist” (1971, p. 28), Camus
sought such a (dialogic) courage to help him resist the absurdity of the French ideological
totalitarianism in Algeria. This work understands Camus’ resistance as the courage to accept and
engage prejudice. Prejudice is a “primordial first home”; “It is the provincial welcome” of
difference (Arnett, 2008a). Simone de Beauvoir (1948) alludes to the connection between
prejudice and dialogic ethics when she opined that individuality and the tainted ground are
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symbiotic. By the same token, the individual ground of conviction cannot be justified without
acknowledging the ground of the other:
If it is true that every project emanates from subjectivity, it is true also that this
subjectivity movement establishes by itself a surpassing of subjectivity. [Wo]man
can find a justification in his [her] own existence only in the existence of other
[wo]men … I concern others and they concern me … The me-other relationship is
so indissoluble … (p. 72)
This insight illustrates the contemporaneity of the biased ground and dialogic ethics, and
exploring this connection helps to explain the project’s communicative relevance and its central
claims about the inevitability of prejudice in dialogic ethics. As a dialogic concept, prejudice is
both a techne and a praxis that interrogate the totalitarian assumptions of progress and agency as
well as forms of communitarianism that “grant presumptive allegiance to traditional beliefs,
norms and practices” (Whedbee, 1998, p. 173). Dialogic ethics interrogate conformity, the
tyranny of precedent, and common sense, while acknowledging the tainted ground or narrative
difference.
Arendt’s notion of judgment based on Homeric impartiality, is an insightful remainder of the
necessity prejudice for dialogic ethics. Impartiality is attentive openness to the tainted ground or
narrative difference. According to Arendt (2006),
Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans,
and to praise the glory of Hector, the foes of the defeated man, no less than the
glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk. That had happened nowhere before; no
civilization, however splendid, had been able to look with equal upon friend and
foe, upon success and defeat—which since Homer have not been recognized as
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ultimate standards of [wo]men’s judgment, even though they are ultimates for the
destinies of [wo]men’s lives. Homeric impartiality … is the root of all so-called
objectivity—this curious passion, unknow outside Western civilization, for
intellectual integrity at any price. (p. 258)
Homeric impartiality is a precursor of the postmodern assumption that “dialogic learning as first
principle embraces diversity and difference … [and] the recognition that there is ‘one’
communication ethic” (Arnett et al., 2010, p. 112). The rhetorical rhythm of everydayness is a
Homeric impartial response to prejudice, not a Cartesian methodological computation of truth as
consistency. The impartial response is a dialectically engaged “enlarged mentality”; it allows
both the acknowledgment and engagement of differing viewpoints. Dialogic ethics assume
Arendt’s notion of enlarged mentality in human communication, inviting attentive openness to
prejudice, whether singular or plural.
Dialogic ethics refuse to stand above history and cast judgment from the standpoint of
methodological consistency. Rather dialogic ethics dialectically—not in the Hegelian sense—
engage different narratives with Homeric boldness. This work frames prejudice as a
phenomenological and existential ethical necessity, which propel the “the interpretive act of
dialogue” (Pat Arneson, 2007, p. 64). It sees the interpretive act of dialogue as Gadamer sees it
in philosophical hermeneutics and as Schrag sees it in “rhetorical intentionality.”
Thus, Gadamer writes:
That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start,
sensitive to … alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither “neutrality”
with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and
appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is
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to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness
and thus assert its own truth against one’s own meanings. (1975/1989, pp. 271272)
And Schrag:
The distinctive stamp of rhetorical intentionality is that it reaches out toward,
aims at, is directed to the other as hearer, reader, and audience. The intentionality
illustrates not the theoretical reflection of cognitive detachment but rather the
practical engagement of concrete involvement … The rhetor … calls for
deliberative action and reasoned judgment. Within this intentionality of
engagement, the ethical issue is unavoidably broached … Rhetoric as the
directedness of discourse to the other, soliciting a response, is destined to slide
into ethics. (1986, pp. 198-199; cited in Langsdorf, 2008, p. 246)
Thus, the interpretive act of dialogue is, fundamentally, enthymematic pluralism. It favors an
enthymematic intersubjective and horizontal relationality relationship that encapsulates the
centrality of the tainted ground in every dialogic encounter. The question of prejudice leads not
only to its history but provides an explanation of how the concept had been engaged in the
history of Western philosophy. Chapters two through six explored the different moments in
which there has been a dedicated reference to prejudice, however implicit: Aristotle’s
interpretation as it is applied to epistemic endoxai and enthymematic understanding; Paul’s
conception of universalism and evental truth, the irony of epistemological suspicion in William
Shakespeare’s comedies and plays; Soren Kierkegaard’s derivative individual and; Emmanuel
Levinas’s derivative “I.”
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These precursors illustrate the connection between prejudice and dialogic ethics.
Dialogue begins with the acknowledgment of the phenomenological reality of ground and its
inevitability in dialogic engagement. We live in an era of differing viewpoints. This is why
Lyotard called for replacing master narratives with petite narratives. His call is a response to the
postmodern demand: dialectic plurality. Lyotard’s call was, however, presaged in the history of
the concept of prejudice—the tainted ground—and its effect on human communication.

Prejudice: A Prophecy “Come of Age”
The etymology of prejudice leads to prejudgment not as character flaw that manifests
itself as pathological bias, but as the epistemological ground for judgment, especially individual
reasoning process. For Aristotle, the enthymeme, epistemic endoxa, techne, and phronesis were
specialized modes of rhetorical discourse that foreground human judgment. Epistemic endoxa
was seen as popular beliefs and expressions as well as a discursive substratum of judgment. The
discourse of epistemic endoxa was enthymematic understanding. Epistemic endoxa privileged
respect for culturally situated opinions or beliefs as well as the ability to acknowledge the truths
or viewpoints of the other. Epistemic endoxa had the potential for the construction of a more
rigorous system of knowledge. Within these modes of rhetorical discourse was the role of
subjective universality as a communicative practice tied to the notion of prejudice.
Contextual meaning of the Christ event is a central theme of Paul’s non-conventional sense of
universalism. For Paul, prejudice is driven by a rhetoric of universal singularity which takes into
account difference as the biased ground of otherness. Universal singularity addresses Paul’s
notion of universalism as problematized prejudice which bears witness to the Christ event as
rhetorical points that are determined to express meanings in the face of differences. Paul’s
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universal singularity portrays prejudice as a dialogically constituted ethics. Perhaps more than
any other, Shakespeare endeavored to explain suspicion as a dialogic implicature of prejudice.
Suspicion questions the primacy of agency, and articulates the ground of conviction, directing
attention to the existential ethical reality of situatedness.
Prejudice, for Kierkegaard, deconstructs modernity’s flawed understanding of
individuality. The individual is a totalitarian construction of social mores which Kierkegaard
called leveling. Kierkegaard questioned the modern obsessiveness with the notion of the mass
public, calling forth an existential turn to an ethical power to the single individual, a derivative
self. What drives the derivative self is subjective freedom. It is a freedom from modernity’s
social colonization of the self, making the self originative rather than derivative. The bias that
Kierkegaard brings to the history of prejudice is single ethical individual. Levinas expands the
notion of prejudice beyond Kierkegaard’s derivative self to a responsive “I” otherwise than
originative agency. Levinas suggests a face-to-face encounter that exemplifies prejudice’s
relationship with the ethical and dialogic as a phenomenological attentiveness to radical alterity.
Prejudice is the incomprehensible face of the Other in Levinas’s ethics.
The notion of prejudice advanced in this work brings to light the necessity of the ground
of conviction as a communicative praxis with transformative potentials. The concept’s potential
for dialogic transformation is evident Schrag’s engagement of Guattari’s notion of transversality
in terms of “in-between” which gives rise to enthymematic understanding (see Ramsey & Miller,
2003, p. 24). In this regard, Gadamer (1987) held that understanding involves the
The suspension of one’s prejudices, whether this involves another person through whom one
learns one’s own nature and limits, or an encounter with a work of art, or a text: always
something more is demanded than to understand the other, that is to seek and acknowledge the
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immanent coherence contained within the meaning claim of the other. (p. 87; cited in Roy and
Starosta, 2001, p. 8)
Understanding—opening up to prejudices—involves the “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer,
1975/1989). Understanding situated in prejudice entails the “dialectical questioning” (Arnett,
2007a, p. 67) of a status quo, deconstructing the modern totalitarian emphasis on progress. That
is, negotiating rather than imposing difference; acknowledging rather than dismissing
particularities; opening rather than closing. The Pentecost event in the Acts of the Apostles
drives home this point.
And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak with other tongues, as
the Spirit gave them utterance … everyone heard them speak in his own language. (Acts 2:4-7)
The dialogic implication of the Pentecost event is that difference is protean
The Pentecost event foreshadowed the postmodern preoccupation with the provincial
ground of conviction, on the one hand, and the invitation to bracket one’s prejudices so as to
recognize, acknowledge, or receive the different ground others. The disciples stood and
announced their ground of conviction, inviting the audience to open themselves to an inevitable
possibility, difference. The communicative implication of the Pentecost event is that dialogic
understanding entails prejudice otherwise than closure.
A definitive characteristic of dialogue is openness to difference. Openness involves
standing one grounds of bias and as well as listening to the invitation to difference. Dialogue is
an enthymematic understanding that requires the cocreation of meaning without losing one’s
prejudicial, biased, or narrative ground. Buber alludes to the necessity of the biased ground as “a
place that can be counted upon as we explore new terrain and make contact with others” (Arnett,
1992, p. 55). Buber sees the connection between prejudice and dialogue through what he calls
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unity of contraries, reminding us of how one’s fundamental ground invites the embeddedness of
difference. Thus, prejudice is fundamental to dialogue. Prejudice is primal in dialogic
understanding.
The necessity for prejudice in dialogic understanding moves communication from the
apocalyptic paradigm, which served the totalizing conditions of the Enlightenment and
modernity, to an eschatological paradigm. The eschatological paradigm nourishes the dialogic
implicature of prejudice. The dialogic implicature of prejudice features in Badiou’s reading of
Pauline universalism. Badiou’s Paul offers a non-conventional sense of universalism, a
reconfiguration of truth as universal singularity otherwise than universal generality. Universal
singularity, for Badiou, privileges prejudice as a fundamental ground of conviction. Badiou
suggests that prejudice is a truth procedure that interrogates monological impositions inimical to
dialogue. This project advocates that prejudice opens and transforms “blind rationality,” and
promotes ethical relations dialogically.
From a dialogic standpoint, prejudice is a truth event that connects a singularity to a
universal, a provincial to a cosmopolitan, a value context to an absolute ethic, a principle to a
story, and a petite narrative to a humanistic logic. Through these connections, prejudice
illuminate ethics as an infinity of disclosure. The dialogic consequence of ethics as a disclosure
involves an authentic response the ethical reality of difference. Levinas understands the ethical
reality of difference as an asymmetrical process of responsive-giving, an idea that Lipari (2009b)
describes as a form of “empathy,” “compassion,” and “understanding” that ruptures the force of
brazen homogeneity. Prejudice, in this case, is an invitation to “awareness,” “rhetorical
listening,” and “moral sensitivity” to the “unfamiliar” (see Lipari, 2009b; Tompkins, 2009). As
an invitation, prejudice deemphasizes modernity’s “habits of the heart,” individualism, calling
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forth a turn to enthymematic intersubjectivity. This call to enthymematic intersubjectivity
constitutes the postmodern emphasis on individuality that was foreshadowed by Tocqueville
(1969) in Democracy in America (see Arnett, 2007b).
As such, prejudice decenters the dogmatic confidence in monologic impositions that
point to the ontological connection between individualism and totalitarianism, and provides a
model for a communicative praxis that begins in the phenomenological, not ontological,
narrative ground of difference. Postmodernity proclivity for difference celebrates prejudice as a
phenomenological empowerment of individuality, and dethrones the ruling oligarchy of
individualism. Prejudice, thus, offers a disclosure, dialogic opportunities for engaging
relationships that rest on the desire for enthymematic intersubjectivity. Individuality and
enthymematic intersubjectivity go hand in hand. This is central to the Kierkegaardian notion of
dialogic irony, an existential-phenomenological ethics of individual responsibility which
Kierkegaard develops out of his reading and understanding of the Socratic elenchus. Unlike,
leveling, an ontological sterilization of difference and violent cooptation of individuality,
dialogic irony privileges a derivative “self” as an a priori human trait. Levinas further develops
the notion of the derivative self when he called for an ethics of responsibility toward radical
alterity. For Levinas, prejudice is prior “originative agency.” Prejudice is an a priori
communicative praxis that ethically invites an attentive listening to difference.

The Dialogic Implicature of Prejudice
The question of prejudice brings us to attentive listening. The process of prejudice is the
“implicate order” (Bohm, 1983) to listening (see Lipari, 2009b). Martin Luther King, Jr.’s I
Have a Dream speech illuminates the dialogic implicature of prejudice and its ethical necessity
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in human communication. King’s speech invites and implicates the I as a derivative creature
ethically responsive to the radically different other. The I Have a Dream speech unmasks the
ethical necessity for listening to difference in an a racially segregated America. In the process of
unmasking the ethical necessity for listening, King engages a dialogic implicature, that of
learning from monologic assumptions/impositions that dehumanize otherness: “One hundred
years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself an
exile in his own land. So we’ve come here to dramatize a shameful condition” (King, 1986, p.
217). The gathering, aimed at dramatizing humanity’s prejudice against the differing ground of
otherness constitutes a dialogic implicature: “listening to the historical situation, attentiveness to
emergent questions, and dialogic negotiation of emergent answers, providing an outline” for the
“dialogic ethical competence” (Arnett et al., 2010, p. 111). Listening as an ethical implicature
underscores the postmodern dialogic ethical demands, attentive learning as “moments of
meaning” (Cissna & Anderson, 2002) charged with “tensional ethical practice,” that is,
negotiating contending narratives without losing one’s own ground or colonizing the ground of
the other (Stewart & Zediker, 2000, p. 224).
The dialogic implicature of prejudice privileges ethos as a listening act over logos as a
“humanistic commitment to agency and control” (Arnett, 2007b, p. 122). The ethos of prejudice
and how it problematizes originative agency resonates with Weil’s (1952) “gymnastics of
attention” (Eppert, 2004, p. 46). Such gymnastics emanate from an attentiveness to the evental
experience, Badiou would argue. Thus, prejudice foments the communicative platform for a
listening which “reforms” rather than “deforms.” Reform requires dialogic engagement with the
unfamiliar. Charles Dickens makes reform primal in A Tale of Two Cities by rejecting the
ontological assumption of the Enlightenment project that difference/otherness constitutes
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communicative deformity. It is this “phenomenological lie” that precipitated the French
Revolution, and is typified in A Tale of Two Cities as a humanistic agency that Lyotard (1988)
would say “prohibits dialogue” (p. 111). Dickens articulates an existential-phenomenological
rejection of “blind rationality,” a defining characteristic of the Enlightenment project. The tainted
ground, in A Tale of Two Cities, drove an ethics of listening by interrogating master narratives or
non-negotiable goods that trump individuality in the name commonality. As such, prejudice is—
phenomenologically—an immanent response to an ethos, and fashions a dialogic critique of an
ongoing communicative problematic.
Prejudice’s dialogic implicature invites a listening act which interrupts a universal “stand
over” by engaging difference as an embedded necessity, ethically speaking. By so doing,
prejudice engages listening as a rhetorical watershed which rests within the postmodern quest for
disclosure. This project calls into question closures that protect and perpetuate monologic
manipulations, a form of rhetorical paternalism (Scott, 1991). The dialogic implicature of the
signs of the time is disclosure. Bonhoeffer’s “confessional” notion of dialogic of responsibility
provides an excellent explication of the pragmatic communicative relevance of disclosure within
the interpretive framework of the “penultimate.” Arnett (2005) suggests that Bonhoeffer
“addresses the ‘penultimate’ within a ‘world come of age,’ calling for honest engagement with a
historical moment of diversity and change” (p. 58). This work frames the penultimate from a
postmodern construct that we live in a world of difference, and that attentive listening to
difference through an acknowledgment of the ground of the other is a dialogic necessity.
Prejudice functions as the penultimate sign of the time by disclosing what would otherwise be
considered an “assumption of history” (Lacan, 1991). This project turns the table around, in the
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tradition of postmodernity, calling forth, not an assumption of history, but “a becomingimperceptible” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) which interrupts universal metalanguage.
The capacity to interrogate metalanguage positions prejudice as intrinsic to dialogue.
Embedded in the dialogic implicature of prejudice is the taken for assumption that enthymematic
understanding is a dialogic necessity in human communication. Dialogue is possible when
fundamental prejudice, the ground upon which one stands, is engaged enthymematically. The
following quotation from Kenneth Cissna and Rob Anderson (1994) illustrates the linkage
between fundamental prejudice and enthymematic understanding in dialogic conversation:
Dialogue results when participants refuse to assume that they already know the thoughts,
feelings, intentions, or best behaviors of the other. Although the dialogue partner maybe a
lifelong friend, one is willing to be surprised by the fundamental strangeness—the
unfamiliarity—of a position that is not one’s own. Each person knows that I am not you and that
you are not me. Partners in dialogue imaginatively infer realities and perspectives that are not
their own and communicate such interpretations tentatively. Perspectival flexibility—ideally
from both sides—characterizes dialogue (Cissna & Anderson, 1994, p. 14).
Dialogue involves the enthymematic engagement of fundamental prejudice, the tainted
ground of the other, inviting partners in a dialogic conversation “to reach out to the other in an
authentic fashion, willing to try to meet and follow the unpredictable consequences of”
discourse. Aristotle, by way of enthymematic understanding, Badiou’s Pauline universal
singularity, Shakespeare’s rhetorical turn to skepticism otherwise than suspicion, Kierkegaard’s
rejection of mass totality, and Levinas’s derivative ethics of responsibility remind us of the
dialogic necessity and implicature of prejudice. Dialogically, prejudice encourages “perspectival
flexibility.” This flexibility is grounded in epistemic endoxai conditions that underwrite plurality.
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In other words, prejudice is a rhetorical-phenomenological platform for a communicative praxis
that centers on discourse and action, and points to the significance of ethos in human life and
communication. Ethos points to the idea that prejudice is prior to epistemic agency. In a similar
vein, prejudice points to the idea that dialogue begins with the primordial acknowledgment of the
provincial ground of the other (see Arnett, 2008a).
The dialogic implicature of prejudice suggests both a phenomenological and an ethical
reality: the difference and the response before us. Postmodernity possibilizes prejudice as a
dialogic necessity through the communicative engagement of difference. This requires a dialogic
courage which possibilizes the communicative conditions of responsiveness. As Arneson (2014)
argued, responsiveness to radical alterity requires the courage to “acknowledge the plurality of
perspectives” (p. 91). Prejudice’s a priori ethical character had been subjected to excessive
ontological suspicion, dismissive of the concept’s inherent capability to both create and shape
rhetoric not as an epistemic persuasion, but as an activated listening act that exhibits the
communicative competent act of attentiveness to multiplicity and individuality. This work, from
a postmodernist perspective, deconstructs the ideological masochism of the
Enlightenment/modern project. Thus, this work fashions the concept of prejudice as a dialogic
opening for continuing the conversation on and about virtue contention within the postmodern
community of memory.
Taking the dialogic necessity of prejudice into account, I am inclined to assent to
Lyotard’s call to rewrite modernity. Such rewriting involves bearing witness to the differend. By
so doing, prejudice shatters and interrupts master narratives. Like “‘micrologies’ that accompany
metaphysics in its fall,” prejudice “inscribes the occurrence of the unthought that remains to be
thought in the decline of the ‘great’ philosophical thought” (Boeve, 2014, p. 47). Prejudice is a
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postmodern “sublime” which invites an anamnesis. The sublime attests to the Enlightenment’s
prejudice against prejudice, modernity’s ideological totalitarianism, and the tyranny of
individualism. In the simultaneity of the differend and the sublime, prejudice questions a status
quo with narratives that bear witness to humanity’s inhumanity toward humanity, and by so
doing, suggest a dialogic necessity that Arnett (2007a) calls “dialectical communicative labor.”
In the lexicon of Arnett, dialectical communicative labor suggests the necessity for
“communicative differentiation” or what Schrag calls “transversal awareness”—an
enthymematic understanding amidst differing viewpoints (see Arneson, 2014, p. 84).
Nelson Mandela’ s commitment to the “conciliation of difference” (Salazar, 2002) in
post-apartheid South Africa foregrounds Arnett’s dialectic communicative labor and Schrag’s
transversal awareness, while offering insight into the dialogic necessity of prejudice. As
Philippe-Joseph Salazar (2002), A South African scholar of Rhetoric, writes, Mandela called for
a new South Africa that brings “plurality to unity, while remaining respectful of the differences
that the nation-as-polity entails” (p. 23). Mandela made dialectical communicative labor and
transversal awareness a central component of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation by
reframing communicative engagement as an open-ended dialogue that obliterates relationships of
power and domination and subverts totalitarian ideologies in the name of an expanding circle of
“friendly enemies”—to use the metaphor of Chantal Mouffe (2000)—as a place that recognizes
and acknowledges “differentiation and difference” (Arnett, 2007a). The phenomenological
reality of prejudice is that it possibilizes “‘a unity of contraries’ where the ‘contradictoriness …
is transcended in the dialogic character of the lived experience” (Schilpp & Friedman, 1967, p.
246; cited in Vogel, 1996, p. 60). Said differently, fragmentation and contention are constitutive
of the dialogic implicature of prejudice.
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Prejudice’s rhetorical production marks dialogue as an ethics that enables dialectical
thinking according to tacitly understood communicative “praxis,” of “aiming at the ‘Good Life,”
as one might say in Ricoeurian terms (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 171). Paul Ricoeur, like Levinas,
prioritizes ethics, calling for an attentiveness of the “Self” to “Others” rather than the epistemic
dismissiveness of authoritarian prescriptivism. The latter, that is, authoritarian prescriptivism
prohibits and subsumes difference as the fundamental ground of dialogue. Prejudice serves as
counterpoint to dialogue as an ethical practice and ethics as a dialogic practice. Prejudice creates
and opens rhetorical avenues for listening to difference “in an authentic fashion, willing to try to
meet and follow the unpredictable consequences of” a communicative encounter (Arnett, 1992,
p. 11).
The willingness to listen to difference, meet and follow the unpredictable consequences
of a communicative encounter is grounded in a philosophy of “courage,” courage that engages
the invitation to respond to broader existential-ethical horizons of view of human communication
and relationships. Courage, according to Kierkegaard, is the capability to confront social
amalgamation, leveling. For Sartre (1953), courage is the authentic expression of human
freedom, and any ethics that stymies this existential and phenomenological freedom is a “bad
faith” act (p. 83) Engaging one’s prejudice and the tainted ground of others is a courage, an
ethical courage that articulates the “pragmatic conditions of authenticity” (Eicher-Catt, 2005, p.
113). The importance of this authenticity is that it provides a way to think about prejudice as a
priori commitment to dialogic difference, “opening up, and keeping open … possibilities”
(Gadamer, 1975/1989, p. 298) for interrupting a status quo. Thus, Levinas (1969) is justified in
questioning the tyranny of ontology and its methodology subsumption of ethics. Levinas referred
to ontology as “a philosophy of injustice” (p. 46) that undermined ethical relations and
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difference. Levinas writes, ontology subordinates “the relation with someone, who is an existent,
to be a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the
domination of existents, subordinates justice to freedom” (p. 45). Prejudice foregrounds dialogue
through an ethics of difference or ethical relations.
Dialogic of communication is situated in ethical relations, and it beckons a primordial
responsibility: the acknowledgement of difference. In Buber’s terms, this “‘unity of contraries’”
… which calls on us to appreciate the worth of our own patterns and beliefs and, at the same
time, to respect others and their ways of seeing and acting in the world…’” connects prejudice to
ethical relations (Baker-Ohler & Holba, 2009, p. 52). Unity of contraries is a responsive
acknowledgment of prejudice. This work point to the dialogic implicature of prejudice in
postmodernity, an era of ground contention, inviting participants in an ethical discourse to
attentively listen and learn from the “everydayness” of radical alterity. It is no accident that
Nelson Mandela’s encounter with the “deductivist monologues of one-way tyranny” (Christians,
1995, p. 67) that characterized apartheid South Africa precipitated his call for dialogic civility in
and for post-Apartheid South Africa. Mandela’s responsiveness to singularity, multiplicity,
plurality, and individuality is core to dialogue and civility. This responsiveness embraces
prejudice as a phronetic—phronesis—necessity in every dialogic encounter, spurring what John
Hicks (1989) called “soteriological ‘spaces’ within which” dialogic partners can find a discursive
opening (1989, p. 240), and listen out for the unknown, uncomfortable, and unexpected.
This emphasis on listening out is at the heart of Bonhoeffer’s “Christocentric first
principle … of listening and silence, countering the ongoing impulse to tell without genuine
engagement with Otherness … listening well underway before speaking begins … listening
before offering one’s voice … listening with the companion of humility” (Arnett, 2005, p. 51).
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Arnett points to the dual aspect of listening: standing one’s own ground, responding to the
postmodern historical reality, Otherness. (p. 52). Maurice Friedman (1988) would call this
attentive responsiveness, a Buberian wisdom: “to listen so faithfully and to respond so fully as to
make alive for others the truth that has been made one’s own” (p. xvi). Genuine dialogue
involves a faithful attention to one’s prejudice and the prejudice of the Other. This work frames
prejudice as a phenomenological-existential condition of ethical “embeddedness” and
“situatedness” of difference. One manifestation of prejudice is dialogic relationality; it points to
ethics as a relational responsiveness and openness to the concrete moment. With the above
conception of prejudice in mind, I now turn to the linkages between prejudice and dialogic
ethics, and by way of conclusion argue that prejudice is a dialogic necessity that problematizes
human existence as communicative encounters and/or engagement.

Conclusion: Prejudice and Dialogic Ethics
The label “dialogic ethics” appears frequently in communication scholarship. The
concept refers to “the extent to which dialogue and ethics are intertwined aspects of human
existence” (Lipari, 2012, p. 228). Drawing from Levinas’s derivative “I,” dialogic ethics is used
here to connote and ethics of responsiveness. This implies listening and learning from the
particularities that constitute Otherness. Prejudice invites reflection on the dialogic quality of
listening. Jean Gebser, a cultural philosopher of Eastern European origin, alludes to this listening
potential in the “dimensions of consciousness,” which Arneson (2007a) argued resonates with
Buber’s “‘between’ of dialogue” (p. 195). The “dimensions of consciousness” point to a Gelstalt
that link up enthymematically to co-create meaning in the postmodern community of memory.
“The ‘between’ is a mental-rational designation for an aspect of communication that allows us
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access to other dimensions of consciousness” (p. 204). A full discussion of Gebser’s dimensions
of consciousness and Buber’s “between,” and how the two concepts interanimate in a dialogic
setting are beyond the scope of this work (see Arneson, 2003; Pat Arneson, 2007a).
Prejudices activates the “between,” and the “between,” in turn, manifests itself in
dialogue as “expressive consciousness.” Thus construed, prejudice and dialogic ethics implicate
each other as “dimensions of consciousness,” and, as such, constitute the ground through which
human communication flourishes in the “between.” The “dimensions of consciousness” and the
“between” interanimate to constitute prejudice as an ethos prior to epistemology in human
communication. As an ethos, prejudice possibilizes dialogue as an openness and a becoming that
expresses the interplay between a conceptual account of a dialogic activity and a dialogic mode
of listening. This interplay, however, favors a tensional meeting of minds.
This work frames dialogue as tensional meeting of minds based on the necessity of
prejudice in dialogue as evidenced in its implicit references in the rhetoric of Aristotle and Saint
Paul, epistemology of Shakespeare, the existentialism of Kierkegaard, and the phenomenology of
Levinas. These philosophers of communication extend a meaning of prejudice that rests on
dialogue as understanding difference and/or radical alterity as the “‘dividing, disrupting, and
dissolving aspects’ that prepare the way for awakening consciousness’” (Gebser, 1985, p. 284;
cited in Arneson, 2003, p. 9). John Stewart and Karen Zediker (2000) described this awakening
as “letting the other happen to me while holding my own ground” (p. 232). Prejudice—one’s
own ground or the tainted ground—privileges awakening consciousness as an element of
dialogue, breaking away from the status quo, the conventional “common ground.” As Julia
Wood (2004) argued, the common ground stymies “genuine dialogue … because almost
inevitably the dominant culture defines what ground is common or legitimate” (p. xvii). In
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essence, conscious awakening invokes the tainted ground not as commonality, but as a “fusion of
horizons.” Gadamer details dialogic opening that appreciates alterity within the context of
“multiplicity of meaning” as a process of understanding (White, 1994, p. 92).
Multiplicity of meaning begins with the acknowledgment of divergent narratives as
communicative grounds that shape and nourish the “postmodern communicative home” of
“touchstone” (Arnett, 2007b, p. 115). Levinas (1991) understood the pragmatic necessity of
touchstone as an ethical reality of Otherness, requiring “the immediacy of the sensibility … the
for-the-other of one’s materiality … the immediacy or the proximity of the other … the
immediate opening up for the other …” (p. 74). Hence, immediacy entails a responsiveness that
honors prejudice as presence—HERE/HEAR I AM, and invites listening out for “something
other, always other, always inaccessible, and always still to come” (Levinas, 1987, p. 82). This
make listening an enthymematic first principle because it interrupts and interrogates the
ontological monopolism that characterized modernity’s proclivity for pretentious telling. Such a
listening act that interrupts and interrogates a status quo—a “confession” that prejudice is a
primordial narrative bias before us.
Rhetorical prejudice—in the sense it is advanced in this work—tied to dialogic ethics
provides originary insights into difference as a communicative first principle of ethics,
appreciating the tainted ground, radical alterity and differing narratives as reflections of
primordial openness in a dialogic conversation. Prejudice is not an ontological enquiry into
difference, but a phenomenological-existential opening to “ambivalent encounters” wherein
disagreements lead not to dismissiveness, but the willingness to engage the strange and
uncomfortable as “mature encounter with Otherness” (Levine, 1985, p. 141). As an otherwise
than closure, prejudice fosters and constitutes a burgeoning of alterity resolved to portraying an
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ethics of “relational dialectics” (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996) ever attentive to listening and
learning. Arnett and Arneson (2016) précised this thus: “radical differences begin, accompany,
and transform our communication with one another in a time of otherness and offer a pragmatic
reminder to learn from difference” (p. xii). This pragmatic reminder reveals the listening
dimension of dialogic ethics, and opens opportunities for “subverting” a status quo.
As Arendt suggested in the Promise of Politics,
the world comes into being only if there are perspectives; it exists as the order of worldly
things only if it viewed, now this way, at any given time … in other words, human beings in the
true sense of the term can only exist only where there is a world, and there can be a world in the
true sense of the term only where the plurality of the human race is more than a simple
multiplication of a single species. (pp. 175-176)
We live in an era of plurality of narratives and standpoints. Arendt’s depiction of the
“human condition”—referring to modernity’s disregard for ground, which she describes as a
“banality of evil”—exemplifies how rhetorical prejudice bears witness to the signs of the time,
and generates a dialogic competent ethics that enable service and productivity otherwise than
power and aggressivity. The former, responsive to individuality (see Tocqueville, 1969), points
to the phenomenological dangers of individualism, the communicative dark side and effects of
the Enlightenment project (Arnett, 2007b, pp. 117-119). The latter, unresponsive to individuality,
reified “dogmatic rationalism” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 10) as the rhetorical rhythm of sensus
communis.
This work connects the Enlightenment and modernity’s view of communicative
competence to epistemologically distinct variants of tyranny, all dismissive of the prejudicial
ground of otherness. Postmodernity deconstructed the enlightenment’s prejudice against
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prejudice, offering instead a phronetic confession that discloses the tainted ground as a
communicative necessity. The phronetic confession emerges from within the discerned
responsiveness to an enthymematic relationality that does not dictate, but summons and invites
the co-creation of meaning and understanding as “relational openness” (Arnett, 2005, p. 209).
This understanding of prejudice within the framework of phronetic confession is correlated to
Alan Badiou’s ethics of singularity—“the valorization of difference” (2001, p. xxx). In a certain
way, this is the postmodern ethics of narrative contention which constitutes difference as
“healthy ambiguity” (Stewart, 1998, p. 340) within a competent communicative act that positions
prejudice.
The history of the prejudice points to the (healthy) ambiguity before us—an ambiguity
that derives it efficacy in the inductive dialogic of plurality. This work, in dialogue with
Aristotle, Saint Paul, Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, and Levinas, opens communicative praxis,
competence, and encounter to “the inexhaustible play of” (Nancy, 2013, p. 13) prejudice. This
inexhaustible openness advocates the irreducible singularity and alterity of otherness, and
foregrounds the postmodern agenda: subverting the epistemic impulse to totalize and control
knowledge. Arnett (2011b) suggests how such a subversion assumes “a hermeneutic bias—there
is no one universal understanding of what constitutes communication ethics” (p. 45). Hence for
communication for ethics, prejudice is the “communicative content” of dialogue (p. 46).
Prejudice “shapes” dialogue by possibilitizing the fundamental ground of difference as “the
amalgam of discourse and action that informs and drives the economy of communicative praxis”
(Schrag, 1997, p. 42). This work points to a communicative praxis propelled by a narrative
ground of prejudice-shaped responsiveness to plurality, a dialogic necessity of the postmodern
era.
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This work acknowledges the inevitability of prejudice and the embedded summons to an
enlarged mentality. The inevitability of prejudice and the embedded summons of an enlarged
mentality are interwoven facets of dialogic ethics. Prejudice is contingent upon on an enlarged
mentality and an enlarged mentality is contingent upon prejudice, and the two come together in a
concatenation of difference that is dialogic. This work illustrates the relationality and
synchroneity of prejudice and enlarged mentality by positing an ethical responsiveness,
attentiveness, and the engagement of fundamental difference. This dialogic triumvirate of
responsiveness, attentiveness, and engagement resonates with Schrag’s “rhetorical turn,” which
Arnett (2011b) says involves the ethical acknowledgment of fundamental prejudice (p. 55).
This work offers hope in understanding how prejudice “gives meaning and a place to
stand” (p. 54) in every human relation, interaction, and communication. Furthermore, this work
constitutes an invitation to a dialogic opportunity to encounter radical alterity, existentially,
phenomenologically, and ethically; and by so doing, welcome the tainted ground of the radically
different other—a taken for granted ground—as an embedded, situated reality. The hope is that
this study will help frame a dialogic communication ethics within a history of the problematic
term, prejudice, with the objective of displaying the pragmatic reality that dialogic
communication ethic begins not in objectivity nor in the commonality itself, but rather in the
very ground of prejudice that shapes the conversation and its conventional patterns. This essay
unmasks the past assumption that prejudice can and should be always eradicated. Such thinking
falls prey to the modernist set of assumptions hostile to the existential reality—to paraphrase
Buber—that we walk in the modern-day light.
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